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In the field of health policy, the role of scientific knowledge is 
significant, and trends towards more involvement. The growing 
need for scientific knowledge points to the tension between the 
need for more evidence-based policy, and fear of a technocratic 
and uncritical role of science in policy-making. This paradox of 
scientific authority emphasises the importance of questions about 
the role of science in policy making: how do scientists and policy 
makers come to useful facts, how do they negotiate the processes 
involved in applying scientific knowledge in policy–making, and to 
what consequences for the shaping of Dutch health policy. This 
thesis investigates these questions inspired by the concepts 
boundary work and performativity. This book contributes to 
discussions on science and policy interactions. The book is not 
only relevant for researchers of the science policy boundary, but 
also for policy makers, politicians and others who have an interest  
in the role of science in policy.
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Introduction
The reactions of experts and politicians to the outburst of the Icelandic volcano 
Eyjafjallajökull in the spring of 2010 exposed the close ties between policy meas-
ures and scientific knowledge. The volcanic eruption and the resulting uncer-
tainty about the safety of flying through the ash cloud posed huge problems for 
(European) aviation. In a first reaction to expert opinions, the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (easa) closed the airspace above Europe for more than five days, as 
the volcanic ash drifted slowly over Europe. However, as the economic and social 
consequences of the closed airspace became increasingly apparent, the expert 
opinion of the easa was openly disputed both by aviation companies and politi-
cians from several member states. The klm, the Royal Dutch Airlines, concluded 
that “the airspace situation is different throughout Europe and local solutions are 
needed”1 after aircraft were sent out for ‘problem-free’ test flights. 
As political attention was directed to the economic and social consequences 
of the closed airspace, the problem eventually boiled down to the issue of how 
to come to workable solutions that satisfy both experts and policy makers; a 
solution that guaranteed the safety of flying while leaving enough ‘space’ neces-
sary for air traffic. The London-based Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (vaac) 
met these demands by coming up with six-hour predictions of the ash cloud in 
high, middle and low cloud. These local predictions provided a workable solu-
tion between safety and economic mobility and settled albeit temporarily the 
controversy between scientists, policymakers and air-carriers over the volcanic 
ash problem. The controversy not only laid bare a crisis of governance in the 
eu, as it took political leaders five to six days to come into action, but also made 
visible that workable solutions for such an economic, social and safety problem 
is found in a concertation of both science and policy. This concertation takes 
place in a complex and dynamic reality and is difficult to orchestrate. 
In times of crisis, such as in the case of the volcanic ash cloud, the role of sci-
ence in policy-making processes becomes more apparent than in ‘normal’, less 
controversial times. There is, however, hardly a policy area imaginable where 
science is not involved – even though that role, in general, stays hidden from 
the public at large. In the Netherlands, policy programmes such as the financial 
reform in the health care sector or those that support health promotion rely upon 
scientific knowledge. In less controversial times as well, on the smaller scale of 
policy programmes and single policy measures, policy makers do not act without 
1 klm ceo Peter Hartman at http://nos.nl/artikel/151324-klm-voert-testvlucht-uit.html; and, Van 
Nieuwstadt, Michiel. Ad Hoc Asnormen. In nrc Handelsblad 29 mei 2010: 13.
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the involvement of scientists. Scientific input is needed to answer policy questions 
such as: How can we keep citizens healthy and safe, how can we safeguard afford-
able health care among ageing Dutch citizens, and how can we maintain good 
quality of health care while increasing the efficiency of health care practices? 
The growing need for scientific knowledge brings along tension between the 
need for more evidence-based policy, and the fear of a technocratic and uncritical 
or uncontrollable role of science in policy-making. This paradox of scientific 
authority, as Bijker, Bal and Hendriks (2009) put it beautifully – needing knowl-
edge for policy-making processes versus a critical attitude towards using science 
in policy-making – emphasises the importance of questioning the role of science 
in policy-making: How can we understand this role? What are the consequences 
of close interaction between science and policy? And, if we want to improve the 
effectiveness of scientific evidence in policy, how can we achieve this? This thesis 
addresses these questions, taking health care and economic thinking on health 
care as its focus of investigation. 
Science in policy-making 
From criticism of technocracy to evidence-based policy
Science in policy-making is embodied in many shapes and forms, from the 
individual expert who provides short-term expertise to big science advisory 
institutions that deliver assessments and reports on a regular basis. Science 
advisory institutions are but one means of offering scientific input to policy-
making. In the Netherlands many institutes provide input in the form of expert 
opinions, reports and models, and occupy various positions in the policy field. 
Some offer science advice on demand, while others voluntarily (without being 
asked) contribute their advice to government. Science advisory bodies in their 
turn use different forms of scientific knowledge to come to their advice. For 
example, many disciplines are involved in the health care sector, including 
medicine, epidemiology, sociology, economics, as well as policy science.2 Many 
of these advisory institutes integrate and assess existing scientific findings from 
2 Well known examples of science advisory bodies in the health care sector are the National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (rivm), the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research (nivel), 
the Council for Public Health and Health Care (rvz), the Scientific Council for Government Policy (wrr), the 
Social and Cultural Planning Agency (scp), the Health Council (gr). The Netherlands Institute for Economic 
Policy Analysis (cpb), as well as universities,  also provide input about health care. 
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other places. They can be characterised as boundary organisations wherein the 
scientific and the political meet in one way or another, and where translation of 
the scientific and the political takes place. 
Many institutes have a longstanding relation with their affiliated policy fields 
and a long history of providing science advice on policy issues. The science advisory 
field saw a huge rise after World War ii, in an era where science was looked upon 
as the rational solution to political problems, building on “the Enlightenment 
idea of rationality of scientific knowledge as the way towards the solution of 
all social and personal problems” (Hoppe, 2002:7). Peter Weingart (1999:275) 
described the involvement of science advisory institutions in policy-making as “a 
dialectical process of the scientification of politics or policy and the politicisa-
tion of science”. In short, in the technocratic approach, the problem with science 
advice is presented as a struggle between two rationales, the scientific rationale 
of the objective and the political or policy rationale of the normative. They should 
be kept separate or at least traceable in discussions between science advisors and 
politicians or policy makers.
The longstanding involvement of science advisory bodies in policy-making 
has led to criticism of the role of science as a technocratic power, in that science 
has (far too) much influence and power over formal democratic decision-makers 
(Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hilgartner, 2000). Bader and Van den Berg (1993) 
have, for example, criticised the technocratic role of Dutch science advisory 
institutes for constituting a democratic deficit. This deficit originates from the 
presentation of scientific findings as a ‘black box’ that leaves implicit theoretical 
and normative presumptions, as well as the empirical uncertainties in research 
findings and prognoses. It has been suggested that science for policy should be 
more explicit and open about the assumptions and limitations of research. Others 
such as Halffman (2003) and Maasen and Weingart (2005) have also argued for a 
democratic approach in regulatory science for policy. 
This criticism of the technocratic role of science in policy-making and the call 
for a more democratic approach is a consequence of both a rationalist take on 
the involvement of science in policy-making (Weingart, 1999) and the complex 
technical nature of contemporary policies (Jasanoff, 1990). For Jasanoff (1990), 
the technocratic reproach results from the sheltered position of science advisory 
bodies in the policy-making landscape, and hence the unfamiliarity with the role 
of such science advisory bodies. Indeed many science advisory bodies operate 
cautiously and with discretion in their field, and are anxious about attracting 
unwanted attention to their way of working and their recommendations. As 
Jasanoff argues, “given the prominent role in policy-making, the activities of 
scientific advisors are poorly documented and their impact on policy decisions 
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is difficult to understand or evaluate” (1990:1). The problem is thus not whether 
these institutes contribute to a politics of technocracy or to a politicisation of 
science. The key issue is that the role these science advisory bodies play as trans-
lators of science for policy-making is relatively unknown and therefore hard to 
understand. Recent work on science and policy-making has taken up this call for 
further investigation of the role of science advisory bodies.3 This thesis is part 
of this work. 
Towards evidence-based policy 
The debate on the role of science in policy was given a new dimension recently 
in the public health field, which has expressed a wish for greater involvement 
of scientific knowledge in policy-making. Delays and a lack of (or too much) 
government action on international and national incidents regarding citizen’s 
health, such as the bse epidemic in (uk) cattle, the threat of a pandemic outbreak 
of the swine flu in the autumn of 2009 and the Q fever outbreak4 in the south 
of the Netherlands, have led to criticism of the neglect or misuse of scientific 
evidence in policy in order (not) to take action.5 Structural problems in public 
health, such as the obesity trend in children and high incidence of alcohol abuse 
in the baby boom generation,6 also demand more knowledge of what can work 
to solve these issues. 
Moreover, as evidenced-based medicine has become the gold standard for 
public health in many industrialised countries, the call for evidence-based health 
policy has been picked up by many public health scholars and is brought back to 
the policy makers, in line with the new public management standards for more 
accountability in government policy: 
3 Dutch examples are the work of Bijker, Bal and Hendriks on the Dutch Health Council, well presented in 
their book The Paradox of Scientific Authority (2009), the work of Annick De Vries (2008) on how uncertainty 
is dealt with in the work of the cpb, the work of Esther Turnhout, and the other projects that were part of 
the Rethinking project. These exceptions seem to confirm the rule that there are still not many empirical 
descriptions or analysis of the workings of science advisory bodies
4 Another example is the hpv vaccination programme introduced in 2009. The government and rivm 
were criticised for being too forward with a vaccination programme that had been tested for only six years. 
5 This also incorporates the critical blasting of individual scientists by journalists, as for example hap-
pened in an interview with virologist Ab Osterhaus in an interview in Vrij Nederland on June 2010 (Martijn, 
M., and Vanheste, T. 2010. “Ik geloof heilig in wat ik doe”. Vrij Nederland June 19th). 
6 In Volkskrant, September 10th 2010. Meer alcoholproblemen onder babyboomers. 
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If doctors are expected to base their decisions on the findings of research surely 
politicians should do the same, (...) the case for evidence-based policymaking is difficult 
to refute (Ham, Hunter and Robinson, 1995)
The general lack of evidence-based intervention is shown by many public 
health professionals at many levels in the public health field. It ranges from a 
need for proven local interventions at the individual level for Municipal Health 
Services (ggd’en) and local government to evidence about the effects of nation-
wide programmes focused on health promotion at the collective level (Black, 
2007; Lomas, 2003; Puska, 2007; who, 2009). 
In the public health field this call for evidence-informed or evidence-based 
policy (ebp) has brought up the question of how to increase the use of existing 
evidence in health policy-making. The use and uptake of evidence in health 
policy-making is, however, not easy, and critical supporters of ebp agree that 
research has as yet had little direct influence on health services and governance 
policies (Black, 2001; Hunter, 2003; Lomas et al, 2003; Reijmerink and Hulshof, 
1997). In 2008, for example, the Dutch Health Council concluded, in an advice to 
the government, that there is enough health services research but that improve-
ment and sustainability of the use of results is needed.7 But also international 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation call for a better evidence 
base in policy (who, 2009). 
Bridging the gap 
Scholars in the public health field have sought input from concepts developed 
in knowledge utilisation studies (ku). ku scholars investigate science-policy 
interactions as a form of science advice to politics (e.g. Gibbons, 1994; Lindblom 
and Cohen 1979; Weiss, 1991) and have accordingly focused on the question 
how this relationship should be organised and why. Problems encountered on 
the research policy interface are often interpreted as a lack of understanding 
between the social worlds involved and as a lack of infrastructural support 
to get research findings to the policy-maker’s desk (e.g. Hutchinson and 
Estabrooks, 2009; Lomas, 2003; Smee, 2006; Straus, Tetroe and Graham, 2009). 
Consequently, much effort is put into developing strategies to bring research and 
7 See: Health Council. 2008. Http://Www.Gezondheidsraad.Nl/Nl/Adviezen/Gezond-Zorgonderzoek-De-
Toekomst-Van-Het-Gezondheidszorgonderzoek-Nederland; and Raad voor de Gezondheidszorg (Health 
Council). Gezond Zorgonderzoek. De Toekomst Van Het Gezondheidszorgonderzoek in Nederland. Den 
Haag: Gezondheidsraad. 
Science in policy-making 13
policy together and bridge the gap between science and policy. New frameworks 
have been developed for infrastructural support for science-policy interaction, to 
support changes in attitudes of both researchers and policy makers, and in the 
conduct of more research (Bekker et al, 2010; Hunter, 2009; Nutley et al., 2010). 
The Lomas framework8 for linkage and exchange of research evidence (Lomas, 
2000; Lomas et al, 2003) is an often used source of inspiration for other scholars, 
as it provides an elaborate and detailed model to enhance the translation of 
research findings into politics.
Maria Jansen (2007) has pointed to the under-theorised character of the public 
health field in thinking about science-policy relations. Indeed, many ku concepts 
used in the public health field do not question the standard model of science 
production. This standard model makes a Popperian distinction between the 
context of discovery – the realm which produces scientific knowledge – and the 
context of justification – the realm which proves the usefulness and impact of 
scientific evidence in relation to political or societal problems (Boon and De Vries, 
1989; De Vries, 1995). In this tradition, science and policy are separate realms 
with divergent objectives that should be kept apart. ku scholars argue that policy 
should be given a more influential role in the context of justification; that is, in 
the realm where science enters the ‘real’ world and is judged on its merits in rela-
tion to policy problems. Yet, policy makers are kept from the context of discovery, 
where scientific knowledge is produced. Consequently, such understanding of 
science-policy interactions, while focusing on their mutual interdependence, 
reifies instead of overcoming the boundaries between them. The public health 
field has arrived at the point where such conceptualisation of the science-policy 
boundary has become insufficient, as scholars such as Hunter (2009), Horstman 
(2010), Lin and Gibson (2003), and Nutley et al. (2010) have argued. Likewise, there 
is a need for new understanding of the policy process and the role of research, as 
well as new conceptualisation of the science-policy relation. 
8 The aim of the Lomas framework for linkage and exchange is to closely connect science and policy in 
an early stage of research and bring together three domains involved in the production of useful evidence; 
institutional and formal structures for decision making, informal structures of stakeholders and coalitions, 
and information production structures including interaction between research and media. It does so with 
the help of a checklist of questions that raise awareness among policy makers, stakeholders and scientists 
in order to bring the relevant parties together and keep them together through all stages of research (Lomas, 
2000; Lomas et al, 2003). 
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Science and policy interactions as boundary work
In policy science (ps) and science, technology and society (sts) studies, 
recent work on the relationship between science and policy-making offers new 
insights into science-policy relations. Recent work focuses on the boundary work 
performed in interactions between science and policy makers (see for instance Bijker, 
Bal and Hendriks, 2009; Halffman, 2003; Hoppe, 2010; Huitema, and Turnhout, 
2009; Jasanoff, 1990, and 2005; and others). Both ps and sts scholars have gradually 
moved from classifying science and policy relations towards analysing science and 
policy practices as forms of boundary work. This interpretation of science-policy 
relations enables researchers to move away from earlier more rigid conceptions of 
science and politics as two essentially different fields of human endeavour.
sts studies have long focused on science and how science comes about: that 
is, it concentrated on such questions as how scientific facts are created, how sci-
entific knowledge becomes authoritative and how scientists distinguish science 
from non-science, that is, perform ‘boundary work’. Such studies have brought 
the insight that the production of scientific knowledge is a human endeavour, that 
it takes place within a certain debate or discourse (or a repertoire or regime) and 
that science therefore creates its own truths and untruths, instead of simply repre-
senting an ‘objective’ and ‘natural’ state of things (Collins, 1985; Foucault, 1980; 
Latour 1987; Woolgar, 1988). Science is itself a culture that can be studied (Law, 
1986). These studies go a step further in showing how science is intertwined with 
society and how they are often co-produced: knowledge and the societal contexts 
in which it is produced cannot be seen as separate entities but are intertwined at 
many levels. Such studies provide space for the social, cultural and political impli-
cations of science and policy interactions. 
These insights are embodied in the notion of boundary work, which relates to 
the cultural construction of what science is and what it is not. As the American 
sociologist Gieryn neatly points out, the quest for the answer to what is science has 
moved gradually from “essentialist studies of demarcation” (what is science, and 
what not), “to constructivist studies of boundary work” (how science is defined in 
action by attributing characteristics that segregate it from non-science) (Gieryn 
1995: 407). Constructivist studies of boundary work seek “explanations for things 
at the top of that discipline’s agenda: uneven distribution of authority, power, 
control, and material sources” (Gieryn 1995: 441). The way scientists mark their 
scientific paths gives insight into how scientific discourses are constructed, and 
how science gains its authority. 
Gieryn’s discursive approach has been extended by others who show that 
boundaries are constructed through discursive, material and social arrangements 
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(Bal 1999; Bijker, Bal, and Hendriks, 2009; Halffman, 2003; Hoppe, 2010). In 
Halffman’s definition, based on work by Shapin and Schaffer (1985), boundary 
work “structures the division of labour between experts and policy makers” (2003: 
417). It does this by demarcation: that is, protecting science from unwanted par-
ticipants and interference with the help of prescriptions for proper behaviour by 
participants and non-participants; and by coordination: that is, defining proper 
interaction between these practices to make such interaction possible and con-
ceivable. Halffman locates such practices of boundary work in both language 
(discourse) and matter: it can be found in texts (like protocols or specific formula-
tions of tasks), objects (models or machinery) and in people (experts) (2003:58). 
Scientific facts are the result of both science-policy interactions and of social and 
material elements involved in this interaction. Yet, Halffman (2003) emphasises 
that sts studies tend to focus on the science side of the interactions, under ana-
lysing what happens the interactions with policy makers.9
The notion of boundary work is extended by ps scholars whose studies show 
science and policy interactions create bridges between different epistemic cul-
tures in the form of ‘interlocking networks of knowledge and power’ or ‘discourse 
coalitions’ and in which the interdependencies between many parties play an 
important role, as well as the role of culture (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Hoppe, 
2010; Wittrock, 1990). The focus lies in solving questions on how to legitimise 
decision-making democratically, under conditions of uncertain knowledge, and 
within changing political systems (e.g. Fischer, Miller and Sidney, 2007; Hajer 
and Wagenaar, 2003; Jasanoff, 2005; Stone et al, 1998; Stone, 2007), such as in the 
formulation of social problems, the (public) perception of policy problems, and 
the (scientific) instruments used to tackle those problems (Maasen and Weingart, 
2005; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). 
In the study of science and policy relations attention has thus shifted from 
classifying science-policy relations to empirically describing and explaining what 
happens in science and policy interactions, how these interactions are organised 
and what consequences they have on the way the world is perceived, by scientists, 
policy makers and others. This thesis parts from this take on investigating 
science and policy relations.
 
9 Halffman (2003) argues that sts scholars either under analyse the boundary work that takes place, or 
portray these negotiations as trivial, and overall miss out on the role of political theory in conceptualising 
the interaction between science and policy. This last point, however important, does not belong to the scope 
of my research. 
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Studying models as material locations of science and policy 
interactions 
One place to study practices of science and policy interaction is in the construc-
tion of models. Models play an increasingly important role as scientific tools for 
policy-making, in scientific advice and in the constitution of policy facts (see e.g. 
Edwards, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990; Morrison and Den Butter; 2003; Yearley, et al, 2003; 
Zeiss, 2004).10 Studies on the use of models – such as in sts studies and in the 
philosophy of science–  show how models are both the result of scientific and 
professional interaction (van Daalen, Dresen, and Janssen, 2002; Edwards, 1999; 
Evans, 2000; Morgan and Morrison, 1999; Shackley & Wynne, 1995). That is why 
models occupy not only a unique place in the study of many scientific phenomena 
(Morgan and Morrison, 1999), but also offer unique places to study the interaction 
between science and policy.
The focus of much sts and philosophy of science research on models is on 
climate models. This research illustrates how climate policy and climate research 
are co-produced through the use of models, and how this makes drawing the 
distinction between the ‘science’ and the ‘policy’ difficult. Paul Edwards (1999) 
argues, for example, on the basis of his study of General Circulation models11 
that the conceptual distinction between models and data is misleading and hence 
requires another conception of the nature of scientific work. The same is argues 
by Morgan and Morrison (1999) and Sismondo and Gissis (1999). Others have 
stressed how models encourage negotiations between model makers and policy 
makers, for example on uncertainty (Shackley and Wynne, 1995), as a democratic 
tool amongst various groups people (Yearley 1999), in interdisciplinary projects 
(Galison, 1999), and in macro economic policy (Evans, 2000). Critical comments 
argue that the increased use of sophisticated scientific models affects the authority 
of science, and tends to exclude scientific practices that do not build upon sophis-
ticated models (e.g. Shackley and Wynne, 1995; Yearley, et al, 2003; Zeiss, 2004). 
Models bring together political worlds and scientific worlds, and offer good 
places for boundary work between science and policy. In bringing together social 
worlds, a new kind of scientific knowledge is created, scientific facts that are 
‘packaged for policy processes’ (e.g. Edwards, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990; Zeiss, 2004). 
In this, models are seen not just as passive instruments, that “have to be put to 
10 Most of the literature concentrates on models that aid policy-making; in Jasanoff’s (1990) terms the 
literature concentrates on models in ‘regulatory science’. However, there are also models that aid compli-
ance with policy; Ragna Zeiss calls this ‘regulated science’ in her PhD dissertation (Zeiss, 2004). 
11 General Circulation Models are key components of global climate models that serve as input for global 
climate policy (Edwards, 1999).
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work, used or manipulated” (Morgan and Morrison, 1999: 32)12 by both scientists 
and policy makers in order to gain effect but as active constituents of the social 
worlds in which they function. sts scholars emphasised the role of materiality 
in constituting scientific facts (Collins, 1985; Foucault, 1980; Halffman, 2003; 
Latour 1987; Latour 1993; Woolgar, 1988), as in contemporary society scientists 
build upon already existing networks, theories, and software. Models thus have a 
materiality that determines and limits the choices and actions and the knowledge 
that is produced through these models. 
Performativity of economic thinking
In recent years the attention of sts studies has shifted towards economic 
thinking and how we can understand the role of economic science in society. This 
shift follows the rise of neo classical economic policy in governance strategies 
in many eu countries, for example, the introduction of a market-based policy 
programme in Dutch health care in 2006. This shift in economic thinking in 
health care has tempted many Dutch scholars to critically investigate the origins 
of market-based policies and its consequences for health care and health policy 
(Helderman et al, 2005; Trappenburg, 2005; Grit, and Dolfsma, 2002). 
Social studies of economic markets have captured science not only as a mode 
of investigation and classification of social phenomena, but also as an actor that 
actively brings these phenomena to life, through this investigation and classifica-
tion. Understood this way, scientific knowledge is an ‘actor’ able to bring things 
into, or out of, action by its own being, an idea referred to as the ‘performativity’ 
of science. These studies recognise performativity of scientific knowledge in, for 
example, economic models, and in their role in creating markets. Such ‘material 
embeddedness’ of economic science in societal institutions – such as macro-
economic models – provides essential elements in constituting new ways of eco-
nomic thinking (Barry and Slater, 2002; Callon, 1998; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; 
Zuiderent-Jerak, 2009). In this perspective economic ‘laws’ are not naturally given 
events that can be studied and described by economists in an economic theory but 
are instead actively constructed by economists and economic science. 
The historical account by MacKenzie (2007) is a good example of the role of the 
Nobel-prize winning Black-Scholes-Merton (bsm) model in the transformation of 
the derivatives market at the Chicago Board Options Exchange in the 1970s and 
12 Sismondo (1999) also argues that models and simulations can be regarded as tools and representations 
(as objects and ideas) and that they cross otherwise well-established boundaries as between theory and 
experiment. 
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1980s. Up until the 1970s, options prices13 were generated by immensely complex 
mathematics that proved little better in predicting prices than calculations based 
on rules of thumb. Although other models were developed to capture this complex 
mathematics, the bsm model became the leader, not only because it overcame 
some of the complexities of earlier option theories used to generate the option 
prices, it also made it attractive to programme computers with this model to pro-
duce these prices and deliver more accurate price lists. On the computer the model 
worked faster too. This case illustrates how economic theory provides the tools to 
institute elements for particular markets, by building upon already existing social 
and material relations. The bsm model is performative because it transforms the 
actions on the exchange market floor into the parameters of the model. 
In this example economic science is an important constitutor of an exchange 
market. Not only is the model performative in the actions on the exchange market 
floor: what it changes becomes embedded in institutions and economic theory 
(Callon, 1998). Hence the representation of reality is also changed. The notion 
of performativity of science captures economic theory as a kind of independent 
materiality that enacts specific notions of a market by its own account. Not merely 
the interactions between economists, the state and other agencies – mobilisers 
of human actions – are also important in shaping the economy. The mobilisation 
of economic theory and the kind of mobilisation are important too. This new 
take on the role of economic science offers a framework for looking closer at the 
social, political and cultural implications of the involvement of economic science 
in policy-making, for example in the introduction of the new market-based policy 
programme in Dutch health care. 
Research thesis
The general focus of this thesis lies in investigating practices of science and 
policy interactions as forms of boundary work with a focus on economic thinking 
in health care. From this, the following research questions emerged: 
How are practices of science and policy interactions organised? 
What are the social, cultural and political consequences of this organisation? 
And what is the role of materiality in these interactions? 
13 These are called Black-Scholes prices (Mackenzie, 2007).
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These questions form the main focus of this thesis. During the case studies 
these questions have been specified to investigate and better understand what 
happens in the specific practices of science policy interactions investigated in this 
thesis, and are addressed in separate chapters. In chapter two and three I inves-
tigate questions about the organisation of science policy interaction processes in 
relation to the science advisory bodies introduced in the case studies: 
— How can we understand the way science advisory organisations mediate in the health 
field? And how can these differences and similarities between these institutes be 
understood as practices of boundary work?
— What practices of boundary work characterise the modeling practices of the scientists 
and policy makers involved in the construction of the care model for the Dutch health 
care sector? And to what consequences? 
Chapter four investigates the construction of policy messages for public health 
policy from a theatrical perspective on science and policy relations and focuses in 
the following question:
— How is the relation between science and policy organised in order to come to useful 
information for public health policy? And how can this relation to be understood as 
a re-conceptualisation of science policy interactions as an interactive and reflexive 
practice?
Chapters five and six investigate the concepts of performativity and materiality in 
relation to science and policy interactions, and start from the following questions:
— What is the performative nature of computer models as boundary objects? And how do 
these models shape and change the social worlds they coordinate?
— How do material manifestations of science-policy interactions – such as policy tools or 
models – come about as a result of science policy interactions concerning Dutch health 
care? How do such material devices shape and configure policy change? 
The case studies
The chapters of this thesis deal with different issues of science and policy inter-
action. Each chapter discusses the specific issues that derived inductively from 
four empirical cases and addresses the questions posed above. The first study 
captures the construction of an econometric model for the health care sector 
(ramingsmodel gezondheidszorg, further: care model) developed by a multi-
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disciplinary team of science advisors from three leading Dutch science advisory 
institutes. The second study focused on the construction of Public Health Status 
and Forecasting (Volksgezondheid Toekomst Verkenning, further vtv) reports 
developed by the Centre for Public Health Status and Forecasting (cvtv), located 
at the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (rivm). The third 
study closely examined the role of health economics, as a separate discipline, 
in developing health measures, specifically the role and structure of the Dutch 
risk adjustment fund for the health care sector. The fourth study investigates 
the construction of the larch model, which was developed in the early 1990’s 
at the department of Quality Landscape Ecology at the State Institute for Nature 
Management (rin). This study was carried out and analysed by Ragna Zeiss. The 
cases studies are examples of ‘normal’ science and policy interaction. Although 
the people involved in these cases did run into quarrels and disputes, the cases 
were not controversial as such or hot topics of political debate. As examples 
of ‘normal’ science and policy interaction, they offered the opportunity to investi-
gate ‘normal’ interactions to gain insight into daily science-policy practices.
For each case study a reconstruction was made of the development of the mod-
els.14 Given that a large part of these practices took place a number of years ago 
we used in depth semi-structured interviews and complemented this with a docu-
ment analysis. The case study of the care model, covering the period 1994-1999, 
included 23 semi-structured interviews with key actors, and a document analysis. 
The vtv case study, covering the period 1995-2006, included 30 open interviews 
with key actors in public health, and archive research. For study of the risk adjust-
ment model that covered the periods 1995 and 2005, seven extra interviews were 
held. The larch case study, carried out by Ragna Zeiss, covered the period 1990-
2006, and involved interviews held with 21 actors and a document analysis. The 
data collection took place between February 2004 and September 2007. 
Structure of the thesis
The following chapters of this thesis address the issues mentioned in this intro-
duction (Chapter 1) and draw from the empirical cases listed above. The second 
14 In order to insure the anonymity of the interviewees, all interview material is coded; a list of interviewees 
is obtainable with the authors. The interviews include members of the project groups from the respective 
science advisory bodies, and policy makers from the departments of the affiliated Ministries as well as mem-
bers of scientific committees, and employees from other organisations. Some of the actors were interviewed 
more than once. A full account in Dutch for the vtv case study can be found in (Van Egmond et al, 2006)
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chapter presents two case studies which provide detailed accounts of science 
and policy interactions and starts from the typology or boundary arrangements 
developed by Tennekes. The third and fourth chapters discuss two case studies 
in depth from the perspective of boundary work. The next two chapters (five and 
six) take the conceptualisation of the science-policy boundary a step further by 
addressing the role of models as materialities and the notion of performativity 
of science. Although tempting, I do not provide definitions of what science and 
policy are. Instead I discuss what goes on in actual science-policy relations, and 
how science and policy are given shape in action and finally, in chapter seven I 
present my conclusions. 
Chapter t wO  Exploring the Future of Health Care: how science advisors 
struggle with the policy boundary in Dutch public health policy 
This chapter looks at and compares the different types of boundary work car-
ried out by three science advisory institutes. As starting point, it questions the 
organisation of science-policy interaction processes. How can we understand the 
way scientific institutions mediate in the health field? What do these institutions 
do to sustain their own positions in this field? How can we understand the differ-
ences and similarities between these? 
For a better understanding of these questions, two examples of science and 
policy interaction – the macroeconomic care model constructed by an interdisci-
plinary project team, and the construction of policy messages in vtv reports – are 
compared with regard to the interactions between the science advisory bodies 
and care policy makers. I discuss the differences in institutional location in both 
case studies and how this is reflected in the organisational set up of the science 
advisory institutes with the policy makers. This has the effect of bringing into 
focus the various roles played by the science advisory institutes, in that the cvtv 
producing these reports seems to fulfil an advocacy role in the public health 
sector, while the cpb fulfils a more technocratic role in the economic advisory 
field. However, I argue that characterising single institutions according to one 
model is superficial. Instead, the case studies show that different science-policy 
interactions are at work, at different moments in the advisory processes, and at 
different places in the organisational structure. Instead, it is helpful to distin-
guish between the on stage image of the role of these science-based organisations 
in the policy-making process, and the backstage ways of performing their role 
as science advisory institute for policy-making in constituting and maintaining 
credibility and authority (see also, Bal, Bijker, and Hendriks, 2002; Hilgartner, 
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2000). On stage and backstage cannot be seen as separate entities; they are two 
sides of the same coin, strategies to maintain their current positions.
Chapter three  Boundary Configurations in Science-Policy: modelling 
practices in health care
This chapter discusses a boundary configuration in the making. It starts from 
the following research questions: which practices of boundary work characterise 
the modelling practices of the scientists and policy makers involved in this inter-
disciplinary project? How does that affect the shaping of model parameters? 
Based on a case study of the care model project I investigated the interac-
tions and negotiations that the economic experts and public policy makers in 
the project employed in order to come to a workable model. Through a detailed 
account of these interactions and negotiations I discuss how science advisory 
bodies are entangled with some of the policy actors they advise in what I call 
boundary configurations. These strongly situated interconnections between science 
advisory institutes and policy institutions share a specific approach to problem 
definitions and methods and that are embedded in (and at the same time embed) 
social, discursive, and material elements. Boundary configurations build upon 
existing relationships that preceded the interdisciplinary project, shape the kind 
of science, and relatedly, the kind of social and political theories about health 
care. Over the course of the project, these interconnections became stronger and 
began to have consequences for the inclusion of other experts. In this chapter, I 
show how the model was not as successful as hoped for at the start of the project 
but that it did succeed in other ways. It provided one participating institute with a 
new tool for assessing economic policy measures for the care sector. As such the 
model extended the work of this institute to the care sector, and filled in a space 
that was not yet claimed by other science advisory institutes. In this chapter I also 
illustrate how the process of model construction forged new liaisons between 
the cpb and the Ministry of Health, thus enforcing the boundary configuration 
between economists at the ministry and the experts at the economic science 
advisory institute. 
Chapter fOur  Connecting Evidence and Policy: bringing researchers 
and policy makers together for effective evidence-based health policy
This chapter investigates an attempt to create a tool for evidence-based public 
health; successful in terms of the undisputed information it provides. It starts 
from the following questions: How is the relation between science and policy 
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organized? And how can this interaction be understood as a re-conceptualisation 
of science policy interactions?
Regarding the growing need for evidence-based policy in the health care sector, 
few tools actually contribute to the use of research findings and health informa-
tion in health policy. The vtv reports have grown into authoritative resources of 
information that are used as input for policies relating to health promotion. The 
question is how to understand this. Moving beyond current theories about knowl-
edge utilisation often employed in public health, I offer a reconceptualisation 
of science and policy interactions as interactive and reflexive processes wherein 
science and policy are not taken as separate worlds but are seen as two ends of a 
continuum. I discuss the role of materiality in these interactive processes. This 
study of the processes of the vtv reports over a ten-year period suggests that the 
success of the reports in informing policy depends largely on the institutional 
infrastructure that has been created over the years. This infrastructure supports 
and manages in many ways and on many levels both formal and informal contacts 
between scientists and policy makers. I argue that this infrastructure takes into 
account the fact that science and policy interactions are multidimensional and thus 
have to take place in both formal and informal settings. Dividing science-policy 
practice between on stage representations and backstage action offers space for 
reflexive interactions between scientists and policy makers. It also offers an effec-
tive way out of the current trend towards a stricter separation of the scientific and 
the politic in the light of the accountability trends. 
Chapter five Modelling for Policy: science-based models as 
performative boundary objects in Dutch policy-making 
This chapter discusses the role of models for policy by drawing on and 
exploring the tensions between the notions of boundary objects offered by Star 
and Griesemer (1989) and performativity (e.g. Callon, 1998). The central questions 
focus on the performative nature of computer models as boundary objects and 
how o these models shape and change the social worlds they coordinate? 
The concept of boundary object proves useful in gaining a better under-
standing both of the hybrid character of science-based models and their role in 
the coordination between different social worlds. However, such a sociological 
or symbolic interactionist’s account of the functions of models in science and 
policy interactions tends to stick with the assumption that although these worlds 
need to interact, they remain stable throughout the interaction. Building on the 
idea of science as a performative tool, the case studies illustrate how models are 
constituted by negotiations between scientists and policy makers and at the same 
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time constitute, (re)configure and reform social worlds. I argue that models not 
only actively coordinate social worlds but also contribute to changing them. The 
performativity of models ranges from generic (instrumental) to substantial as 
they influence social worlds to the extent that these worlds start behaving the way 
models describe.
Chapter six  Analysing Policy Change: the performative role of econo-
mics in the constitution of a new policy programme in Dutch health care
This chapter extends the notion of performativity by investigating the role of 
economic science in health policy development. Here I focus on the role of eco-
nomic science in the creation of material devices – policy tools – used by policy 
makers and politicians in political decision-making regarding health care reform. 
The following questions are posed: How do material manifestations of science-
policy interactions – such as policy tools or models – come about as a result of 
science-policy interactions concerning Dutch health care? How do such material 
devices shape and configure policy change? 
Market solutions implemented in previous years for ‘better’ governance of the 
public sector have been thoroughly analysed in policy science, and explanations 
for policy change are often sought in deliberative and discursive practices through 
methods such as discourse analysis. I put emphasis on material manifestations 
of science-policy interactions and how they shape and configure public policy 
change. I investigate the role of economic science and economists in the construc-
tion of material devices that in turn configure and frame health care as a market. 
Building on Callon’s notion of performativity of economics, and on the basis of 
case study research, I demonstrate how science-policy interaction co-constructs 
material devices that frame the health care sector and its actors as parties within 
a ‘regulated competitive’ market.
Chapter seven  Conclusion
Here I finish with a general discussion of the practical and theoretical conse-
quences of the conclusions drawn in this thesis for our understanding of science-
policy relations in regard to health care. The main conclusions are that scientific 
advisory organisations employ different strategies to come to effective and 
authoritative knowledge for policy, contingent strategies of inclusion and strate-
gies for ‘staying out but keeping near’ or more rationalist strategies of exclusion. 
Which strategies get are employed depends partly on the institutional context, and 
partly on the boundary configurations in which these organisations are situated. 
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Important in practices of science and policy interactions are materialities such as 
models, as expressions of scientific knowledge. Materialities can be performative 
in that they shape reality to resemble more the descriptions of that reality in those 
representations. Moreover, materialities are also political actors.
Moreover, it can be useful to understand the interaction of science and policy 
and the way it is organised from a theatrical metaphor. Science is on stage in pres-
entations of reports and messages to policy makers, for example in the form of 
reports, white papers and debates in media. The backstage is the realm where 
the reports and messages are constructed in interaction with policy makers. The 
presentation on stage is in its turn the outcome of backstage processes, and is 
at the same time a representation of the role science advice is to play in policy 
making: objective and distant and non-political, or involved and political as in 
the case of futurists. With respect to the on stage role of science advice, science 
advisory bodies that use the contingent strategy of inclusion seem to benefit from 
opening up backstage processes. Certain openness about backstage processes 
contributes to its authoritative position in the field. Science advisory bodies that 
employ the strategy of exclusion and expansion seem to benefit from closed 
backstage processes with respect to its role in science advice, whereas they benefit 
from openness about their tools.
Chapter One  Science and Policy in Interaction26
References
Bader, V., and H. Van den Berg. 1993. 
Simulatiemodellen En De Maakbare Toekomst. 
In Het Centraal Planbureau in Politieke Zaken, 
edited by H. Van den Berg, G. Both and p. 
Basser, 63-79. Amsterdam: Wetenschappelijk 
Bureau Groen Links.
Bal, R.. 1999. Grenzenwerk. Edited by Mumford reeks. 
Enschede: Twente University Press. 
Barry, A., and D. Slater. 2002. Introduction: The 
Technological Economy. Economy and Society 31 
(2): 175-93.
Bekker, M., S. van Egmond, R. Wehrens, K. Putters 
and R. Bal. 2010. Linking research and policy in 
Dutch healthcare: infrastructure, innovations 
and impacts. Evidence & Policy 6 (2): 237-254.
Bijker, W., R. Bal, and R. Hendriks. 2009. The 
Paradox of Scientific Authority. The Role of Scientific 
Advice in Democracies. Cambridge Massachusetts 
London, England: The mit Press.
Black, N. 2001. Evidence Based Policy: Proceed with 
Care. British Medical Journal 323: 275-9.
——. 2007. uk Health Services Research Network: 
At Last, a Health Services Research 
Organization. Journal of Health Services Research 
and Policy 12(1): s1-2.
Boon, L., and G. De Vries. 1989. Wetenschapstheorie. 
De Empirische Wending. Groningen: Wolters-
Noordhoff.
Callon, M. 1998. (eds) The Laws of the Markets. The 
Sociological Review. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.
Collins, H.M. 1985.  Changing Order: Replication and 
Induction in Scientific Practice. London: Sage.
De Vries, A. 2008. Towards Do-Ability. Dealing 
with Uncertainty in the Science-Policy 
Interface. Universiteit Twente.
De Vries, G. 1995. De Ontwikkeling Van Wetenschap. 
Een Inleiding in De Wetenschapsfilosofie: Wolters-
Noordhoff.
Edwards, P.N. 1999. Global Climate Science, 
Uncertainty and Politics: Data-Laden Models, 
Model-Filtered Data. Science as Culture 8(4): 
437-72.
Evans, R. 2000. Economic Models and Economic 
Policy: What Economic Forecasters Can Do for 
Government. Empirical Models and Policy-Making: 
Interaction and Institutions, edited by Frank A.G. 
Den Butter and Mary S. Morgan. London and 
New York: Routledge.
Fischer, F., and J. Forester, eds. 1993. The 
Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. 
Durham / London: Duke University Press.
Fischer, F., G. Miller, and M. Sidney. 2007. (eds) 
Handbook of Public Policy Analysis. Theory, Politics 
and Methods, Public Administration and Public 
Policy / 125: crc Press.
Foucault, M. 1980. Power / Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77. New York: 
Pantheon.
Fujimura, J.H. 1992. Crafting Science: Standardized 
Packages, Boundary Objects, And ‘Translation’. 
Science as Practice and Culture, edited by A. 
Pickering, 168-211. Chicago, London:  Il: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Gibbons, M. 1994. The New Production of Knowledge: 
The Dynamics of Science and Research in 
Contemporary Societies. London: Sage.
Gieryn, T.F. 1995. Boundaries of Science. In: 
Handbook of Social Sciences, edited by S. Jasanoff, 
G.E. Markle, J.C. Petersen and T. Pinch, 
393-443. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Grit, K., and W. Dolfsma. 2002. The Dynamics of 
the Dutch Health Care System--A Discourse 
Analysis. Review of Social Economy, 60(3) 377 – 
401. 
References 27
Hajer, M., and H. Wagenaar. 2003. (eds) Deliberate 
Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the 
Network Society. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Halffman, W.  2003. Boundaries of Regulatory Science, 
Eco / Toxicology and Aquatic Hazards of Chemicals in 
the Us, England and the Netherlands, 1970-1995. 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2003.
Ham, C., D.J. Hunter, and R. Robinson. 1995. 
Evidence Based Policymaking. British Medical 
Journal 310: 71-2.
Helderman, J-K, Schut, F.T.S, Van der Grinten, T. 
and Van de Ven, W. 2005. Market-Oriented 
Health Care Reforms and Policy Learning in 
the Netherlands. Journal of Health Policy, Politics 
and Law 30: 189-209
Hilgartner, S. 2000. Science on Stage. Expert Advice as 
Public Drama. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
Hoppe, R. 2002. Rethinking the Puzzles of the 
Science-Policy Nexus: Boundary Traffic, 
Boundary Work and the Mutual Transgression 
between Sts and Policy Studies. 1-52. Enschede.
——. 2002. Van Flipperkast Naar Grensverkeer, 
Veranderende Visies Op De Relatie Tussen 
Wetenschap En Beleid. Den Haag: Adviesraad 
voor Wetenschaps- en Technologiebeleid.
Hoppe, R. 2010. Lost in Translation? Boundary 
work in Making Climate Change Governable. 
In From Climate Change to Social Change, edited by 
P. P. J. Driessen, P. Leroy and W. Van Vierssen. 
Utrecht: International Books Utrecht.
Horstman, K. 2010. Dikke Kinderen, uitgebluste 
werknemers en vreemde virussen 
Filosofie van de publieke gezondheidszorg in 
de 21e eeuw. Inaugural speech. 
Huitema, D, and E. Turnhout. 2009. Working at the 
science-policy interface: a discursive analysis of 
boundary work at the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency. 
Environmental Politics 18 (4) 576 - 594.  
Hunter, D.J.  2003. Evidence-Based Policy and 
Practice: Riding for a Fall? Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 96: 194-96.
——. 2009. Relationship between Evidence and 
Policy: A Case of Evidence-Based Policy or 
Policy-Based Evidence? Public Health 123: 583-86.
Hutchinson, A.M., and C.A. Estabrooks. 2009. 
Theories and Models of kta: Cognitive 
Psychology Theories. In Knowledge Translation in 
Health Care: Moving from Evidence to Practice, 
edited by S.  Straus, J.  Tetroe and I. Graham. 
Mississauga, Ontario: Wiley-Blackwell.
Jansen, Maria W.J. 2007. Mind the Gap. Collaboration 
between practice, policy and research in local public 
health. Thesis.
Jasanoff, S. 1990. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as 
Policy Makers. Cambridge, Mass. London, 
England: Harvard University Press.
——. 2005. Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in 
Europe and the United States. Princeton University 
Press. 
Law, J. ed. 1986. Power, Action and Belief. A New 
Sociology of Knowledge?, The Sociological Review 
London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in Action. How to Follow 
Scientists and Engineers through Society. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
——. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge 
Mass, usa: Harvard University Press.
Lin, V., and B. Gibson (eds). 2003. Evidence-Based 
Health Policy: Problems & Possibilities. Victoria: 
Oxford University Press.
Chapter One  Science and Policy in Interaction28
Lindblom, C.E., and D.K. Cohen. 1979. Usable 
Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lomas, J. 2000. A Framework for Linkage and 
Exchange of Research Evidence. Health Affairs 19 
(3).
Lomas, J., N. Fulop, D. Gagnon, and P. Allen. 2003. 
On Being a Good Listener: Setting Priorities for 
Applied Health Services Research. The Milbank 
Quarterly 81 (3): 363-88.
Maasen, Sabine, and Peter Weingart (eds). 2005. 
Democratizarion of Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms 
of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making. 
Dordrecht: Springer.
MacKenzie, D. 2007. Is Economics Performative? 
Option Theory and the Construction of 
Derivates Markets. In Do Economists Make 
Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, edited 
by D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa and L. Siu. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press.
MacKenzie, D., and Y. Millo. 2003. Constructing a 
Market, Performing Theory: The Historical 
Sociology of a Financial Exchange. American 
Journal of Sociology 109 (1): 107-45.
Martijn, M, and Vanheste, T. 2010. ‘Ik geloof heilig 
in wat ik doe’. Vrij Nederland June 19th
Morgan, M.S., and F.A.G. den Butter (eds). 2000. 
Empirical Models and Policy-Making: Interaction and 
Institutions. London and New York: Routledge.
Morgan, M.S., and M. Morrison (eds). 1999. Models 
as Mediators, Perspectives on Natural and Social 
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nutley, S., S. Morton, T. Jung, and A. Boaz. 2010. 
Evidence and Policy in Six European Countries: 
Diverse Approaches and Common Challenges. 
Evidence & Policy 6 (2): 131-44.
Puska, P. 2007. Health in All Policies. European 
Journal of Public Health. 17 (4): 328.
gr (Health Council). 2008. Gezond Zorgonderzoek. 
De Toekomst Van Het 
Gezondheidszorgonderzoek in Nederland. Den 
Haag: Gezondheidsraad.
Reijmerink, W., and J. Hulshof. 1997. 
Volksgezondheid Toekomst Verkenning 1997. 
Een Stap Dichter Bij ‘Evidence-Based Halth 
Policy Making’. tsg, Tijdschrift voor Sociale 
Geneeskunde 75 (6): 359-60.
Shackley, S., and B. Wynne. 1995. Global Climate 
Change: The Mutual Construction of an 
Emergent Science-Policy Domain. Science and 
Public Policy 22 (4): 218-30.
Shapin, S., and S. Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the 
Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sismondo, S., and Gissis, (eds). 1999. Modeling and 
Simulation, Science in Context.
Smee, C. 2006. Improving Policy-Making in a 
Ministry of Health. Journal of Health Services 
Research and Policy 11 (1): 2-3.
Star, S.L., and J.R. Griesemer. 1989. Institutional 
Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: 
Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s 
Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39. Social 
Studies of Science 19: 387-420.
Stone, D. 2007. Recycle Bins, Garbage Cans or 
Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy 
Analysis Institutes. Public Administration 85 (2): 
259-78.
Stone, D., A. Denham, and M. Garnett, eds. 1998. 
Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach. 
Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press.
Straus, S., J. Tetroe, and I.G., D, (eds). 2009. 
Knowledge Translation in Health Care: Moving from 
Evidence to Practice: Wiley-Blackwell.
References 29
Trappenburg, M. 2005. Gezondheidszorg En Democratie. 
Inaugural Speech, Erasmus mc. Leiderdorp: 
Demmenie Grafimedia.
Van Daalen, C. E., Dresen, L. & Janssen, M. A. 2002. 
The roles of computermodels in the 
environmental policy life cycle. Environmental 
Science & Policy, 5: 221-231
Van Egmond, S., R. Bal, M. Bekker, and T. van der 
Grinten. 2006. Wetenschap Voor Beleid. Over 
De Rol Van De Volksgezondheid Toekomst 
Verkenning in De Beleidsvorming. 1-65. 
Rotterdam: ibmg / emc.
Van Niewstadt, M. 2010. Ad Hoc Asnormen. nrc 
Handelsblad, 29 mei.
Weingart, P. 1999. Scientific Expertise and Political 
Accountability: Paradoxes of Science in Politics. 
Science and Public Policy 26 (3): 151-62.
Weiss, C.H. 1991. Policy Research: Data, Ideas, or 
Arguments? In Social Sciences and Modern States, 
edited by Peter et al. Wagner, 307-32. 
Cambridge: Cambridge up.
who. 2009. Improving Children’s Health and the 
Environment: Examples from the Who 
European Region. Copenhagen.
Wittrock, B. 1991. Social Knowledge and Public 
Policy: Eight Models of Interaction. In Social 
Sciences and Modern States. National Experiences and 
Theoretical Crossroads, edited by P. Wagner. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Woolgar, S. (ed). 1988. Knowledge and Reflexivity: 
Sage.
Yanow, D. and P. Schwartz-Shea. 2006. Interpretation 
and method. Empirical research methods and the 
interpretive turn. London: Scharpe.
Yearley, S., S. Cinderby, J. Forrester, P. Bailey, and P. 
Rosen. 2003. Participatory Modelling and the 
Local Governance of the Politics and Uk Air 
Pollution: A Three-City Case Study. 
Environmental Values 12: 247-62.
Yearley, Steven. 1999. Computer Models and the 
Public’s Understanding of Science. Social Studies 
of Science 29(6): 845-66.
Zeiss, R. 2004. Standardising Materiality. Tracking 
Co-Constructed Relationships between Quality 
Standards and Materiality in the English Water 
Industry. University of York.
Zuiderent-Jerak, T. 2009. Competition in the Wild: 
Emerging Figurations of Healthcare Markets. 
Social Studies of Science 39 (5): 765-92.

31Chapter twO 
Exploring the Future of 
Health Care
How science advisors struggle with the policy boundary 
in Dutch public health policy
Van Egmond, Stans
Exploring the future of health care: how scientists struggle with the policy boundary 
Book chapter in Hoppe and Halffman (eds). Rethinking Political Judgment and Science-Based Expertise 
(working title), forthcoming.
Chapter t wO Exploring the Future of Health Care32
Introduction 
The Dutch government has since long played a leading role in public health and 
health care issues. The past centuries the role of the government has expanded 
from the regulation of public health issues (focussed on environmental and hygi-
enic aspects, e.g. epidemiology), to the (financial) organisation of the care sector. 
For these tasks it has relied and built upon the input of scientific advisory bodies 
and policy assessment institutes in the process of health policy making. Examples 
are the Netherlands Institute for Public Health and the Environment (rivm), as 
well as the Netherlands Institute for Health Services and Research (nivel), the 
Health Council (gr), the Council for Public Health and Health Care (rvz), the 
Social and Cultural Planning Office (scp) and recently the cpb, among others. 
Although in the every day processes of public policy making the use of knowl-
edge and expertise of numerous experts and expert organizations has become 
a routine event, actual processes and interactions between scientists and policy 
makers often remain rather concealed. Although both the cpb and rivm are 
bureaucratically situated within the policy realm, their role in policy making 
processes has often been described as a technocratic one (Bader et al, 1993; 
Hoppe, 2002a; Hoppe, 2002b; Pesch, 1999; Van den Berg et al, 1993). This impli-
cates that although formally both institutes work in service of the government as 
deliverer of ‘facts’, their influence on day-to-day policy making processes is much 
stronger than many regard desirable. Some research has shown that behind these 
more traditional pictures of the organisation of the science policy nexus a much 
more subtle and refined image of science policy interactions arises in which for 
instance the fact-value distinction, or even the research – policy distinction looses 
ground (Fischer, 2003; Jasanoff, 1995; Van den Bogaard, 1999; Weingart, 1999; 
Latour, 1987). 
The importance of expertise in policy making processes, and lack of empirical 
research on the topic raise questions about how these processes are actually organ-
ized. How can we understand the way scientific institutes mediate in the health 
field? What do these institutes do to sustain their own positions in this field? 
Moreover, how can we understand the differences and similarities between these 
institutes? For a better understanding of these questions, this chapter focuses 
on the interactions between these science-advisory bodies and health care policy 
makers. We have focused on the construction of Public Health Status reports 
by the rivm and the development of an macroeconomic model for the care sector 
in an interdisciplinary project in which the cpb, the Social and Cultural Planning 
Office and the rivm have partaken. The focus of this chapter lies with the role 
of the cpb.
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The first section15 discusses theoretical perspectives on science policy interac-
tions. The second section gives an overview of the developments of the health care 
system in the Netherlands, as well a characterisation of the (political) discussions 
surrounding health care policies. The third section addresses the organisation of 
the Public Health Status and Forecast Reports (vtv report) of the rivm. In the 
fourth section the development of the Care Model is discussed. The last section 
compares the two cases. 
Models on the interaction between science and policy
The relation between science and politics or policy making has been described 
by many scientists, from public policy scientists (pps) to sociologists of science 
to sts-scholars (Hoppe, 2002b; Jasanoff, 1990, and 1995; Weingart, 1999; Latour, 
1987). The relationship between science and politics has since wwii shifted from 
a position in which scientists operated rather autonomous in the political process, 
to a position in which scientific knowledge and the input of scientists is no longer 
taken at face value; the relation between science and politics is more often built on 
negotiated trust or recurring trust-crises (Hoppe, 2002b; Hoppe, and Huijs, 2003). 
Both the rivm and the cpb are institutes that mediate between science and policy 
making; the rivm has as its main objective to deliver scientific facts to policy 
makers in the field of health care, whereas the cpb assesses policy proposals 
with the help of science-based mathematical models. As such both institutes fit 
rational models of science-policy interactions; especially bureaucratic models or 
technocratic models. However, the relation between science and policy is more 
ambiguous than these rational models suggest. This proves even more true in 
the public health policy field, that is characterized by its hybrid management 
structure in which contradicting values from both the professions as well as the 
government are interwoven, and struggle for power prevail (Van der Grinten, and 
Helderman, 2005; Helderman et al, 2005). 
Models that presume primacy: for science or for policy 
After wwii in many Western countries models of science policy interaction 
were developed based on notions of rational behaviour of organisations; the deci-
sionist or bureaucratic model based on ideas of Weber, and the technocratic model 
15 This chapter benefitted tremendously from comments by Dean Niewsma, Rob Hoppe, and Stuart Blume. 
Previous versions have been presented at the 4S conference in Vancouver in October 2006, at the nob confer-
ence in November 2006, and at the wtmc graduate school in March 2007. 
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of the relation between politics and scientific knowledge. Although both models 
assume a distinction between objective knowledge and subjective values, between 
the factual and the normative, these models are often depicted as opposites in 
regard to the primacy of policy makers over scientists and scientific knowledge 
and vice versa. Both also differ in the roles assigned to science and politics, as 
either diverging or converging with each other. The technocratic model, based on 
ideas of Bacon, attracted much more attention in continental Europe, while the us 
depended more on bureaucratic decisionist Weberian models. The technocratic 
model was, however, believed to lead to an increasing ‘scientification’ of politics, 
whereas the bureaucratic model leads to an ‘politicisation of science’.
Other rational models are the enlightenment model and the engineering model. 
The enlightenment model emphasizes the divergence of policy and science, with 
a leading role for science. In this model scientists deliver value-free facts while 
politicians deal with normative considerations and decision making. This model 
depicts a rather naïve or romantic notion of the role of science in society. Scientists 
are portrayed as independent but ingenious experts who discover and develop new 
knowledge, and help progress our knowledge of the world for the benefit of society, 
independently of wishes and interference of policy makers and politicians (Hoppe, 
2002b; Hoppe, and Huijs, 2003). Moreover, scientific knowledge is thought to 
slowly trickle down to society through newspapers, and popular scientific journals 
and tv programs, to be picked up by politicians. The engineering model depicts 
the exact opposite. It depicts, as is described by Hoppe, the relationship between 
scientists and policy makers as politicians on top and scientists on tap; science 
or knowledge is mobilized by the recruitment of knowledge producers to answer 
knowledge demands articulated by politicians and policy makers or administra-
tive management (Hoppe, 2002b). Scientists are staged as engineers, who, with 
little initiative and creativity, merely apply existing scientific knowledge for the 
production of local solutions to local problems. These engineers remain external 
to government structures, in contrast to the scientists in the bureaucratic model. 
These four models have been criticized by many social and policy scientists for 
the oversimplified depiction of the relations between science and policy, and the 
over-exaggeration of the influence of science on political decision making (see e.g. 
Fischer, 2003; Lindblom, 1979; Woodhouse, and Nieusma, 1997; Weingart, 1999). 
According to Weingart these rational models “not only render[s] problematic 
the legitimacy of irrational decisions, but also reduce[s] the range of options to 
an objectively determined singular best decision” (1999:154). It thus limits the 
explanatory ability of these models in policy fields that are more hybrid in nature 
such as the healthcare sector. For such hybrid policy fields only second-best 
solutions are available (Arrow, 1963). Collingridge and Reeve (1986) point to four 
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problems that are encountered with the use of scientific results as the basis for 
political judgement and policy making; (1) the high costs and (2) the length of 
time involved with gathering scientific data, (3) the irrelevancy of the findings for 
acute policy problems, (4) and the co-ordination of all relevant scientific data for 
the policy questions. These problems led them to argue that “the role of scientific 
research and analysis is therefore not the heroic one of providing truths by which 
policy may be guided, but the ironic one of preventing policy being formulated 
around some rival technical conclusions” (1986:151). 
Others have criticized the assumption that science delivers value-free-facts 
while the normative decisions are left to politicians; an assumption that has 
been proven a myth (Jasanoff, 1995; Latour, 1987; Weingart, 1999). Nonetheless 
this assumption is still widely accepted by followers of the traditional models, 
scientists as well as policy makers. According to Weingart there is an “obvious 
connection between a positivist concept of science and a decisionist model of 
scientific advice” (1999:152-155). This implies however, that policy scientists as 
well as other scientists who play a role in the policy making process and political 
decision processes tend to hold on to this model, because it secures their authority 
and the role of science in the political realm. This has proven so for the institutes 
analysed in this chapter. Moreover, scientists themselves are in fact active actors 
in sustaining an active role in policy making, as Jasanoff has shown (Jasanoff, 
1990). The political neutrality and disinterestedness of scientists cannot be upheld 
anymore, and exemplifies a ‘politicization of science’ paralleling the ‘scientifica-
tion of politics’ (Weingart, 1999; Hoppe, 2002b). However, these models are still 
in effect if only to legitimise existing science-policy relations. 
Models that presume dialogue
These critiques have led to a generation of more incremental models that 
grant the scientific community more influence on the public perception of policy 
problems, and that presuppose a dialogue between scientists and policy makers 
or politicians on the formulation of social problems as well as on the (scientific) 
instruments to tackle those problems. The four models that are distinguished 
differ in their interpretation of politics as an arena in which different stakes are 
fought over (the advocacy model and the dispositional model), or as an agora 
in which these stakes are discussed (the policy learning model and the policy 
coping model). Advocacy models depict the political process as a non-violent 
struggle in which each interest mobilizes its own science-based expertise. 
Scientists and policy analysts are like lawyers, and their business is advocacy 
analysis. The dispositional model holds the notion of a discourse-structuration 
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and interaction conceptualization of knowledge use. The discourse coalitions 
identified in this model work as bridges between different epistemic cultures 
creating ‘interlocking networks of knowledge and power’ or ‘discourse coali-
tions’ (Wittrock, 1990:333; Hajer, and Wagenaar, 2003; Hoppe, 2002b), between 
politics and scientific disciplines. 
Policy learning and policy coping models regard the aims and workings of 
science and policy making as roughly analogous. The policy making process in 
these models is viewed upon as a process in which the interdependencies between 
many parties play an important role, as well as negotiating, cooperating and 
coordinating with many different parties involved. Moreover, policy oriented 
models hold the presumption that there is an equal status between scientists 
and policy makers. The policy process functions as a sort of research process in 
which policy measures are regarded as sets of hypotheses, and policy making as 
a form of social experiment. However, policy oriented models are more relevant 
for situations in which a certain amount of (political or scientific) agreement is 
reached on the nature and solution of the problem; in other words they work only 
for problems that have been tamed, not for complex and untamed problems. See 
figure 1 for a clearer overview of the characteristics of the six models. We have 
used the typology of boundary arrangements depicted by Tennekes (2005). 
Science / policy models: performative power on different levels
These models have performative power on different levels. The bureaucratic 
and technocratic models are often presented as wished-for organisations of 
science-policy interactions, so that at the discourse level these models may stay 
mere condensed theoretical or wished-for representations. However, discursive 
notions can also influence the organisational shape of the science-policy interac-
tions. Both the cpb and rivm are originally typical bureaucratic organisations 
of the science-policy boundary; embedded in the organisational structure of the 
government with a sharp focus on policy problems. The case studies conducted 
in this chapter reveal, at closer looks, that the above-mentioned models seem to 
dissolve on the level of actual practices, thus leaving room for new insights into 
the relation between science and policy making.
Science-based expert organisations are faced with difficult and multiple roles; 
they are mediators between scientific knowledge and policy processes; they have 
to be close to politics without being too close; they have to depoliticize policy 
problems without doing away with the normative choices associated with them; 
and importantly, they have to sustain their authoritative positions and credibility 
in order to perform these roles (Bal et al., 2002; Hilgartner, 2000; Weiss, 1991). 
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However, both institutes have similar and different ways in which they perform 
these roles and sustain their positions. We find these differences and similarities 
on three levels (see figure 1). The first the level of discourse: how are the rela-
tions between science and policy discussed and talked about in the political and 
public realm? The second level of analysis is the institutional organisation of the 
institutes in the policy field. It addresses questions as how advisory practices and 
trajectories are arranged in organisational structures and its consequences. The 
third level is an analysis of the advisory trajectory at the level of actual practices. 
This section focuses on the way scientists and policy makers interact with each 
other in the day to day policy making and science advice and the tools used for 
this. In the analysis of these science / policy interactions a few key dimensions 
have been incorporated: how these institutes deal with value issues, how they 
deal with (sharp) disagreement and conflict between different types of knowl-
edge, and how uncertainty issues are being dealt with.
An insight into these dimensions offers an understanding of how scientific 
institutes mediate in the public health field, and how institutes sustain their own 
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Figure 1 Typology of science / policy interactions, model characteristics (Tennekes, 2005).
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positions in this field. What seeps through when having such a closer look is the 
notion that the role of the rivm and the cpb and the organisation of the science-
policy nexus can be defined differently at different levels that at the same time con-
tradict and reinforce each other and can be captured at three levels; at the level of the 
boundary discourse, at the level of the organisational boundaries, and at the level of 
advisory practices. These are three aspects that are not mutually exclusive, but 
complement each other in understanding science-policy boundaries. At the same 
time, the three levels represent both the front stage image of the role of these science-
based organisations in the policy making process, and back stage ways of performing 
their role as science advisory institute for policy making. Therefore the interactions 
between the front stage images of science policy boundary and the backstage work 
that is done on stage 02, is an empirical question, we seek to understand. 
Health in the Netherlands: from public health  
to health care
Modern health policy in the Netherlands started with the 1865 laws on public 
health, supported by a core group of hygienists. These laws, instigated by the 
wish to control epidemic outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as cholera and 
typhoid, regulated the outlines of the tasks of the government regarding public 
health; protection of the health of citizens due to poor environmental conditions 
in cities at that time. These laws laid the first foundations of a notion of a care 
for public health by (1) substantial government supervision of public health, and 
(2) a professionalizing of the medical profession (Van Zon, 1990). Shortly into 
the twentieth century the focus of the government shifted away from control 
of infectious diseases and the development of epidemiology (public health) to 
the treatment of chronic diseases such as cancer and coronary diseases, and 
individual health care (Van der Grinten, and Helderman, 2005; Mackenbach, and 
Van der Maas 2004). 
This transition was accompanied by a major shift in the approach of public health 
problems; from the focus on public health and prevention to a focus on the organi-
zation and financial structure of the health care sector. Since, three contradicting 
values have played a key role in both the organisation of and political discussions 
about health care; the quality, accessibility and affordability of health care and health 
services. The possibilities and impossibilities of the government to meet these three 
values have shaped the organisation of the health care system into a complex system, 
with both public and private involvements (Van der Grinten, and Helderman, 2005). 
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Recently, the Dutch health care sector underwent its probably most profound reform 
since the introduction of the national health plan in 1941. 
Dutch healthcare: public and private arrangements
Before wwii the health care system was characterized by privately funded 
organisations and health care providers divided along the lines of existing class 
differences at that time. In 1941 the occupying government16 laid the basis for 
a national health plan, the Sickness Fund Act (Ziekenfondsbesluit). Most impor-
tantly, this act instigated the foundation of a fund available for a larger part of the 
Dutch citizenry, and coverage of hospital care. In 1966, this process was finalized 
by the introduction of the Sickness Fund Law (Ziekenfondswet 1966). With this a 
national and obligatory health care insurance was constituted. From the sixties 
onwards, the health care sector has been financed partly through the tax system, 
to support the special insurance scheme created for long-term care, the awbz (the 
General Law on Special Health Expenditures). Partly, it has been financed through 
individual (private or public) insurance schemes. 
From 1970s onwards health care costs began to rise17, and the affordability of 
health care became topic of governmental policy making. Instigated by notions of 
new public management (Walsh, 1995), government control became the new policy 
approach for the moderation of the growth in costs of public health care in what 
Helderman et al describe as an etatist policy program (2005). This etatist policy pro-
gram that aimed at cost containment succeeded, but brought about reverse problems 
such as increasing waiting lists for health services (Schut, 2003, 2004). It led to the 
infamous Dutch ‘Stalinist system of public health’, referring to its highly bureaucratic 
way of operating, and to many critical comments from the professional realm. 
Towards a market based policy program
A new solution was sought in restructuring the health care sector, supported 
by the adoption of a more economic view on public health and its management 
systems. This trend can be seen throughout many Western countries. Ashmore, 
Mulkay and Pinch for example have shown that in the uk a trend of economization 
and the formation of communities of health economists can be distinguished from 
16 In 1941 the Dutch government was not officially in charge due to the occupation of the Netherlands by 
Germany. 
17 The costs increased steadily over the years, from 3.9 percent of the Gross National Product in 1960 to 
nearly 9 percent in 2000 (vws, 2001; cpb 2001B).
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the seventies onwards (Ashmore et al, 1989). In the Netherlands the famous 1987 
Dekker report18 (Dekker, 1987) laid the foundation for a financial system of regu-
lated competition, inspired by the us health economist Enthoven (Enthoven, 1988). 
Although the Dekker plan was not effectuated in the Netherlands for many years, 
it strongly inspired the 2001 White paper on the future of the health care system 
written by the Ministry of Health. In the paper a market based policy program for 
a more effective system for the governance of public health was presented (vws, 
2001; cpb, 2001; Marktwerking Projectbureau, 2000). The market oriented plans 
contained a twofold effort for reform. Firstly, the Ministry of Health designed a 
system of demand regulation. An example of this is the personal health budget 
(pgb) introduced in 2000, that enables individuals to buy care themselves with 
little interference of insurance and care companies (in the context of the former 
awbz care) in any form, ranging from (some forms of) medical care to help with 
housekeeping. Secondly, the government proposed a health insurance market 
reform based on the notion of regulated competition. This new insurance market 
was introduced in January 2006.
With the effectuation of the new health insurance law in January 2006, the 
political debate about the effects and desirability of competition in health care 
has gotten a new boost. As it took up centre stage at the November 2006 elections, 
it seems that the last words about the health care system and the insurance market 
have not been spoken yet. Moreover, the current governmental shift towards a 
decentralisation of public health policy to regional and local government, with 
the new Social Support Act (wmo, wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning) in 2007 
and the Collective Prevention and Public Health Act (wcpv: wet collectieve pre-
ventie volksgezondheid), will instigate more public and political discussions on 
the ‘most effective’ health care system in future years. 
These debates roughly show an input both from the side of public health pro-
fessionals, who hold a professional attitude towards public health policy making, 
based on epidemiological knowledge of (public) health and values deriving from 
the medical profession (Kasdorp, 2004; Putters et al, 2004), and from a health 
care sector governance point of view. The latter regards the organisational and 
financial structures of the health care sector as key elements in supporting effective 
health policy, and in securing the core values of health care. Adherents to the first 
standpoint have often ventilated the critique that health policy in the Netherlands 
18 The Dekker plan succeeded the 1973 Report from the committee Hendriks. Since the publication of the 
Dekker plan in 1987 modified versions of the plan have been published every couple of years; the plan Simons 
in 1990, a policy report by the Ministry of Health in 2001 (Vraag aan Bod), and advice from the ser and the rvz 
both in 2000 (see Schut, 2004).
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has developed rather unilateral, from the organization of health care point of view, 
without substantial improvements for health care regarding the three central values 
of the public health care sector (Van der Wal, Klazinga, and Post, 2004). 
Science advisory bodies and knowledge institutes have played a significant role 
in recent reforms of the health care sector: the shift towards more competition 
in health care. 
In the midst of these health care reforms both the cpb and the rivm have 
taken up new roles regarding the policy making process in health care and public 
health. The cpb (Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis) developed 
an economic model to support macro economic modelling of policy proposals 
for the health care sector. The rivm has since 1993 released four Public Health 
Prospect and Forecasts (vtv) reports; reports that hold extensive information on 
public health issues, and the health status of the Dutch population. These reports 
are used for the development of prevention policy regarding public health issues. 
The role of both institutes has changed with the developments of these new 
instruments; the cpb has entered the health care sector with the construction of 
a Care model, whereas the rivm has expanded its status in the realm of public 
health issues. This, and their important contribution to public health and health 
care policies required a closer look into how both institutes play their role as sci-
ence advisory bodies within policy processes.
The Future of Public Health: forecasting the public 
health status of the Dutch19
The rivm has supported policy-makers and professionals on issues in Dutch 
public health and the environment for almost a century. Originated in 1909 as the 
Central Laboratory, over the years it merged with other institutes as the National 
Institute for Serology, the National Institute for drinking-water facilities and the 
19 The findings of both case studies reported in this chapter (cpb and rivm) are based on 45 interviews held 
with actors involved, and on documents and archive material from both institutes, such as research accounts 
and reports, minutes of meetings, informal and formal correspondence between the project members, and 
between project members and the Ministry, with related scientists and other partners. People interviewed 
involve project leaders and members of the project groups of both the cpb and the rivm, several policy 
makers at the Ministry of Health, members of expert groups and scientific and policy boards. References to 
archive documents such as informal letters and project proceedings are not referenced in the literature list, 
but in the main text. Some of the names of respondents have been anonymized for privacy reasons. 
Chapter t wO Exploring the Future of Health Care42
Institute for Waste Research into what is since 1984 called the National Institute 
for Public Health and Environment20 (rivm). The new institute benefited from 
the mutual expertise in multi-disciplinary research groups, without overlap of 
financial and material means (Van Zon, 1990). It now fell under the heading of 
several Ministries; the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (vws), the Ministry 
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (vrom), and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (lnv).
At present the rivm accommodates four divisions; (1) the Centre for 
Infectious Diseases Control, (2) the Public Health and Health Services Division, 
(3) the Nutrition, Pharmaceuticals and Consumer Safety Division, and (4) the 
Environment and Safety Division, and it employs about 1500 people. In 2006, the 
sub-sector Environmental research parted from the rivm, and merged with the 
Planning bureau for Nature into Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
(mnp), a new planning bureau that falls within the range of the ‘protocol for 
planning bureaus’. It resides solely under the heading of the Ministry of vrom. 
The remaining parts of the rivm no longer fall within the scope of the planning 
bureau protocol; and work in service of the Ministries vws, lnv and vrom as an 
agency. Over the years the rivm has constituted a large network in many policy 
fields concerning the environment and public health, and it holds an authoritative 
scientific position and reputation both nationally and internationally. 
The centre of Public Health Status and Forecasts (centre vtv) supports and 
advices the government on public health issues. The centre has published four 
Public Health Status and Forecasts reports (vtv) for the Dutch government since 
1993 concerning developments in the health status of the Dutch population for 
the coming years. The activities of the centre have over the years expanded from 
the manufacturing and presentation of these four-yearly reports to the frequent 
release of special issues of the vtv report concerning pressing public health 
matters, and the design of two national, public websites; the National Compass 
for Public Health and Health Care, and the National Atlas for Public Health and 
Health Care. The centre employs almost one hundred persons. Issues addressed are, 
among others, major causes of death in the Netherlands, ‘healthy life expectancy’, 
differences in health and disease between rich and poor, urban and rural dwellers 
and among ethnic groups (rivm, 2006; website www.rivm.nl/en/, October 2006). 
For the discussions of the institutional and discourse levels, we will also discuss 
the rivm to broaden the argument. 
20 In Dutch, the institutes’ names are Centraal Laboratorium, Rijksserologisch Instituut, Rijksinstituut voor 
Drinkwatervoorziening en het Instituut voor Afvalstoffen Onderzoek, Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid 
en Milieuhygiene respectively. 
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The centre vtv: the future of public health21 
The Report 2000, a White paper published by the Ministry of Health in 1986, 
provided the starting point for a succession of policy measures leading up to the 
start of a centre vtv. The report gave an overview of (1) the public health status 
of Dutch citizens, and (2) formulated policy measures to be taken in the future 
to ensure continuing monitoring of the public health status of citizens by the 
government (Boer, 1986). The report argued that the government should focus on 
(a) prevention and policy measures aimed at specific parts of public health (eg 
the effects of the use of alcohol and tobacco), (b) the level of health provisions in 
the Netherlands, (c) the financial system, and (d) information on public health 
developments (Boer, 1986). Concretely, an “investigation into the possibilities of 
research of health promotion, protection and prevention”, is proposed as well as 
a “consultation with statistical organizations on the implications for […] data 
collection on public health and the health care sector” (Boer, 1986:132; Nationale 
Raad voor de Volksgezondheid, 1987). It nevertheless took another few years until 
the first vtv report was released in 1993. These developments, instigated with 
the government White paper ‘Nota 2000’, show some developments counteracting 
the professional critiques on the underdeveloped focus on public health discussed 
before, as it enlarged the role of the rivm in public health policy making.
The centre vtv publishes, among others, the Public Health Status and Forecast 
reports (vtv), that provides an integrative and analytical overview of trends in 
the health of Dutch citizens, such as exposure to health risk factors (e.g. smoking, 
fast food, physical inactivity), incidence of illnesses, use of health care services, 
and related costs. The aims of the centre have gradually shifted from explaining 
differences in health status between Dutch citizens towards the need for com-
parisons between the Netherlands and other eu countries, with the help of health 
indicators (rivm, 2006). More importantly are recent trends of decentralising 
political responsibility and accompanying changes in the health care system. 
Recently the Social Support Act (wmo: wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning) and 
the Collective Prevention and Public Health Act (wcpv: wet collectieve preventie 
volksgezondheid) have shifted the attention on the public health policy making 
and prevention politics away from the central Government towards local gov-
ernments and public health organisations. The role of the centre vtv in these 
decentralised health policy processes will change accordingly. The local health 
policy will be based on Government White papers, build upon vtv expertise. This 
21 For this paragraph many archive documents have been used as well as many official reports released 
by the rivm over the years among which; rivm, 1995; rivm, 1997; rivm, 1999; rivm, 2002; rivm, 2003a; 
rivm 2003b (together with Nivel); rivm 2004.
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will lead to shifts in emphasis in the set-up of the reports and maybe the data 
collection routines, as well as in the social network in which the vtv is shaped. 
However, at this point the new role of the centre vtv in supporting local govern-
ments is still in development.
Institutionally the formal relation between the rivm and policy makers is 
organized along the lines of the bureaucratic model, as it facilitates the primacy 
of the policy makers over research questions and assignments. As the position 
of the rivm within the governmental policy making process changed to that of 
an agency of the affiliated Ministries, the relation has become that of a principal 
– agent, facilitating a more formalized relation of the policy makers with the 
research questions and assignments. As such the rivm and the Ministries have 
many project-bound relations. The relation between the Ministry of Health and 
the centre vtv is organised such that policy directorates formulate a research or 
knowledge question in the form of a detailed quotation or offer, which the centre 
vtv uptakes for research. After some time the centre vtv formally reports back to 
the Ministry. It leaves the centre vtv formally with little space to initiate research 
questions itself and define which public health issues it deems warranted for 
further investigation or advice. In that sense the centre vtv has become more 
dependent of the Ministry and its needs, and the division of tasks between the 
institute (deliverer of facts) and the Ministries (for the normative considerations) 
is formally strictly arranged. 
In order to organize the use of the vtv, the release of the summary report is 
directly linked to the policy cycle of the Ministry. Both the policy makers and 
the vtv experts focus on keeping the vtv report in line with the policy cycle, as 
this extents the use of its messages in the governmental prevention reports. The 
organisation of the science policy boundary thus fits the bureaucratic model, 
because the vtv report is in these instances a loyal instrument for policy devel-
opment by the government. Consequently, the relation between the centre vtv 
and the Ministry of health is characterised by claused trust or as an ambivalent 
relationship; trust is renegotiated each time a new project is taken up.
 
Dealing with uncertainty
The background of the rivm may lead to the belief that the role of the institute 
within Dutch policy making has been fairly unproblematic. And, as the absence 
of political discussion on the position of the centre vtv shows, for the reports of 
the centre vtv this may well be so. However, over the years the rivm has been the 
focal point of a few controversies over the presumed technocratic use of scientific 
knowledge for policy making, albeit focused on the environmental pillar of the 
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rivm, such as the De Kwaadsteniet affair in 1999. The De Kwaadsteniet was a 
dispute over the use of mathematical models for environmental policy making, 
instigated by allegations by an rivm employee De Kwaadsteniet. The rivm took 
up the dispute to review their dealings with uncertainty in general. In 2003 the 
rivm published the mnp / rivm Guidance for Uncertainty Assessment and 
Communication (rivm, 2003a), consisting of a number of reports, quick scan 
tools and a website, to assist mnp experts with environmental assessments 
(rivm, 2004)22. The reports provide a range of possibilities and tools to deal 
with uncertainty, from assessing and providing democratic entrance, problem 
definitions and use of specific mathematical techniques in quantitative research 
methods. As the uncertainty reports promote self-education and good practice, 
they are factually designed instances of policy learning (Van Asselt et al, 2001). 
Two important shifts have taken place as an effect of these reports on uncer-
tainty assessment. Firstly, these reports constitute the implicit outlines to deal 
with the fact / value distinction, and knowledge conflicts. The uncertainty report 
written by Van Asselt et al in 2001, offers a few methods to assess uncertainty on 
the systems level23. The rivm has translated these suggestions in their quick-
scan as the first step in the identification of the kind of uncertainties playing a 
role in specific reports; at the level of problem framing and the involvement of 
stakeholders (rivm, 2003a). This classifies the fact / value distinction as part of 
the uncertainty debate. Secondly, as uncertainty has become a temporary or at 
least solvable problem through ‘the thorough and systematic treatment’ of it in 
writing reports, it plays an important role in settling knowledge conflicts. As 
such the fact value distinction and knowledge conflicts have been absorbed by 
the uncertainty discourse, a technical solution to prevent too much uncertainty 
to become a political dispute. Moreover, the discussion regarding uncertainty has 
sharpened the boundary between science and policy, in the sense that the realm 
of normative considerations has grown at the expense of scientific input, and has 
shifted towards policy makers and the public. 
Interestingly, the reports dealing with uncertainty issues hardly find resonance 
in the vtv reports. Publicly, a discussion on the role of the vtv in policy making 
22 The De Kwaadsteniet affaire was not the starting point of a new thinking about uncertainty, but rather 
highlighted the importance of thinking about uncertainty. In that sense it functioned as an accelerator. 
The mnp/rivm Guidance for Uncertainty is based in the 2001 research report written by the Maastricht 
University in commission of the rivm. It synthesises the research carried out on uncertainty since 1997. The 
research report main conclusion is that the rivm needs to develop a protocol for uncertainty (Van Asselt, et 
al, 2001).
23 For example the nusap method (Van Asselt, et al, 2001). 
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is surprisingly absent. Discussions among health scientists about the role of the 
vtv reports in public health policy making usually focus on the question how to 
bring the important messages under the attention of the policy makers. Reviews 
of the vtv reports usually take place in Dutch public health journals, and focus 
on the usefulness of vtv reports as instruments that can ‘rationally support the 
process of rational policy development’, a step closer to evidence-based health 
policy development (Reijmerink, and Hulshof, 1997). Over the years the vtv 
reports have become more political in that the reports, as a member of the scien-
tific committee argued, ‘have over time become more involved with and focused 
on policy-issues’ (Interview, 20050926), due to shift in focus towards interna-
tional comparisons and focus on performance indicators. However, political 
discussions as have taken place with the cpb, on the desirability of the reports 
or the monopoly position (regarding public health information) have not taken 
place with regard to the vtv. As such the vtv reports are rhetorically assigned 
an enlightenment status at the discourse level, as scientists are portrayed as 
bringers of messages for policy makers, who in their turn should listen well to 
the experts. This is illustrated by the organisation of the vtv practices on the 
level of actual practices. 
The vtv in the making
The Public Health Status and Forecast reports (vtv) provide an integrative and 
analytical overview of trends in the health of Dutch citizens. The vtv reports 
focus, furthermore, on social-economic factors that explain differences in health 
status between Dutch citizens, which have shifted more and more towards a 
comparison between the Netherlands and other eu countries (rivm, 2006). The 
vtv consists of threefold products; the comprehensive summary report that is 
released approximately every four years, specific theme reports focused on single 
topics, and two websites. In this paragraph we focus on the construction of the 
four-yearly comprehensive summary reports, and the theme report Health Care in 
the Large Cities of the Netherlands, released in 2003. 
The centre vtv collects and integrates data gathered from many sources. Data 
from various scientific sources is collected and measured based on a conceptual 
model for public health based on the public health model developed in the 1970’s by 
the Canadian minister Marc Lalonde (rivm, 2006; De Leeuw, 1986). The Lalonde 
model recognises various determinants of health, as well as organisation and 
quality of health care; hereditary factors, lifestyle factors and environmental fac-
tors. The conceptual model of the vtv has extended Lalonde’s model; it recognises 
exogenous factors such as lifestyle, physical and social environment; personal 
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factors that are divided in hereditary, psychological and acquired personal char-
acteristics; and health care and prevention as separate factors. The outcomes, 
which are manifold, are used for the formulation of overall policy messages for 
the summary report. These messages provide policy makers of the Ministry of 
Health with information for the formulation of (prevention) health policy. 
The formulation of messages for policy makers proves a rather sensitive 
endeavour for the centre vtv. Repeatedly interviewees go in length about the dif-
ficulties that were met in presenting the findings: 
“At the start [of the project in 1993] we were not allowed to give policy advice, because 
the Ministry held the opinion that ‘we were the researchers and should deliver the 
facts’ and ‘they were the Ministry and make policy’. In later stages the critique was that 
the report was too much an encyclopaedia, and should focus more on the problems 
experienced by the Ministry” (interview, august 9th 2005). 
This remark points towards the unstable balance in trust between the centre 
vtv and policy makers from the Ministry of Health. A lot of work goes into creating 
and maintaining a trustworthy relationship with policy makers. The vtv easily 
runs the risk of entering the normative and political realm formally ascribed to 
the Ministry and the government. At this point the clear but subtle front stage 
fact / value distinction between the centre vtv and the Ministry becomes visible: 
the centre vtv delivers facts and the Ministry sets out the normative outline. In 
this, the primacy of the policy makers becomes visible. 
The front stage fact / value distinction requires a subtle balance between 
policy-orientedness and policy distance for the messages in the vtv report. This 
demands constant and subtle weighing of how to proceed; with the information, 
with the experts involved and policy makers’ demands by the vtv project leaders. 
The products of the centre vtv derive from the scientific realm, but need to be 
translated into messages usable for policy problems encountered by policy makers 
of the National government. To meet this twofold need the centre vtv has set up 
an organisational infrastructure that provides a back stage space for open and 
informal negotiations firstly with the relevant policy makers, and secondly with 
the scientists and experts involved. This structure allows the project managers of 
the centre vtv a constant going back and forth between the front stage and the 
backstage that is required to write good products.
Firstly, the most difficult task for the project team lies in the composing of the 
messages in such a manner that they are acceptable for the policy makers. The 
vtv reports most of all signals the developments and key issues in public health 
that will face the government over the course of 10 to 15 years (rivm, 1997; rivm, 
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2002; rivm, 2006). Although the centre vtv, with its knowledge of public health, 
can be expected to be well informed of effective measures, it has to be very careful 
when phrasing messages in the form of policy solutions. This balance first entails 
putting a lot of time and effort in creating intensive contacts with key figures at the 
Ministry of Health, policy makers as well as heads of directorates. For every policy 
question asked by the Ministry the project team will follow a certain organisational 
routine that enables them to meet the policy standards, as well as the scientific 
standards, an involved process that is well illustrated by one of the project leaders 
in an interview; 
“The approach followed concerning the expert groups and board of policy makers 
differs per product. Per theme report we put together a new board of policy makers 
and a new expert group, depending on the research question asked by the Ministry. As 
project leader you are asking yourself constantly who’s in the board, who should be in 
the board and whether the people that are in it still comply, and if someone should be 
replaced and by whom if someone leaves the board” (Interview, June 22nd 2005).
These close contacts are necessary for writing useful reports, but also for the 
creation of the ‘right momentum’ for the presentation of the political messages 
of the report. The head of the directorate Public Health of the Ministry of Health 
had for example agreed with vtv 2002 project team to present the findings in 
such a way that the Ministry could “come up with the political answer to the [vtv] 
straight away, in the form of the governmental report Living Healthier Longer, 
to reinforce the impact of the vtv, and to be able to translate the messages into 
policy action” (interview, 14 September 2005)24. For this reason the centre vtv 
has permanently located two project leaders at the Ministry of Health, as liaisons 
between science and policy, in the directorate Information and Analysis that 
was formed for this purpose. These liaisons work intensively with the head of 
the directorate Public Health, to get other directorates involved in the process of 
formulating the research questions. More importantly, these liaisons involve the 
24 Unfortunately, unforeseen and unique political events paralleling the presentation of this particular 
vtv hampered the public presentation, and minimized the political impact of the vtv messages. In the week 
before the elections in May 2002, the Populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who had been the leader of a new right 
winged and fast growing political party, was murdered. In the political mayhap that followed a Cabinet was 
formed with his party in it, which came to a halt about four months later, and new elections were issued. 
These political events strongly influenced and hampered continuing governmental work. Nevertheless, the 
messages from this report have been used in the second governmental prevention report, albeit with much 
less publicity than was hoped for.
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policy makers during the writing process in articulating questions, and during 
the data collecting phase and during the writing of the reports. This is necessary 
to make sure the messages fit the policy questions and the prevention reports of 
the Ministry, and to be able to convince other departments of the importance of 
the vtv reports. For this a general board of heads from public health directorates 
is installed, that regularly monitors the writing phases of the reports by means of 
presentations to this board. This has proven successful in that vtv messages have 
been used extensively the past years for governmental prevention reports.
Secondly, the process of writing the summary report entails many contacts 
with the scientists, and the putting together of many scientists for deliberation on 
the meaning and usefulness of the data. Although the vtv project team includes 
a relatively small number of persons, the team draws on hundreds of scientists to 
participate in the vtv process; either as authors, as experts in the expert groups, 
as part of the extensive literature reviews, as data deliverers, or as scientists 
working in commission of the centre. This becomes visible in the prominent place 
of the literature list and the supplements with the names of all the experts (and 
institutions) involved in the process that cover many pages in the vtv (summary) 
reports. Because the messages in the report are the outcomes or the sediments of 
a very long process of collecting, shifting, measuring information, and debating, 
negotiating, and rewriting texts generated by hundreds of experts, the process of 
developing reports functions as a scientific and political consensus platform for 
the public health sector in the Netherlands. It is in this consensus platform, as a 
back stage negotiation space, that knowledge conflicts are sorted out. 
In this way the centre vtv and the vtv reports have gained an authoritative 
position both in the standardisation of health indicators, and regarding the 
reputation for scientists working in the field of health care. The vtv has become 
a trustworthy source for scientists when working outside their field, for teaching 
reasons as well as for background information; 
‘I presume that when the rivm provides me with a suggestion, that is how I see it, well 
because it is the rivm and it is their job to assemble this information, I presume it is 
a trustworthy suggestion, more trustworthy actually then when I receive it from the 
university library’ (Interview, August 15th 2005)
The process of manufacturing the vtv reports is at the same time an obliga-
tory point of passage (Callon, 1986) for health scientists; research findings receive 
more standing, or become more true, when they can be found in the vtv. In this 
sense the centre vtv fits the policy learning models in which knowledge conflicts, 
the fact value distinction and uncertainty are dealt with by designed occasions 
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for settling possible disputes (Hoppe, 2002). The organisational set-up and the 
obligatory point of passage provide these occasions, so that knowledge conflicts 
and uncertainty debates stay within the realm of the vtv organisation, and do 
not enter the front stage arena. This strategy of conflict avoidance, in the form 
of an advocacy coalition with scientific experts and organisations, shows some 
characteristics of the enlightenment model of science policy interactions.
The organisation of the relation between the centre vtv and the Ministry of 
Health fits the principal-agent relation described in the engineering model, and 
according to the wishes of the Ministry of Health to have more control over the 
knowledge that is produced for the use of answering policy questions. This could 
potentially endanger the policy learning process of the institute, and the initial 
aim of the institute to signal future trends in public health developments. The 
centre puts a lot of effort in possible policy learning. The construction of the sum-
mary report is evaluated each time, internally as well as with the help of external 
reviewers. The main question at this level is; did the vtv report deliver a workable 
message, and why (not)? Furthermore, the centre vtv has become part of the devel-
opment towards evidence-based public health policy. For this the centre needs to 
guarantee a ‘collective memory’, since problems that occur in public health tend 
to stretch over long periods of time, and solutions or prevention strategies are not 
easily found or implemented. The example of the fast increase of obesity and the 
related impending increase in people with diabetes type ii in the Netherlands 
proves only so much (see e.g. rvz, 2002). These problems cannot be solved in a 
short period of time, or by a single party in public health, but require enduring 
action by many parties involved. 
This need for a collective memory – in the form of longstanding experts working 
for the vtv or the Ministry – in order to sustain effective policy measures applies 
just as well or even more so to the Ministry of Health, since many policy makers 
circulate every two to three years between different directorates and Ministries. 
This could potentially lead to fragmentation of knowledge within the Ministry 
of Health and could hamper the efficacy of policy measures. More importantly, 
despite its formal relation to the Ministries, the centre vtv forms a monopoly, 
since no other institute comes close to creating a kind of network and the exper-
tise such as situated at the centre vtv. In certain respects the new, formalized 
relationship might therefore lead to an artificial relationship that could hinder 
effective use of the expertise at the centre, for instance in cases where the centre 
has a signalling function and reports messages that do not get picked up by the 
Ministry, requiring informal intermediary structures.
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The Cpb – modelling the economy of health care 
The longstanding role of the cpb has gained the institute a role of economic 
arbiter within the playing field of policy making. The cpb was established 
immediately after the end of wwii to provide the government with economic 
indications in order to enhance much needed economic growth in the period of 
economic recovery in the aftermath of wwii (Passenier, 1994). At present the 
Bureau has a central position in Dutch policy making, in more than one way. The 
cpb is an economic research institute for the Government, carrying since 1989 
the objective to make “independent economic analyses that are both scientifically 
sound and up-to-date, and relevant for government policy, Parliament and ngo’s, 
such as political parties and the industry” (cpb website, April 2nd 2007; Passenier, 
1994:350). The cpb addresses a wide range of policy fields, such as the National 
Budget, labour market developments, energy markets, inflation, infrastructure, 
and developments in the budget deficit, the welfare state, education, pensions 
and Europe (cpb, 2006; Passenier, 1994). Moreover, by way of the yearly National 
Budget presentations in the Central Economic Plan (cep) and the Macro Economic 
Outlook (the mev), it has an important directive role in the Dutch policy making 
process at the national level, stipulated by law. Moreover, the cpb participates in 
government councils and consultative bodies. Only quite recently the cpb has 
started to work on health care issues as a singular policy issue, with the construc-
tion of a Care model that started in 1995, and the release of a growing number of 
reports on health care issues25. 
For its analyses the cpb uses many economic models. Many of these models 
are unique in the world. Assessment procedures are often preceded by many years 
of model development. A large part of its work and its expertise therefore involves 
the construction of models. Although in the public eye the assessment trajecto-
ries are most visible and seem most important, the more invisible stage of model 
construction offers as much or even more insight into how the cpb shapes its role 
as intermediate between the scientific world and the world of decision making 
and policy.
Dealing with distrust 
In the literature the role of the cpb is often described as technocratic (Pesch, 1999; 
and 2002; Hoppe, 2002, Van den Berg et al, 1993), pointing at the informal power 
the cpb has over governmental decision-making, as it is hard for policymakers to 
25 e.g Healthcare scenarios 2003-2006, and a growing body of reports on the effects of the new insurance 
system, pharmaceutical policies and more, see eg www.cpb.nl for more.
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by-pass cpb analyses. The cpb is granted the power to “make and break” cabinets, 
making its decisional power resemble that of the technocratic model. However, 
the institutional position of the bureau reveals the more bureaucratic nature of 
the position of the cpb vis-à-vis the National Government, in which policy makers 
have the last word. Institutionally, the cpb is part of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. This Ministry executes staff matters, such as wages and other financial 
affairs of the cpb, as far as the formal relationship is concerned. However, to 
guarantee a minimum amount of independence, the cpb is situated at another 
location, away from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Accordingly, there is a divi-
sion of labour between employees who deal with staff matters with the Ministry 
and employees that maintain relations concerning content with the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. The experts working at the cpb are formally civil servants, in 
service of the National Government. 
The authoritative position obtained by the cpb over the years, was in great part 
due to its’ capability to move beyond the pillarized situation that characterized 
the Dutch political system during most of the 20th century (Lijphart 1975; Van den 
Bogaard, 1998). As is shown by Van den Bogaard (1998:8), the cpb’s mathematical 
approach to economic planning proved “a solution for the potential threat of 
conflicts among pillars”. The mathematical-statistic model, as introduced first by 
Tinbergen, could be seen, according to Wilts as a “neutral a priori evaluation of the 
effects of policy measures on economic parameters and thus on the functioning 
of the Dutch economy as a whole” (Wilts, 1997:147), an important instrument in 
seeking consensus in the pillarized Dutch politics (Van den Bogaard, 1998). 
These scientific standards used by the cpb have had manifold effects in Dutch 
society. With the foundation of the cpb, the government provided itself with sci-
entifically skilled experts in economic matters. In its turn the cpb influenced the 
development of statistical economics as a scientific discipline, due to the model 
approach developed by its founders, as is shown by Wilts (1997). Accordingly, 
combined with its sixty years of involvement in many sectors of Dutch policy 
making, the cpb has had great authority in shaping the Dutch economy.26 This 
partly explains the critique on the technocratic position of the cpb in policy 
processes. Formally the cpb has a bureaucratic relation with politics (science on 
tap, politics on top). In practice however this relationship displays technocratic 
26 Although not a line of argumentation followed here, one could argue that both influences of the 
cpb – shaping the economy and shaping the science of economics in the Netherlands – are heavily inter-
twined. See (Callon 1998) for an explorations of the intertwinement of economics and society; see (van 
Egmond and Zuiderent-Jerak, forthcoming) for an analysis of the role of the cpb in the healthcare sector 
that leans strongly on Callon’s approach.
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tendencies (Den Butter, and Kronjee, 2003) as cpb reports prove hard to put aside 
by policy makers; for example because policy makers lack the expertise for alter-
native options. 
Despite efforts to be transparent in methods, their econometric models are 
often difficult to understand for people who are not econometrically trained. 
Their models have the tendency to become black boxes, which contributes to 
the role of technocratic authority that is often assigned to the cpb. It is precisely 
this element in the technocratic bureaucracy institutional form that constitutes a 
form of distrust between the cpb, policy makers and politicians, and between the 
cpb and scientists, that becomes most visible at the front stage. This notion has 
found expression in the rigid and the limited definitions that have been developed 
by the cpb about what is scientific and what is political, and accordingly about 
what is a fact and what a normative consideration. The words of F. Hartog (one 
of the founders of the cpb), spoken in 1970, illustrate cpb’s awareness of its role 
in technical uncertainty reduction as the aim of its institutional position: “when 
the cpb has spoken all possibilities are still open, but we know to what extent” 
(Passenier, 1994:363). Three and a half decades and many disputes later, the web-
site of the cpb leaves no mistakes to the limits of the activities regarding its role 
in the assessment of policy proposals. The board secretary of the cpb, explains it 
in the following words: 
The Cpb does not engage itself in political decisions. What we rather do is, we look at 
all kinds of political issues and examine those in relation to the economic motives and 
consequences. We provide arguments pro and contra certain policy proposals; and we 
provide possible alternative routes. But ultimately the choice for a proposal is not ours 
to make, but is a task for politicians (Interview 040210). 
This remark (and numerous similar expressions) made in public appearances 
point to the effort the cpb has to put into the front stage a display of its political 
independence, and its bureaucratic inclinations.
A modeling trajectory – the care model
Although at the front stage we see that the cpb behaves according to a 
bureaucratic organisation with technocratic influence, the construction of the 
care model shows that in the backstage this it not at all self evident. Political 
discussions often permeate and determine advisory trajectories of the cpb. The 
distinction between what is normative and what is not, between facts and values 
is not always easy to make, especially in an interdisciplinary project such as the 
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care model construction. Science advising in a political environment can quickly 
lead to epistemological and territorial conflicts, as the case study shows. However, 
planning bureaus use many strategies to solve such conflicts. 
In 1994 the cpb started the development of a macro economic model con-
cerning the health sector, together with the Social and Cultural Planning Office 
(Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, scp) and the National Institute for Health and 
the Environment (Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene, rivm). 
The project took place in the context of governmental worries over rising health 
care costs at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, as discussed pre-
viously. In this sense the need for this model is an illustration of the shift towards 
a more accountable government, influenced by ideas of New Public Management, 
and instigated by the 1986 White paper on the future of public health, the famous 
report 2000. The project took place under the authority of the macro economic 
department of the Ministry of vws (Health, Welfare and Sports)27. The need 
for such a model, as described in the official assignment letter by the Assistant 
Secretary for Health, emanated from the need for a “clear starting point for the 
support of the formulation of policy goals for a four year Cabinet period” (cpb, 
letter Simons, 1994). 
The model was expected to provide the government with clear measures, 
in order to set a framework of terms of references for the yearly health care 
budget. The three institutes, the cpb, the rivm and the scp, it was thought, not 
only provided enough expertise to develop the model, but were held capable of 
making an integrated model for the healthcare sector. The rivm and the scp 
facilitated extensive scientific expertise in public health and health care related 
phenomena, and experience in micro economic modelling of public health and 
health care. Combined with the macro economic model experience of the cpb, it 
allowed for the integration of both econometric and epidemiological knowledge. 
More importantly, the model needed to address three policy questions. First, it 
needed to explain past developments in the use and costs of healthcare on the 
macro economic level. Second, it needed to calculate the future effects of pos-
sible financial-economic policy options on the macro economic level. And third, 
it needed to show effects of possible healthcare and prevention policy options on 
the demand and supply of healthcare and its consequences for healthcare costs 
(cpb, scp and rivm, 1994). The stakes in the cooperation project were high, as the 
words of Simons in the same letter illustrate;
27 In 1995 the Ministry changed its name from Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture (wvc) into its cur-
rent name.
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I am aware of the enormous ambitions that are at stake to come to an integrated 
calculation model for the health care sector. […] The collaboration between the Cpb, 
rivm and sCp will provide valuable insights into the structure and dynamics of the 
health care system. (Simons, 1994).
The attempt to integrate an epidemiological, a socio-economic and a macro 
economic approach in one model soon proved too ambitious. 
At the end of 1994 the project team produced a preliminary report, in which 
the outline of the model was discussed. Based on a years’ work of preliminary 
(literature) research and consultation, the project team argued that it would prove 
near impossible to meet all the wishes of the Ministry. The combination of the 
three policy questions in one model raised fundamental problems. The first two 
questions required an economic modeling of costs of the healthcare system whereas the 
third question required modeling of public health developments (eg epidemiological 
trends). However, integrating the two paradigms proved impossible in one macro 
economic model. As the cpb project leader at that time explained:
‘For the planning bureau (Cpb) it was paramount that the model needed to be based 
on economic theory first (…). Well, the sCp had approximately the same starting point 
although slightly more focused on the empirical part. And the rivm had a much more 
bottom up approach, individual diseases and all, and this approach could never be 
united with the economic theoretical approach.’ (041006, Cpb) 
In practice, the parameters that were used for economic modeling were limited to 
‘age’ and ‘gender’, whereas modeling public health included a whole range of other 
healthcare parameters besides age and gender, such as the indicators described 
in the Lalonde model (see page 16), and other indicators such as role of medical 
technology, social economic position of patients, advancing medical opinions etc. 
This delivered many difficulties. Firstly, modeling economically healthcare 
cost developments on a macro scale for a period of four to five years using more 
than the two indicators age and gender proved challenging. Secondly, the inclu-
sion of healthcare policies as an indicator for developments in public health in a 
model that assesses healthcare policies for their effects on cost development proved 
not possible. Typical for regulations aimed at prevention is that the effect of these 
cannot be measured within four to five years, the extent of the desired model. 
Therefore, the project team decided to give priority to the modeling of the costs of 
the healthcare system over a model that could answer all three questions. As was 
said during one of the project meetings: 
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“the aim of the project is to develop a model for costs and not a model for health.” 
(Meeting notes, 960513).
To avoid a priori conflicts over the purpose and outline of the model, the project 
team restricted the extent of the model. Consequently, part of the knowledge 
deemed necessary lost its meaning in this stage of the modeling trajectory. The 
rivm left the project team as a full member in this stage of the development of 
the Healthcare model. 
Solving knowledge conflicts: epistemologically and territorially 
Hidden behind epistemological problems are often questions of normativity; 
what is considered a fact in the matter and what as a normative issue? Obviously, 
different disciplines answer this question differently. Soon after the project team 
had started modeling the patient part, and other parts of the model, the group 
experienced a series of conflicts that seemed epistemological in nature. Firstly, 
there was the question of representation; what elements constitute a better 
representation of the health care sector? The second question was how these 
representations would fit a macro economic model, a more methodological ques-
tion. However, these knowledge conflicts were fuelled by underlying political 
discussions, and accordingly differing ideas on what constitutes a better repre-
sentation of the health care sector. Moreover, these conflicts are solved though 
epistemological and territorial coping mechanisms. 
Illustrative of epistemological differences is discussion on the modeling of the 
demand side of health. At a certain point the project team had to decide which 
effects to incorporate within the demand side of health. As the organisation and 
planning report shows: 
Not taking into account demand effects would imply that we impose on the model that 
certain policy measures such as own payments for doctor consults have no effect 
on the production of health care provisions. Considered the prominent place of own 
payments in the [political] discussion over cost-containment, it seems irresponsible 
to leave such an assumption out. It would be more logical to have the empirical data 
determine if and how own payments influence the production of health provisions. (In: 
Cpb / sCp, rmz 1995). 
This remark exemplifies that the more political an issue is the more careful 
the planning bureau has to be in defining the matter. As the model needed to be 
a representation of the policy field, the question what counts as political issues 
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and what as an uncontested fact should in this case be determined in the political 
realm. Other normative assumptions were more easily put in the model, as long 
as it concerned politically unproblematic matters. The discussion on demand 
was solved by splitting the demand for health provisions in two; the demand is 
determined by (1) the patients when they first visit their General Practitioner, and 
(2) by doctors for follow-up consults. Although not mentioned in discussions 
concerning demand, this choice implied a more market oriented solution, even 
though other solutions were available. However, this effect was not under political 
scrutiny and thus it was not discussed.
In the case of modeling the medical specialist a territorial coping mechanism was 
used. The political delicacy of longstanding plans to restrict specialists’ incomes 
partly explains how a seemingly inconspicuous matter as a medical specialist 
became a controversial obstacle in the project. Parties disagreed about whether the 
medical specialist could be modelled as a combination of “ethical” and “money 
grubbing” characteristics or if more detailed representations were necessary. Both 
institutes held different approaches towards health care – an econometric theo-
retical approach, and an empirical micro economic approach – combined with a 
lack of empirical data suitable for micro-based macro economic modelling. scp 
project members for instance found a single description of medical specialists 
inappropriate, firstly because of lack of empirical information on the behaviour of 
medical specialists, and secondly because one description could never accurately 
represent overall medical specialists behaviour. For cpb project members, however, 
more than one description of the behaviour of medical specialist was difficult to 
fit in a macro economic model. The project team coped with these differences by 
renouncing the collaboration with the scp, in December 1996 (cpb, 961212). The 
project went further with a consultancy role for the scp for specific elements of the 
model, similar to the contribution of the rivm (cpb, 961224). The cpb became the 
main contractor of the model28. In 1999 the project team released the first edition 
of the Care Model, and it was used first for a cpb report on the future of health care 
costs 2003-2006 in a 2001 report (cpb, 2001). Remarkably, the interdisciplinary 
work that was the objective of the project, was transformed into one in which there 
was a hierarchical relation between the three kinds of expertise.
28 Worth mentioning in this respect is that on the cover of the official publication of the model the authors 
make a reference to the way these issues were solved in this interdisciplinary project by using the very par-
ticular words ´in collaboration with ,´ which point to the fact that the scp has substantially contributed to 
the model but is not the main contractor of the project.
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Scientific standards as credibility builders: the role of the protocol 
The role of the cpb as technocratic authority has often led to a political distrust 
that is often shown toward cpb reports and standpoints, resulting in political 
debates on the truth value of cpb findings. In reaction the cpb creates a kind of 
transparency in how it deals with expected uncertainty in policy proposals, as well 
as in the use of scientific knowledge. The protocol for planning bureaus serves a 
role in this. The protocol thus functions as a boundary object, a transparency tool 
that leaves no mistakes as to whom is in charge of the normative deliberations – 
politics – and to the tasks of the cpb – deliver scientific facts and analyses. 
Over the years the cpb has developed reports in which the ‘scientific’ is defined, 
and has used scientific boards to assess its functioning and to accompany its 
projects. The self-assessment report “Scanning cpb”, published in 1997 (cpb, 
1997) concerns the research methods and data use. It focuses on the extent to 
which the research conducted at the cpb is reproducible by others, even within 
the cpb. The cpb is very open about the limitations of the reproducibility of its 
models, and has accordingly required documentation “as exactly, completely and 
justifiably as possible with regard to how the disposable data material has led 
to the results presented” (website www.cpb.nl, September 13th 2006). This open 
display of scientific standards and its limitation adds to trust and credibility of the 
planning bureaus’ front stage performance, by applying bureaucratically organ-
ized rules and regulations in the form of the protocol and the texts on the websites. 
However, as the modeling trajectory shows, this seemingly open attitude front 
stage towards trust and credibility can lead to a limited focus or a limited open-
ness or limited reflexive attitude towards other kinds of economic knowledge and 
theory backstage. 
A recent international report about the cpb – the Beleidsgeorienteerde toet-
sing cpb (btc) report – mostly points towards the complicated relation between 
neutrality and independence, referring to situations in which preferred policy 
measures unavoidably arise from research findings. The report argues that in 
those cases the cpb should not withhold its opinion on preferred policy measures, 
because that would lead to;
the paradox that the Planning bureau for the sake of its independence refrain[s] from 
the policy makers, but at the same time because of this, unintentionally influence[s] the 
direction of the policy discussion. (Commissie btC, 2001:12)
These remarks support the findings of the case study that point toward a 
paradox in cpb’s ways of dealing with its authoritative position in the Dutch policy 
field. On the one hand the cpb actively shapes the Dutch economy and economic 
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policy. On the other hand, the cpb deals poorly with its authoritative position by 
emphasising its independence and scientific credibility. Remarkably, although 
the protocol for the planbureau function formally arranges the independence 
of all bureaus and the playing field of the institutes, both organisationally and 
content-wise, it proves less useful in solving knowledge conflicts between plan-
ning bureaus during actual projects such as the Care Modeling project. In this 
project scientific standards of other science advisory institutes were called into 
question, even though these standards are widely used and tested in the respected 
scientific areas. 
Comparing science / policy interactions: different 
levels at work 
Although in the every day processes of public policy making the use of knowl-
edge and expertise of numerous experts and expert organizations has become a 
routine event, what goes on during the actual processes and interactions between 
experts and policy makers remains rather concealed. The ubiquitousness of 
expertise in policy making processes, however, demands a closer look at how the 
relations between scientific advisory bodies and the policy making processes are 
actually organized, and to what consequences. It raises questions as how we can 
understand the mediating role of scientific institutes in the health field, and what 
these institutes have to do to sustain their own positions in this field. Moreover, 
it raises the question how we can understand the differences and similarities 
between these institutes in sustaining their authoritative positions. 
We started the research with the idea that the science policy interactions 
between the cpb, rivm / centre vtv and policy makers can be characterized 
according the bureaucratic and technocratic organization of science policy inter-
actions as found in pps and sts literature. Although these notions still hold, from 
the research a more subtle and refined image of science / policy interactions arises. 
It is difficult to characterize single institutes according to one model. Instead, we 
have seen different science policy interactions at work, at different moments in 
the advisory processes, at different places in the organizational structure. At each 
moment front stage images of the role of these science-based organisations in the 
policy making process, and the back stage ways of performing their role as science 
advisory institute for policy making play an important role in how both institutes 
present themselves, and in constituting and maintaining credibility and authority 
(Bal et al., 2002; Hilgartner, 2000). 
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A bureaucratic presentation on stage
The institutional space both institutes take up in the Dutch policy realm can 
be characterized, as we have argued, by a bureaucratic organisation of the sci-
ence policy nexus. This implies a primacy for policy makers and politicians in 
the relationship with both science advisory bodies. However, as both institutes 
have a monopoly position in their policy field, this provides both institutes with a 
substantial authority and say over their involvement in policy processes. 
Although they both fit the bureaucratic model and have substantial authority 
over their roles, there are clear differences between both institutes. The bureau-
cratic institutional organisation of the cpb, combined with its complex technical 
instruments, provided the cpb with the kind of organizational learning which ena-
bled the cpb to develop into a technocratic authority. As the cpb has had a great 
influence on the development of economic science since the 1950s, and accord-
ingly the shaping of the Dutch economy after wwii, this technocratic position 
has raised lots of criticism over the years. In opposition, the role of the centre vtv 
in the public health field is quite young and still developing. In this respect the 
centre vtv has hardly had a chance to develop into a technocratic power in this 
field. Moreover, as the centre vtv does not have the planning bureau status, and 
the Ministry of Health formally determines the research agenda for the centre 
vtv, it will probably take more effort to develop a technocratic relation with the 
Ministry of Health and the health field at large. The vtv’s research agenda is much 
more determined by its relation with the Ministry than the research agenda of the 
cpb, especially since the cpb works independently for all Ministries, and the vtv 
first of all for the Ministry of Health. 
Dealing with conflict, uncertainty, and values
More importantly, even as both institutes formally have a bureaucratic relation 
with their policy makers, both institutes have different degrees of freedom in 
dealing with knowledge conflicts, uncertainty and normative issues, eg the fact / 
value distinction. The environmental division of the rivm deals with uncertainty 
in technocratic way by providing a broad range of possible uncertainties, and strat-
egies to act on uncertainty. However, the centre vtv has more degrees of freedom 
than the environmental division of the rivm. The centre vtv solves uncertainty 
issues in the backstage area, through negotiations with involved institutes, health 
scientists and experts. As such the centre vtv is able to act as spokesperson on 
behalf of the public health community. The cpb, however, is able to articulate 
uncertainty in technical terms. Scenario studies published by the cpb usually 
cover variants within the same model, instead of using different models. 
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At the front stage the cpb has to deal with the image of a technocratic organisa-
tion, embedded in political discussions and disputes over the role of the institute. 
Not surprisingly the cpb uses a very strict rhetoric to meet the criticism from 
economists or political parties. At the front stage the cpb keeps a strict regime, 
as to secure its independent status as impartial arbiter for all governmental 
policy fields, towards other planning bureaus and towards all Ministries, through 
the use of the protocol for the planning bureaus, the opd and the yearly work 
programme. Interestingly, this strict protocol has in a sense contributed to the 
technocratic image of the institute, as it could hinder open discussions about 
the parameters of their models. Recent years the cpb has opened up about the 
use of their models, and the way the institute deals with uncertainty issues. The 
cpb depicts since a more transparent attitude towards its’ technical and scientific 
tools, and the limitations of these tools. However, it renders the question whether 
such transparency is enough to soften the image of technocratic power. Moreover, 
the way the cpb deals with conflicting knowledge claims it seems as if the cpb 
really is in no need to shed the image of a technocratic power, since this fits their 
position in the policy field really well.
The uncertainty debate and related actions undertaken by the rivm show that 
especially the environmental part of the rivm (mnp) deals with similar issues as 
the cpb. In opposition, the position of the centre vtv is, as we have argued, sur-
prisingly uncontested, politically as well as scientifically. The centre secures its 
status directly with the Ministry of Health, in their negotiations on the research 
agenda, and is hence involved in an intensive relation with the policy makers at the 
Ministry of Health. Moreover, it is able to act as spokesperson for the public health 
community. Interestingly, the location of the front stage is different to that of the 
cpb. Whereas cpbs’ front stage involves both political, and public elements, the 
centre vtv has a front stage role in the policy cycle, but less so to other parties. 
There is a subtle interaction between wished-for roles of both institutes and the 
actual roles. Both institutes work different strategies to secure their front stage 
performance. However, the cpb performs more work to keep its authoritative 
and independent position to the world outside the policy processes and political 
decision making processes. The centre vtv seems to have more control over the 
front stage role its plays in the public realm, as it is also less involved in political 
issues. More interesting, though, is the freedom both have in portraying some 
normative choices as technical and others as political. Both institutes mediate 
between science and policy, they select, order and assess existing information for 
several scientific and non-scientific sources to make it suitable for policy makers. 
Both institutes have, as discussed before, to talk to the policy makers as well as 
with scientists extensively in order to produce useful products. They do deliver 
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facts, because once a message is in a report, it becomes a fact. In that sense both 
institutes have the authority to create facts, and to depoliticize political discus-
sions. The cpb does that with help of the protocol, and the models. However, 
the centre vtv has to undertake more negotiating work with policy makers than 
the cpb.
Modeling science advice
These diverting positions materialize in the particular institutional shaping of 
the relations of both institutes with the policy field, and the mutual relations and 
status of both fields of expertise. cpb’s position within government arrangements 
is that of a planning bureau, which provides it with a legal position within the 
policy process. Furthermore it has a vote in powerful councils on the highest levels 
of the government, and concerns many policy areas that are affected by or affect 
the economy. Even when the cpb focuses on a specific field within the economy, 
namely health care, with the care model, it still addresses the macro economic 
effects of health care on the economy as a whole. Consequently, its reports are 
bound to have more political impact, although this has partly to do with the time-
lines and nature of the reports: financial impact becomes visible much sooner 
than the future predictions in public health done by the centre vtv. The role of 
the centre vtv is limited to an advisory role, and its reports and statements can be 
ignored by the Ministry of Health. The rivm thus needs to undertake other routes 
and measures to acquire the same effect on the policy process, if at all. 
However, as these two positions formally seem to fit existing models of 
science policy interactions, the usefulness of this classification blurs when used to 
explain day to day work practices of the experts at both institutes to keep their effec-
tive and authoritative position. The vtv is able to maintain its authoritative position 
as advisory body in the public health policy field, because it is able to form an advo-
cacy coalition with the public health sector. As such it can speak for large parts of 
the public health community. The centre vtv has designed a strong organisational 
infrastructure that provides a ‘negotiation space’ for informal contacts both with 
the policy and the scientific fields. This space is necessary to perform the work that 
is needed for the front stage image of the role of the vtv in public health policy 
making. The cpb maintains its authoritative position in the public health policy 
field, through using its authoritative position within the political arena in general to 
constitute authority at another policy area. Its focus is much more on maintaining 
transparency and its independence in the political field in relation to the Ministries, 
than on creating a widely supported network of experts or a knowledge infrastruc-
ture for the building of the model, and further doings in the field of health care.
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Introduction
Recent work on the relationship between science and policy focuses on boundary 
work that is performed in interactions between scientists and policy makers. The 
study of such boundary work offers valuable insights in the organization of sci-
ence-policy relations for policy making, and in how the division of labor between 
science and policy is realized and to what consequences for the substantive issues 
at hand, such as what may pass for a fact and what as a value, what issues should 
be left to politics and what to science and what is left out altogether. Most research 
on boundary work focuses on (the role and organization of) regulatory science in 
environmental issues (Bal, 1998; Edwards, 1999; Halffman, 2003; Jasanoff, 1990; 
Miller, 2001; Wynne, 1992). In this article we focus on economic science in relation 
to health care policy making. 
Although the role of economic science in policy making has been studied by 
scholars such as Evans (1999, and 2000), Van den Bogaard (1999, and 2002), eco-
nomic models as policy instruments are left rather underexposed as research sites 
(see Evans, 1999; Kraemer et al, 1987; Mackenzie and Millo, 2003; Callon, 1998; 
Garcia-Parpet, 2007). Such models provide, in Evans’ words “the sociologically 
fascinating nexus of an activity that brings together, legitimates, and quantifies 
political and moral theories about the world” (Evans, 1999). The value of economic 
models for policy makers is found in their ability to legitimize policy choices that 
in their turn express a political wish to actively shape the world. This requires 
open and transparent processes in which the parties involved remain accountable 
for the choices they make for or against certain models. Economic and econo-
metric models however often become black boxes and are extremely difficult to 
understand for ‘lay’ persons, with the exception of the handful of experts involved 
in the model construction. This makes the study of economic modeling practices 
very relevant and raises questions as: what happens in those modeling practices? 
How do scientists translate theories of the world into model parameters? And 
what is the role of policy makers in this? 
In this article29 we seek to answer these questions by a detailed investigation 
of a unique governmental project in which an econometric model for the health 
care system (further: care model30) was developed in a multi-disciplinary team 
29 This article greatly benefitted from the critical comments of the members of the Health care Governance 
group at the Department of Health Policy and Management, the Rethinking project and the wtmc winter-
school, as well from the critical comments of Rob Evans, Marjolein van Asselt, Babette Mueller-Rockstroh, 
Antoinette de Bont, Jan Seijbel, Marc Berg, and the anonymous reviewers of sthv.
30 All translations of Dutch texts as well as interviews have been made by the authors.
Boundary work in science-policy practices 69
of science advisors from three Dutch science-for-policy institutes. Our analysis 
of these practices of model construction offers insights in economic models as 
specific sites of science-policy interactions. We show that processes of modeling 
provide a necessary discursive space where different disciplines meet, and where 
negotiations between these disciplines take place. Furthermore, we show that 
science advisors are entangled with policy actors that they advise in what we 
call boundary configurations; strongly situated interconnections between science 
and policy institutions that share a specific approach to problem definitions and 
methods and that are embedded in, and at the same time embed, specific social, 
discursive and material elements. In this article we discuss the social, discursive 
and material elements that make up these boundary configurations, and show 
how these have shaped the incorporation of specific types of knowledge and 
associated norms and values, while leaving out others, and to what consequences 
to how health care is organized. That is, the boundary configuration involving 
the economic science advisors and economic policy actors allowed for the con-
struction of a specific version of the care model in which the health care system is 
depicted as a (regulated) market. 
Boundary work in science-policy practices
Social scientists have tried for decades to describe interactions between science 
and politics, and how science is put to use in political decision making processes. 
Fields that have traditionally studied this relation fell short of providing good 
explanations for the interplay between science and politics. Traditional models, 
such as the knowledge utilization model or the technocratic model, portray sci-
ence as the producer of objective knowledge that policy makers can more or less 
easily find and use. A major drawback of this model is that it presupposes a strict 
boundary between science and policy, as well as a unidirectional movement from 
fundamental to applied knowledge (Halffman, 2003; Jasanoff, 1990; see also 
Sabatier, 1999; Weingart, 1999; Wildavsky, 1987; Wittrock, 1991; Woodhouse, and 
Cozzens, 1995).
The concept of boundary work as described by the American sociologist Tom 
Gieryn avoids the pitfalls of these traditional models and offers instead a concept to 
search for methods that interpret “changing allocations of power, authority, con-
trol, credibility, expertise and material resources among groups and occupations” 
in science and in policy making fields (Gieryn, 1995:440). Through boundary work, 
scientists try to demarcate science from non-science. Gieryn describes four reasons 
for scientists to demarcate science from non-science; (1) the monopolization of 
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knowledge, (2) the expansion of boundaries into knowledge spaces owned by 
other scientists, (3) the expulsion of non-scientists from knowledge spaces, and 
last, (4) the protection of knowledge from politics; “staying near but keeping out” 
is how Gieryn refers to this last type of boundary work (Gieryn, 1995:434; Gieryn, 
1983). Studying boundary work offers insight into the normative implications of 
such demarcations. 
Interactions between science and politics, the challenge for involved people and 
organizations is to establish productive relations, in spite of different networks, 
separate disciplines and cultures. This requires “hybrid management” (Miller, 
2001). As such, boundaries that are made in those practices, on the one hand 
demarcate science from non-science, while they also provide ways in which those 
differentiated domains can interact. That is, boundary work allows one to move 
“beyond these boundaries, and to create hybrids of science and non-science” (Bal, 
Bijker, and Hendriks 2002: 323). Boundary work is social, material and discursive 
in nature; protocols, policy or advisory reports, models, jargon, buildings and other 
objects can have demarcating and coordinating consequences (Halffman, 2003; 
Star, and Griesemer, 1989; Bal, Bijker, and Hendriks 2002; Cash, Borck, and Patt, 
2006; Jasanoff, 1990; Miller 2001). Boundaries tend to become harder when they 
become routinized in such discursive, social and material practices (Halffman, 
2003). This makes it harder to overcome boundaries between sciences, and those 
between science and policy, and makes it more difficult to manage such hybrids.
In her study of science advisory agencies in the us, Jasanoff describes 
boundary work as a “hybrid activity that combines elements of scientific evidence 
and reasoning with large doses of social and political judgment” (Jasanoff, 1990: 
229). Building consensus, weighing interests, and depolitization of political 
issues are central in the boundary work of such institutes. Policy making often 
involves choosing between theoretical models of the world, which are typically 
developed by science-based institutes that are to inform the government about 
what model to use. 
Science advisory institutes are neither fully scientific, nor fully policy-oriented. 
The models (ands other tools) that are often employed by them for policy assess-
ments have to be scientifically sound yet useful for policy makers. However, 
being useful entails that a model meets a broad set of criteria. Kraemer at al have 
shown that both technological, and organizational elements, and the connection 
to policy have to be taken into account in the modeling processes (Kraemer et 
al, 1987). Others have shown that models as boundary objects contribute to the 
interpretation and translation of scientific knowledge for policy-making and 
decision making processes by simplifying and stretching the world into useful 
models (Sismondo, 1999: Morgan, and Morrison, 1999; Star, and Griesemer, 1989). 
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Modeling practices provide the necessary discursive space in which negotiations 
between experts and policy makers can take place. 
The three science-advisory institutes that participated in the care project, 
have authoritative expertise respectively on socio-economic issues in Dutch 
society (scp), public health issues (rivm) and macro economic modeling (cpb), 
and are typical places where such boundary work takes place. Although these 
institutes are science advisory bodies, as ‘planning bureaus’ their role in decision 
making processes is more authoritative than other science advisory bodies in the 
Netherlands; they have powerful positions as ‘arbiters’ of the playing field of policy 
makers. They are often criticized as typical Dutch phenomena, and exponents of 
a technocratic organization of science and policy making (Halffman, and Hoppe, 
2005), as they simultaneously legitimize Governments’ attempts to redirect and 
depoliticize political problems. They often are engaged in modeling practices 
directed at sensitive political issues. Special about the case that we describe in 
this article is that they were to cooperate on constructing the same model. 
The article is based on a case study in which a reconstruction was made 
of the development of a macro economic model that covered a period between 
1994 and 1999. 23 semi-structured interviews31 were held with persons involved 
in the development of the Care model, including members of the project group 
from the respective science advisory bodies, and concerned departments of the 
Ministry of Health. Furthermore, some members of the scientific committee that 
advised on the development of the model were interviewed, as well as an employee 
from a large data provider. Some of the actors were interviewed more than once. 
Furthermore a document analysis was done based on archives of the health care 
model at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, and the Ministry 
of Health (containing official letters, proposals, minutes of meetings, notes, 
progress reports, and evaluations of the project). The data collection took place 
between February 2004 and June 2005. 
The need for one economic model for health care policies
The care model project started officially in January 1994 when the Minister 
of Health sent the installation letter of the care model project to the three par-
ticipating science advisory bodies (vws, 1994). Reasons behind the need for such 
macro economic model, derived firstly from the neo-liberal turn in Dutch politics 
in the 1980s, which brought the existing arrangements of the welfare state under 
31 In order to insure the anonymity of the interviewees, all interview material is coded; a list of interviewees 
is obtainable with the authors.
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attack (Helderman et al, 2005; Kickert, 2000). Rising costs of the health care sector 
especially contributed since the 1970s to the Government’s rethinking of its mode 
of governing the health care sector. In 1987 a government commission proposed 
a market based system for the health care sector, in the report ‘Willingness to 
Change’ (Dekker, 1987), as a best way to secure the contradicting values in health 
care such as quality, equal accessibility, affordability and distribution of health 
care. This report sparked many public debates on the effects of such a market-
based policy program (Helderman et al, 2005). Critics feared that market com-
petition in health care would undermine the solidarity of the Dutch health care 
system; that it would lead to contradicting effects such as lesser quality of health 
care, higher costs of care, adverse risk selection of (unhealthy) people, and that it 
would contribute to a deterioration of civilized society. 
These debates for one thing emphasized that clear measures about the public 
health status of Dutch citizens and the costs of the system, necessary to develop 
health policies, were lacking. Based on a government White paper, the ‘Report 
2000’ published in 1986, the government had commissioned the National Institute 
of Public Health and the Environment (rivm) to develop a structural overview of 
the public health status of Dutch citizens, which was first published in 1993 (Boer, 
1986; nrv, 1987; Van Egmond et al, 2007). Although with this report the govern-
ment possessed a tool that provided insights in public health trends, it lacked an 
instrument to rationalize the financial policy choices in the health care system. 
The macro economic section of the Ministry of Health, with its focus on macro 
economic and labor market policy making in health care, had tried for years to 
develop tools that could connect public health information with analysis and pre-
diction of development of health care costs at the macro economic level, and the 
volume of health care services. The project secretary from the Ministry of Health 
reflected on this period:
….in the past we made estimations based on simple demographic patterns. For example 
if we wanted to lower the fees for medical specialists, in the past we simply decided 
to cut down with a couple of ten guilder notes [10 guilder equals about 4.5 euros]. With 
a simple estimation we could calculate that one hundred-thousand consults times 
ten guilders, that’s quite a cut-down. Based on such simple estimations we proposed 
health policy to the Minister (040512, vws)
But the attempts to develop tools by the macro economic section of the Ministry 
proved unsuccessful (cpb and scp, 1997). The political pressure to provide 
transparent numbers on (economic) developments in health care tempted some 
Members of Parliament in 1993 to suggest a new planning bureau for health care 
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issues. Both the Ministry of Health and other science advisory institutes, however, 
did not desire another authoritative institute so close to their own field of expertise; 
an interdisciplinary project with three authoritative institutes could just as well 
provide unambiguous policy answers for many parties as a new science advisory 
body. Therefore, the Social and Cultural Planning Office (scp) took part, for its 
expertise on micro economic modeling and its focus on socio-economic issues in 
Dutch society, such as effects of health policy measures on e.g. the accessibility 
of health care for individuals32 (Trommel, 2003). Also the National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (rivm) was asked, because of its expertise 
on public health issues33 (Van Egmond et al, 2007). And the Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Assessment (cpb), was asked for its’ expertise in economic 
modeling and its authoritative position in Dutch economic policy analysis34 (Den 
Butter, and Mosch, 2003; Pesch, 1999; Van den Bogaard, 1999). 
 
Emerging boundary configurations in modeling 
practices for policy making
Bringing together experts
After the official installation of the project team, a project team was formed. 
Firstly, three experts from each organization, carried out the literature review, and 
wrote a pre-study. After this the project continued with a core of experts from scp 
and cpb, who all had a background in modeling, albeit in different fields. The two 
scp experts were trained in micro-economic modeling of the service industries. 
cpb experts were trained in macro economic modeling. Importantly, the project 
leader was a highly trained (PhD level) macro economist from cpb. A data analyst 
from the cpb supported the project with statistical analysis in the computer. 
During the project between 1994 and 1999 cpb held the same project leader, and 
32 Its bi-annual Social and Cultural Report is a key publication for long-term strategic planning in socio-
economic policy (Trommel, 2003).
33 The rivm publishes among other the aforementioned Public Health Future Prospect (published every 
four years), and the Environmental Outlook (see (rivm, 2002; Van den Bogaard, 2002; van Egmond et al, 
2007).
34 The government relies on cpb’s estimations of economic development and adjusts its policymaking in 
economic, financial and most other policy fields based on these estimations (see e.g. den Butter and Mosch, 
2003; Pesch, 1999; Van den Bogaard, 1999).
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modeling expert. scp however had more alterations in staff; the experts that had 
started in 1994 had all been replaced by other experts at some point during the 
project. Besides the core group of experts, project members often invited in other 
experts, from their own organization and from outside, to model specific parts of 
the health care system.
The project team was supported by a scientific committee. This committee, 
installed for peer review and to support the project group in thinking about mod-
eling the Dutch health care sector, represented as much as possible the diversified 
conceptions of the health care system. At the start, fourteen experts and scientists 
from several universities and of various backgrounds in health care had a seat in 
the committee; economists, health economists, a mathematician, a public health 
professor, one expert from a large data collecting organization in health care, and 
high positioned policy makers from the Ministries of Health, Economic Affairs, 
and Financial Affairs (rmz-1); although over the years some alterations took place 
and the committee became smaller. Between January 1996 and April 1999 the 
committee conferred about twice a year, to comment on versions of the model. 
Last was the involvement of the section of Macro Economic and Labor Market 
Issues (meeva) of the Ministry of Health. This section carried out secretarial 
assistance such as the meetings with the scientific committee, the financial 
affairs of the project, and the monitoring of the project. For cpb, that had no prior 
experience with health care modeling, the involvement of meeva meant a great 
support for their way of working, as both cpb employees and the meeva secretary 
shared similar views on macro economic modeling, the role of economic theory, 
and a shared educational, and social background35. 
Negotiating the models’ scope 
When the project group and supporting scientific committee had been installed, 
a small group started working on a pre-study, to formulate the focus of the model: 
what parts of the health care system should it address and how should it address 
these? This involved translation of the aims set by Government and the bringing 
together of the three approaches of the health care system by the three institutes 
involved, which differed both theoretically and empirically. The aim of the care 
35 When we looked at and asked about the career developments of the persons we interviewed, we especially 
noted that a good amount of the persons we interviewed and that studied econometrics have worked for 
either the cpb or meeva in the past, and have shifted to other key positions within the network of the care 
model, such as to a key position within the data provider Prismant, from the cpb to meeva and vice versa. 
We have also seen these exchanges between meeva and the scp and the health care section of the rivm.
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model as formulated in the commissioning letter was to provide the government 
with “the tools to set the policy agenda for the yearly health care Budget” (vws, 
1994). The model needed to make “useable and trustworthy assessments of pos-
sible effects of financial and economic policies for the Dutch health care sector for 
periods of four to five years”, based on public health information (cpb, 1994; cpb, 
scp, rivm: Pre-study, 1994). Moreover, the model should be based on behavior 
descriptions instead of simple demographic patterns, and it was to represent the 
whole health care system, that is, as the system is regarded by the Ministry of 
Health, encompassing both the financial organization of the system, and the 
organization of the system, and all the types of cure and care that the Dutch care 
system has to offer (Interview, 040512).
In the pre study, presented four months later, three modeling goals were for-
mulated by the project team in close interaction with the project secretary from 
the Ministry of Health. They concluded that, first, the model needed to explain 
past developments in the use and costs of health care on the macro economic level. 
Second, it needed to calculate the future effects (four to five years) of possible 
financial-economic policy options on the macro economic level. Finally, it needed 
to show the (long term) effects of possible health care and prevention policy options on 
the demand and supply of health care and its consequences for health care costs 
(Pre-study, 1994). With these three goals the project met Governments’ wishes 
and the project team was set up in January 1995. 
Interestingly, these goals act in this instance as boundary objects (Star, and 
Griesemer, 1989) in that they both tie together different social worlds – scien-
tific as well as policy related – and coordinated specific tasks to each of these 
worlds: who is responsible for what. The firmness of such boundary objects has 
a certain disciplinary effect for the actors involved, in that actors can be held 
accountable for (not) meeting these goals, and such goals form the footing or 
basis for negotiations about how to use theoretical perspectives on health care 
in order to set up the care model. The specificity of the formulation of the goals 
gave space for an integrated modeling with micro and macro economic theory as 
well as epidemiological and demographic data; a rather complex integration of 
macro economic theory on health care (e.g. what constitutes demand of health 
care), micro economic theory on public health issues (e.g. what does illness mean 
for individual incomes or groups of people), and modeling based on public health 
or epidemiological information (e.g. how often does an illness occur, in which 
sectors of society, and to what costs). An example of its complexity is the question 
what the financial benefits for government expenses are, when an investment is 
made in the prevention of smoking. An answer requires integration of knowledge 
from different scientific disciplines, economic, socio-psychological as well as 
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epidemiological, about the amount of smokers, the kinds of illnesses that are 
related to smoking, effects of prevention programs, and finally the costs involved. 
Such assessments are very complex because the information is needed from dif-
ferent aggregation levels; the macro level (e.g. demand effects), the micro level 
(what does it mean for smokers and / or patients?), and on the policy level (e.g. 
what policy measure to take? Or, when and how does one speak of effective policy 
measures?). 
Through these goals the model had now become ‘a model of’ an integration of 
micro economic theories, macro economic theories and public health theories of 
health care, in order to support health policy. This turned the care project into a 
unique attempt to firstly bring together micro-economic knowledge (e.g micro-
simulation modeling), knowledge about public health trends (epidemiological 
approaches), and macro economic knowledge, and secondly to touch a broad and 
politically sensitive policy field. 
Renegotiating the goal of the model
For a large part the outline of the model had been negotiated on within the 
project team and the expert group but these negotiations took place at the discur-
sive level; a literature surge was carried out and no actual modeling had been done. 
The next step for the project team was to operationalize these broad goals and to 
start with the theoretical descriptions of the health care system. In this phase 
true defining decisions were made regarding what theoretical descriptions are the 
‘best’ representatives of the health care system, and what the model should be a 
model of. A couple of months after the start in 1994, the project team concluded 
that the goals formulated in the pre-study could not be achieved: macro economic 
modeling practices, and micro-economic practices based on epidemiological and 
demographic public health information proved impossible to combine in one 
model. The project leader at that time explained:
For the planning bureau [Cpb] it was paramount that the model needed to be based 
on economic theory first […]. And the rivm had a much more bottom up approach, 
individual diseases and all, and this approach could never be united with the macro 
economic theoretical approach. (041006, Cpb) 
 
The project team, together with the Ministry of Health, decided to shift the 
model’s focus to explanations of past developments in costs of health care, and 
predictions of four to five years of economic assessments of future policy pro-
posals, as these could be done with lesser epidemiological information (Pre-study, 
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1994). The effects of policy on public health were thus proposed to be left out 
of the model. As a consequence, rivm was relocated from the project team to 
the scientific committee where it took on a much smaller role (scp, 1994). The 
authority of the institutes was at stake, and in that sense the process of writing the 
pre study provided the project team with enough good reason to coordinate part 
of the team away without a fight. Moreover, this decision shifted the model from 
a model incorporating three theories of health care, to a model incorporating two 
theories of health care. During one of the project meetings, the project secretary 
remarked: “the aim of the project is [now] to develop a model for costs and not a 
model for health.” (Meeting notes, 960513). 
Materiality in modeling
Models are stylized or simplified representations of reality. This makes models 
into forms of organization of bias. Moreover, because models capture certain ideas 
of the world (and leave out others), it matters who does the modeling. Models for 
policy making need to be a description of the policy ‘reality’ (see also Kraemer et 
al, 1987; Edwards, 1999), therefore close contacts between the modeling experts 
and the policy makers is necessary. In this project some productive work relation-
ships, or boundary configurations were created. Such boundary work is, as we 
show, at the same time material, social and normative in nature. It provides for 
a bringing together of several networks of experts and managers from specific 
educational backgrounds and disciplines, but also specific locations for meetings 
and model building, as well as tools for communication and modeling. Some of 
these materialities, however, support the negotiating ability of certain actors in 
modeling processes whilst closing negotiating abilities of others. The similarities 
in background between cpb scientists and meeva policy makers provided for a 
context in which the expertise of the cpb and their culture of working were better 
understood by the Ministry than that of the rivm and scp. The project secretary 
at meeva commented: 
We prefer to talk with the Cpb because they understand our language. We as financial 
economic policy makers are able to talk with the planning bureau and they just 
understand what we are saying. But the issue with the sCp is that it’s just a different 
world, that is, the policy-oriented sections [of the Ministry] are very able to deal with 
the sCp, but we, the financial economic types, deal with the sCp poorly. (040512b, Ministry 
of Health) 
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One project member mentioned that “one of the more complicated issues with 
the project was that both the cbp and meeva think in economic terms while we 
[scp] and other policy-directorates at the Ministry of Health think more in terms 
of care” and individual effects (040422, scp). Apparently, the project team had had 
no time or opportunity to develop some kind of shared language to understand the 
different standpoints, something that usually takes many years (Duncker, 2001). 
Additionally, when the modeling finally started, the modeling practices 
were more difficult for scp experts than for cpb experts because the software 
that was used for the modeling of the Care Model was located only at the cpb36. 
Modeling requires a continuous tinkering with data and theory (see e.g. Evans, 
1999; Morgan, and Morrison, 1999). Tinkering requires, however, tacit knowledge 
and skills to do so, as well as the ability to develop tools that allow tinkering. 
Having the software nearby, cpb employees were able to try out their parameters 
and equations immediately, while scp employees had to make an appointment 
at the cpb before they could have their findings tested, or have cpb staff test 
their parameters. This hindered scp experts to tinker with solutions for certain 
model parameters. Because scp experts ‘didn’t really understand the language 
in the model’, they were ‘already far behind’, when they finally got the computer 
software (040630, scp). Moreover, the model constructor from the scp indicated 
that because ‘the model was [at the cpb] (…) and we couldn’t check our calcula-
tions with the model’ (…), the cpb ‘felt more entitled to speak to the Ministry on 
behalf of the project’ (040630, scp). The physical proximity to the model, as well 
as the proximity in terms of being experienced with the software that runs on the 
computer, advantaged cpb employees, and disadvantaged scp experts, and had 
serious consequences on how health care practices were modeled, as we will see 
next.
Modeling practices: muddling with the medical specialist
Models, as simplified representations of reality, are built with both theories 
and data. Models for policy are restricted in the use of both theory and data (see 
Edwards, 1999; Sismondo, 1999; Kraemer et al, 1987; Morgan, and Morrison, 1999; 
Boumans, 1999). Too much theory makes a model unsuitable for assessment of 
policy options, while at the same time too much empirical information makes 
a model slow and unfeasible. One member of the scientific committee said 
about this that “models become giants-on-clay-feet if behavior equations are not 
36 We have no information on why this choice was made at first. Later during the project scp also gained a 
copy of the software. 
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empirically founded” (Van der Zee, 1996). Modeling practices for policy provide in 
that sense a ‘boundary zone’ (Galison, 1996) where weighing and simplification 
of theory and data against the policy questions is done until a workable solution 
is found. So what kind of representation of the world a model becomes, depends 
partly on the availability of theoretical descriptions of that reality, and datasets 
that provide numbers about that reality. This is at the same time a technical and 
normative exercise. Moreover, negotiations on use of theory and data, and related 
problems with lack of theory or data, are often used as boundary tools, to exclude 
some expertise and include others. 
The care project had suffered from both lack of economic theory and good quality 
datasets. Both institutes held different ideas on how to treat this problem, which 
also pointed at different ideas on what kind of theory of health care they wanted 
the model to represent. scp, with its focus on effects of policy on the (financial 
and social) position of vulnerable groups of people (elderly people, people with 
low socio-economic status or suffering from chronic diseases), preferably used 
empirically-based parameters with well-described behavior patterns, because of 
“the incompleteness of the macro information” (rmz-20; cpb 1996a), and because 
“micro information provides better insights into the processes for providing care 
at the individual level” (rmz-20). Because of the lack of data cpb was in favor of 
theoretically sound parameters, which also fitted their macro economic expertise. 
They argued that “it is very important that, in this project in which the datasets 
are of a lesser quality than in other projects, the theory plays an important role.” 
(rmz-20). The incompatibility of both standpoints came to the fore when a politi-
cally tense subject was modeled; the role of the medical specialist in the constitu-
tion of demand of health care. 
The medical specialist was both a crucial parameter, as doctors’ behavior con-
stitute a large share of health care costs37 (see Scholten, Roex, and Sindram, 1998), 
and a highly politicized element of the model. In the Dutch health care system, 
the general practitioner acts as the gatekeeper for the health care system; the gp 
decides whether a patient sees a doctor just once or enters the medical system 
37 As Scholten et al argue, in the mid-nineties the government tried to reduce health care costs by replacing 
the fee-for-service system for medical specialists (which lead to higher medical costs due to its open end 
character) with a more effective system. Dutch medical specialists, who feared a reduction of their income, 
organized themselves into a countervailing power. This resulted in a new payment system, in negotiation 
with the medical specialists, both securing the medical specialists’ income, and enabling hospital boards 
to control both quality and costs of health care. However, these developments are not unique for the Dutch 
system, but can be seen elsewhere as well (see Scholten, Roex, and Sindram, 1998; or Ashmore, Mulkay, and 
Pinch, 1989; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994).
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for follow-ups. Once in the hospital, medical specialists’ behavior is crucial in 
deciding for health care use. Thus, not patients, but doctors form a decisive factor 
for demand for health care. As such their role in allocating health care provisions 
and rising costs has been part of fierce political debates for years. 
The inert political nature of the parameter ‘medical specialist’, as most inter-
viewees agreed, required more empirical data, as more empirical data delivers 
more solid model outcomes, a solution to solve political disputes (see also Jasanoff, 
1990). This was also favored by scp. However, the problem of insufficient data 
required a more theoretical approach, favored by cpb. scp proposed to model 
several kinds of doctors that are each differently motivated to perform their job: 
at least one doctor that is inertly motivated by the quality of his or her professional 
judgment, and doctors who are more focused on material concerns as income 
and spare time, more in line with empirical information on medical specialists’ 
behavior; “the quality of his actions, his professional honor, his income and 
his spare time” (040517, scp). The cpb experts proposed to model one type of 
specialist, one that is motivated by financial concerns, because as one member 
of the team remarked “as the model gets too detailed, that leads to an argument. 
Therefore you say ‘let’s stick to one type” (040708, cpb). The meeva secretary 
agreed with cpb’s solution. 
This solution, however, rose critical comments from some members of the 
scientific committee, as they “did not recognize this in practice” (cpb, 040708). 
This argument became so fierce that some of the critical members of the scientific 
committee left because of this. More importantly, cpb used this (and similar) 
disputes as an argument to write a letter, in December 1996, to the project secre-
tary at the Ministry, to request to coordinate scp away from the project referring 
to scp’s “limited experience with macro economic modeling” (cpb, 1996b; cpb, 
1996c). The secretary granted this request38. Naturally, this partly solved the (still 
existing) problem to integrate micro-economic and macro economic modeling 
techniques / approaches.
38 Recent years have shown new interdisciplinary projects and reports that involve scp, cpb and rivm, and 
this can to some respect be regarded as continuations of the (then unfeasible) third aim formulated in the 
preliminary study in 1994; the (long term) effects of possible health care and prevention policy options on 
the demand and supply of health care and its consequences for health care costs. An example is the report 
Geneesmiddelen en medische hulpmiddelen: Trends en dilemma’s. [Medicines and medical appliances. 
Trends and dilemma’s] 1-234. Bilthoven: rivm, 2002; and minor participating roles of cpb experts in many 
scp reports. Both the scp and cpb, moreover, had a supporting role in the rivm’s Public Health Status and 
Forecast Report of 2006.
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Modeling managed competition
Instead of a collaborative between science advisory bodies, both scp and 
rivm became involved in the project in consultancy roles. With both scp 
and rivm experts away from the project, cpb experts, with the help of health 
economists from the Erasmus University, modeled one type of medical specialist. 
This theoretical doctor is a neo-liberal one; he or she is able to work according 
to the theory of managed competition in health care. This solution was chosen 
because it was the best described theoretical solution, not because it best 
described the actual situation in the Netherlands (cpb, and scp, 1995:7). Two 
other options, a model of the short end of the market, which lacked an empirical 
basis, and a more realistic negotiation model, that would lead to an “excep-
tionally complicated” model (cpb, and scp, 1995:7). However, the first choice 
allowed the assessment of policy proposals based on the policy program of 
managed competition; a policy program originally proposed in the 1986, which 
the Ministry of Health tried to implement for some time but had abandoned in 
the mid 1990s as it was too controversial, only to embrace it again in the early 
2000s (Helderman et al, 2005). The model (cpb, 1999) not only became a model 
of the macro economic aspects of the health care sector, but also made possible 
the idea of competition in health care, or the idea of health care as a market, a 
new step within the Dutch neo-liberal economic thinking. 
 
Boundary configurations in modeling for health  
policy making
This case study shows a boundary configuration in the making. It shows that 
science advisors in interdisciplinary projects are often as much influenced by 
strong alliances with specific policy-makers in the same policy field, as with other 
science advisors in the same project. Such strong interrelations are not new; they 
are discussed by others as part of a given discipline’s need to guard against others 
from taking over authority (Abbott, 1988; Gieryn, 1983; Edwards, 1999). However, 
to gain a better understanding of the consequences of such interrelations in rela-
tion to other interrelations of science and policy, we referred to these as boundary 
configurations. 
These strongly situated interconnections between science and policy institutes 
share similar approaches to problem definitions and research methods, and 
become stronger by boundary work that is material, discursive, and social in 
nature. In the network of experts that were involved in the care model project 
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the macro economic experts from cpb got along better with the macro economic 
section of the Ministry, speaking the ‘same language’ and resulting in a better 
understanding of the work that was performed by cpb experts than the work of the 
experts from the social and cultural planning agency (scp) and the public health 
experts from the rivm. This alliance was strengthened by changes in the scien-
tific committee, by the location of the software, in an absence of clear goals, and 
the lack of knowledge on the integration of macro economic and micro-economic 
modeling. Modeling processes provide spaces to negotiate between theory and 
data, and likewise between theoretical worlds and policy worlds. As such, models 
for policy act as boundary devices between policy and science, and modeling 
practices in interdisciplinary projects are forms of necessary boundary work that 
define what values and perspectives on a subject are able to be modeled and are 
thus prioritized. Despite the initial aims of the project to construct an integrated 
model, in which public health and socio-economic insights were combined with a 
macro economic overview, the care model today is a macro economic description 
of the health care system. 
The concept of boundary configurations (see figure 2) also allowed us to 
unpack the consequences of these alliances; to show how these have shaped the 
incorporation of specific types of knowledge and associated norms and values, 
while leaving out others. Although the configuration involving both meeva 
and the cpb is constructed, that is, not an inevitably occurring event, and the 
building of the Care model was an important phase in this construction process, 
it is nevertheless real in its consequences. The boundary configuration involving 
the Ministry and cpb holds more than disciplinary or scientific similarities. The 
similarities stretch to the political realm in that it incorporates shared values 
and political goals. In this case macro economic norms and values are more 
centrally incorporated in the model than socio-economic and public health ones. 
Although referred to as a failure by involved persons, because of the failing 
integration of the three perspectives, our analysis shows that the project was 
successful too in other ways. 
First, the cpb successfully ‘monopolized’ the model by portraying scp and 
rivm experts as incompetent and less relevant to the building of the model. 
However, this outcome was never certain from the start of the model, but was 
the result of boundary work. Secondly, the model filled a space that was not 
taken up or claimed by the scp or the rivm, nor by other science advisory bodies 
in the Netherlands; namely, a macro economic understanding of the health care 
system. Moreover, the interdisciplinary project has resulted in “changing alloca-
tions” (Gieryn, 1995:40) of power, authority, expertise and material resources. It 
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has provided the cpb with a new model39, and with new authority over health 
care issues, as well as control over naming and framing health policy problems 
in macro economic terms and in terms of the market-oriented policy program. 
Also it forged new liaisons between the cpb and the Ministry of Health. Thirdly, 
the macro-economization of the health care system by means of this model, 
makes the health care system assessable according ideas of managed competi-
tion. In this way it provided the Ministry of Health with a new policy tool, for the 
assessment of policy proposals for the health care sector. 
Science advisory bodies are often deployed by governments to build con-
sensus, as Jasanoff has argued, to weigh interests and to depoliticize political 
issues (Jasanoff, 1990). What we have shown, in line with this, is that modeling 
39 The cpb has used the care model for numerous publications, see for example the cpb report 2001/3. 
Den Haag, 2001A; the cpb Report 2001/007 Een scenario voor de zorguitgaven 2003-2006. Den Haag: Centraal 
Planbureau, 2001B; and cpb memorandum 148. Zorg in Model: algemene structuur en varianten. Den Haag: 
Centraal Planbureau, 2006a.
Boundary configuration 
between scientific 
discipline A and related 
policymakers
Boundary configuration between 
scientific discipline B and related 
policymakers
Scientific discipline B
Scientific 
discipline A
Policy area
Figure 2 Boundary configurations in science / policy interactions.
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practices are political processes, as in these practices important decisions about 
what ‘theories of the world’ are incorporated and left out are taken, that have 
implications for the policy measures and decisions that are based on such models. 
A care model built in an interdisciplinary environment can be viewed upon as a 
‘depoliticizing’ tool for the Minister of Health to use in turbulent political debates 
concerning health care reforms, but instead turns science advisory bodies into 
political actors. 
Our research tends to portray the result of the interdisciplinary project as 
problematic because of boundary configurations involving specific science and 
policy alliances, while leaving out others. Such close interconnections between 
scientists and policy makers limit the value of input from other science-based 
experts in policy making processes (see also Halffman, 2003). The price of this 
could be that in the Dutch health care system, other values than macro economic 
ones suffer in importance and are not or badly incorporated in macro economic 
and market-oriented policy measures. Following endless political debates on 
how to secure conflicting values of health care – accessibility, affordability and 
efficiency – this development has given further legitimacy to ‘regulated market’ 
types of solutions which favor specific political positions over others. 
In a way, however, the failure of the model in integrating the different perspec-
tives into one health care model can also be seen as a success for democracy, as 
both the scp and the rivm have remained important actors within Dutch health 
care policymaking, presenting their own models and analysis from perspec-
tives differing from the one embedded within the health care model of the cpb. 
Differences between the perspectives and between the boundary configurations 
in which they are embedded thus remain in the open and lend themselves to a re 
politicization of health policymaking.
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Introduction
Priority setting in health promotion and prevention demands evidence of ‘what 
works’ (Donald, 2001; Hunter, 2003; Lomas et al, 2003; Nutley et al, 2007; Van der 
Grinten, and Kasdorp, 1999). The use of evidence in health promotion is however 
claimed to be problematic. Critical supporters of evidence-based public health 
(ebph) argue that, on the one hand, evidence is lacking, while on the other hand, 
research findings have a hard time finding their way to policy makers (Black 2001; 
Brownson et al, 2009; Fielding, and Briss, 2006; Glasby et al, 2007; Lurie et al, 
2006; Waters, 2009). Despite the many attempts to develop tools to increase the 
use of evidence in public health, this uptake remains incidental rather than struc-
tural (e.g. Goldstein, 2009; Luck et al, 2006). However, many such attempts start 
from a linear perspective on research evidence and policy. This seems to limit 
explanations that focus on the more softer aspects that play an role in the use of 
scientific evidence in policy such as the nature of the policy field and the many 
uncertain and political factors that surround policy making in general (Cummins, 
and Macintyre, 2002; Hunter, 2009; Lin, and Gibson, 2003; Marmot, 2004). 
Analysts have therefore argued for a paradigm shift in thinking about research 
and policy that conceptualizes the translation of research evidence into a process 
of co-creation or co-constructing (Hunter, 2009; Lin, and Gibson, 2003; Lomas, 
2000). This paradigm shift is welcomed, especially in regards to the development 
in European countries towards more accountability and transparency of public 
health policy. Moreover, concrete strategies that employ the interaction of science 
and policy as a process of co-construction are limited. 
In this paper40, we investigate a successful information tool for Dutch public 
health policy as an instance of co-construction between science and policy. The 
Dutch Centre for Public Health Status and Forecast (Centrum Volksgezondheid 
Toekomst Verkenning, cvtv) is part of the National Institute of Public Health and 
the Environment (Rijks Instituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, rivm). The 
centre vtv currently offers information and insights about the health status of 
Dutch citizens and the effect of preventive and health care provisions on their 
health. It is comparable to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. The reports 
are used as official input for priority setting in policy for disease prevention and 
health promotion for Dutch Government, and have since the first publication in 
1993 grown into an authoritative and structurally used source of information for 
40 This paper greatly benefitted from the critical comments of Sam Adams, Katharina Paul and other 
members of the Health Governance Group at the bmg. Earlier versions were presented and discussed at the 
rivm in May 2007, and at the eastt conference in August 2007. 
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government agencies and the public health sector more generally (Reijmerink, and 
Hulshof, 1997; Van Egmond et al, 2007). This raises the question of how we can 
understand the centre’s success as an information tool for public health policy. 
We argue that the infrastructure set up by the Centre vtv is a successful infor-
mation tool because it anticipates on the problems experienced in research trans-
lation for priority setting in public health policy. It does so by explicitly bringing 
together and separating scientists and policy makers during several stages of the 
writing process in closed procedures. We understand these closed procedures 
– backstage – that enables a front stage manifestation of the centre as an authori-
tative, neutral and scientific organisation. In this article, we show that these back-
stage processes and the front stage presentation have a dialectical relationship 
and are not mutually exclusive. As well, we contribute to a re-conceptualisation of 
the relation between science and policy making as a process of co-construction. 
Lessons from our case study can be very useful to improve concrete initiatives that 
support evidence based public health. 
Research synthesis as a scientific problem
Many scholars have reflected on the question how and if the use of research 
evidence, for example epidemiological research, in public health policy can be 
improved. Much effort is put in developing strategies to bring research evidence 
and policy together to develop new frameworks for infrastructural support for 
science-policy interaction and to support changes in attitudes of both researchers 
and policy makers towards the value and need for evidence (Bekker et al, 2010; 
Hunter, 2009; Lomas, 2000; Lomas et al, 2003; Nutley et al, 2007). Recently, 
scholars identified problems with the uptake of research evidence as a problem 
of often employed linear perspective on science and policy relations – the 
thought that evidence finds its way to policy makers on its own merits through 
diffusion – drawn from notions developed in Knowledge Utilization studies 
(ku). As Black argues, this linear perspective often leads to tools that focus on 
a quantification of research impact (2001), and to the development of endless 
checklists that should raise awareness about the inclusion of policy makers in 
early stages of research. These checklists seem however to have limited effect in 
the uptake of evidence in policy making. The linear perspective moreover fails to 
act on insights that problems in the uptake of evidence in policy are constituted 
by many uncertain factors, such as the specificities of the policy field (Hunter, 
2009), the health problems at hand (Cummins, and Macintyre, 2002; Marmot, 
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2004), paradox of prevention41, and how the relation between research and policy 
is perceived and organized institutionally regarding existing power relations 
(Gibson 2003; Jasanoff, 1990; Lin, and Gibson, 2003). 
Discussions on how to bridge the gap between research and evidence conclude 
that a paradigm shift towards more interactive science-policy models is needed 
(Black, 2001; Hunter, 2009; Lin, and Gibson, 2003). This call for a more reflexive 
stance towards the relation between research evidence and policy making has 
led to the development of new understandings of the policy process – in which 
research and policy are taken as reflexive interactive processes in which research 
and policy are co-constructed. From this stance, problems encountered in the 
research and policy interface are interpreted as a lack of understanding of each 
other’s position and lack of infrastructural support (Bekker et al, 2004; Black 
2007; Cookson, 2005; Gibson, 2003; Hanney et al, 2004; Lomas et al, 2003), and 
recently to emphasize the political context as an important contributor to the 
use of evidence (Wright et al, 2007). Consequently, public health scientists have 
put effort into developing interactive models of science policy relations; an often 
used model is the Lomas Framework for Linkage and Exchange (Lomas, 2000). 
Alongside, strategies to bring research and policy closer together are developed, 
as well as supportive tools for effective science policy interaction such as science 
networks and databases (Hutchinson, and Estabrooks, 2009; Lomas, 2003; 
Nutley et al, 2010; Smith et al, 2009). 
The focus in research synthesis research lies however with describing the 
ideal relation between research evidence and policy and in developing tools that 
alternate both worlds of science and public health policy in order to bring these 
worlds closer together. In other words, the abandoned linear perspective seems 
to have been replaced by a similar notion that science and policy are two opposite 
worlds. However, to take science and policy as interactive and reflexive processes 
also requires a need to rethink this opposition and to reconceptualise existing 
relations between research and policy in public health. We argue that knowledge 
and the societal contexts – the policy realm – in which the knowledge is produced, 
cannot be seen as separate entities (Bourdieu, 1992; Giddens, 1994; Jasanoff, 1995; 
Tsekeris, and Katrivesis, 2008). Science does not simply represent an ‘objective’ 
and ‘natural’ state of things but is instead constructed in interaction with that 
41 The nature of health prevention and promotion complicates the use of evidence in the development 
of public health policy: collective gains or benefits require individual behavior changes, while individuals 
do not necessarily benefit from these collective gains. The effects of interventions on future health status 
of citizens often only become visible at the long term, and are surrounded with uncertainty. This is often 
referred to as the prevention paradox.
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context. As this take on science and policy interactions could lead to discussions 
about the value of science and the political nature of science, scientists construct 
a front stage in which science is portrayed as objective and detached. Moreover, 
this requires a new understanding of how scientists and policy makers create 
this front stage and backstage and to what consequences for the interactions 
between science and policy and the construction of ‘scientific policy facts’. With 
our case study, we hope to contribute to this re-conceptualisation of the interac-
tions of science and policy making as interactive and reflexive practices.
Method
We have focused on the ‘how’ as well as on the ‘consequences’ of science 
policy interactions as interactive and reflexive interactions. In other words, how 
the relation between science and policy is organised in specific instances is 
taken as the starting point to investigate what is going on there and how we can 
understand these processes in the light of evidence-based policy making. To do 
so, we used a qualitative case study design. Because large part of these practices 
took place in former years, we have used in depth semi-structured interviews and 
a document analysis42. We interviewed among others high ranked civil servants 
of the Ministry of Health and the Centre vtv. Our research is further limited to 
practices that were documented on paper and that were part of people’s personal 
recollections of ‘how things went’. Analysis was done inductively. Early results 
have been presented and discussed with the interviewees, at the institute of Health 
Policy and Management in Rotterdam, and at the 2007 eastt conference. 
42 The interviews were held with diverse actors affiliated with making and using the reports. Interviewees 
included staff of the centre for Public Health Status and Forecasting and members of the scientific and 
the policy advisory boards of the centre vtv, among which the (former) director of the centre for Public 
Health Status and Forecasting, and the project leader of the 2006 report. Furthermore, we interviewed policy 
makers and directors from the Ministry of Health, and a few directors and professionals from regional 
public health centres, and a staff member of a large health insurance company in the Netherlands. See for 
more information about the interviews the research report, van Egmond S, Bal R, Bekker M, van der Grinten 
T. Wetenschap voor Beleid. ibmg/emc; 2006(22).
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The vtv: from phonebook to successful informer  
of policy
The centre as a learning network organization
The Centre for Public Health Status and Forecast (further Centre vtv) is an 
intermediary organisation between research evidence and government policy 
established at the beginning of the 1990s by the Ministry of Health43, specifically 
to collect, measure, and classify numbers and research evidence on public health 
issues. Its’ reports are used for priority setting in public health policy. In this it 
fulfills five functions. First, the reports are used in the policy cycle of the Ministry 
of Health. Second, the summary reports are agenda-setting tools for the govern-
ment. Third, the reports contribute to the development and use of standardised 
compounded health measurements44. Fourth, the report has an authoritative 
reputation among scientists. Finally, the vtv report is increasingly used as policy 
evaluation instrument, as it monitors the health status of Dutch citizens for 
almost 20 years now. 
The centre vtv started in the early 1990’s with the development of an informa-
tion tool for policy makers based on the model of health indicators developed 
by Lalonde (Lalonde, 1974). Although the publication of the first report in 1993 
was welcomed by policy makers, its’ use in public policy making was taken to 
be incidental rather than structural; it resembled according to many in the field, 
an ‘epidemiological phone book’. The centre has come a long way since this first 
report and has grown into an authoritative institute whose reports are received 
well in the field (Van Egmond et al 2007; Reijmerink, and Hulshof, 1997). The 
question remains how the centre has pulled this off.
The centre can be understood as a network organization aimed at creating 
advocacy coalitions (Fischer et al, 2007), in that it brings together many disciplines 
in public health. This has been a main aim since 1991 when the centre kicked 
off with a conference during which a discussion was held with 50 public health 
experts and representatives from the Ministry of Health about the formulation of 
the main outlines of information tool for policy makers (vtv, 1995). This way the 
43 The Dutch name is Ministerie voor Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport – Health, Welfare and Sports 
(vws).
44 Measures such as the daly (disability-adjusted life years), the qaly (quality-adjusted life years), Years 
of Lost Life (yll), Years Lived with Disability (yld), Burden of Disease (bd), Life Expectancy with Disability 
(lewd), Healthy Life Years (hly), and Integrated Cost Effectiveness measures.
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centre ensured that a policy information tool was acknowledged and carried by 
key players in the public health field. However, the resulted 1000-page report was 
received with mixed emotions in the field; although the assembly of the material 
constituted a thorough piece of work (igz, 1994; Health Council, 1995; rivm, 
1995), others perceived the report as an ‘epidemiological phone book’ lacking 
useful and concrete messages for policy makers (Reijmerking, and Hulshof, 1997; 
Van Egmond, et al., 2007). The information presented proved not as useful for 
policy makers as hoped for during the conference. This called for a revision of the 
centre’s way of working. 
Building an infrastructure to connect researchers and policy makers 
The project team vtv started off with the help of three boards. First, a perma-
nent general policy advisory board (gab) in which high-ranking civil servant 
from the Ministry of Health completed with high-ranking employees from the 
Health Inspection (igz) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Welfare (szw) 
take a seat. This board comes into action only a few times per year and serves 
to provide general Ministerial and political input for the centre’s main aims 
for future. The discussions focus on the long term and macro developments 
in public health. Second, the vtv is supported by the scientific board in which 
high standing experts of the collaborative partners have a seat to provide for 
substantial support. The scientific advisory board consists of experts deriving 
from several public health disciplines such as health policy, epidemiology, health 
economics, medical technology assessment, and health organisations. Over the 
years, the focus of the scientific board shifted to consultations about general 
public health issues that could be relevant for policy makers and to provide 
the scientific arguments why this could be so. It now advises the management 
team of the centre on what messages work best and how these can formulated 
effectively, regarding the policy impact of the messages. The scientific board 
focuses less on the scientific rigour of the evidence – this is left to employees of 
the centre that perform systematic reviews and discuss these findings in project 
groups and the policy advisory boards – but translates this to the policy impact. 
The scientific board serves in this sense as a hybrid that contains knowledge of 
both the scientific and the policy realm. Third, the centre vtv uses a policy advi-
sory board (pab) for policy makers affiliated with specific public health issues. 
The composition of these boards change often, depending on the public health 
theme that is discussed. These boards however gradually became more defined 
and were completed with other tools. 
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Moreover, to extent its knowledge base the centre installed several project groups 
that focus on specific health related issues, such as elderly care or health and health-
care in larger cities. These groups consist of many experts from different institutes 
in the field such as universities, expert and umbrella organizations and change per 
project. In close collaboration with the project leaders from the centre and in close 
contact with policy makers from the Ministry, these experts sort out available data 
from all available sources and research, discuss why specific data and related health 
issues are most relevant and why. The experts contribute also to the writing process 
of the chapters in the reports. This specific form of involvement of experts adds to 
the centre’s core business of gathering and assessing scientific evidence, for which 
it uses systematic literature reviews based on generally accepted scientific methods 
such as the guidelines used by the Cochrane Collaboration. This way, softer or ‘grey’ 
data is separated from hard data and after the initial selection, many of these find-
ings are translated to and interpreted for the Dutch situation. 
Finally, the centre put more effort into the development of standardized health 
measurements or risk yardsticks, such as measures for Disability-Adjusted Life 
Years (daly), the Quality-Adjusted Life Years (qaly), Healthy Life Years (hly), and 
Integrated Cost Effectiveness Measures, as well as others. These measures have in 
their turn lead to a standardisation of epidemiological information. Epidemiology 
as a scientific discipline has since become more affiliated with delivering such 
information. These measures provide a broader insight into the elements that 
determine the health of Dutch citizens. 
Coming to useful facts: acting on tensions in the 
interaction with policy makers
Between facts and policy messages
As the centre vtv expanded its knowledge network and the reports gained a 
larger role in the policy cycle45, some tense interactions between the centre as 
45 As a consequence of these infrastructural changes the centre changed the set up of the reports. The 
second report, released in 1997, held three lines of inquiry; (1) the renewal of core data, (2) an extension with 
additional theme-reports, and (3) an integration of collected data, and considered further the relationship 
between the health status of citizens and the use and costs of health care. As such, the 1997 Report moved 
beyond the display of an overview and analysis of available public health data, and received well with the 
actors in the field, including the Ministry of Health (23, 24). In 2002 and 2006 the centre extended the core 
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deliverer of evidence and policy makers became apparent and came down to 
finding the right distance between the centre and the policy desired by the Ministry 
of Health. On the one hand, the centre needs to be close to policy in order to come 
to useful messages. One official from the Ministry of Health mentioned that the 
Ministry tries to dig up numbers since “numbers are decisive, since they are not 
susceptible to political motions, from the left, the right or anywhere. Numbers 
are just numbers” (20051005). Thus, numbers decrease political discussions 
(Weiss, 1991). Moreover, the feasibility of policy measures also contributes to the 
use of certain. The incentives for policy measures need to be clear, although it is 
not always easy to see what the incentives are of specific policy measures. As the 
official explained, “you have to be careful that you don’t overstress certain issues 
because if you don’t have a solution, you’re stuck with it” (20051005). An example 
of this is diabetes; the centre vtv can calculate exactly what the societal costs of 
diabetes are, and where cut backs can be made. This knowledge is, however, in 
itself not enough for the government to act on. As explained by another (former) 
official from the Ministry of Health stated, “hospitals receive a certain amount 
of money each year, and if they spent less, this money does not automatically 
flow back” [to health insurance companies or the government] (20050906). Thus, 
knowing how to cut back costs regarding an illness, such as diabetes, does not 
automatically imply that these cutbacks are deemed useful or that they can and 
will be made. Therefore, the centre needs provide the Ministry with useful facts: 
that is, facts that give the Ministry enough reason to develop policy for. To come 
to such useful facts, researchers have to be closer to the policy makers; as the 
former head of the centre vtv mentioned, “the centre needs to know what goes on 
at the Ministry and the Ministry needs to know what knowledge is available and 
what is not, [as it is] a two-way road” (20050913). 
On the other hand, however, the centre cannot come too close to the Ministry. 
A project member illustrated that the centre was, at first, not allowed to provide 
policy advice “because at the Ministry, they held the idea that ‘we at the Ministry 
develop policy and you at the centre are the researchers and present the facts’” 
(20050809). The Centre cannot tread on the domain of the Ministry; this is 
perceived as threat to the role of the Ministry as policy maker in public health. 
However, these were the same policy makers that critiqued the first report because 
it “resembled an encyclopaedia and it was too broad, and the report needed to 
report and theme reports with websites that are continuously kept up to date, and that invite citizens to react 
on the information. This enabled the larger role for the reports in de policy cycle of the Ministry. Comparable 
websites in the uk are the medirect.co.uk website or the nhs.co.uk websites. The difference is that the vtv 
has no commercial or medical incentive. 
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come closer to the problems the Ministry deals with” (20050809). Thus the centre 
has to walk a thin line between staying close but keeping distance; a close dis-
tance is needed to come to messages for policy makers that are, at the same time, 
not policy messages. This effectively becomes ‘closeness’ to policy and policy 
makers, while simultaneously serving as a safe distance to policy makers. Such 
close distance, moreover, is a kind of tool that takes into account the sensitivities 
implied in the power relations between the Ministry as contractor and the centre 
as agent. Because this close distance depoliticizes the information brought about 
by the centre vtv, it also contributes to the scientific credibility of the centre and 
the presentation of science ‘speaking truth to power’.
Establishing close distance
The central problem in research synthesis for policy, to establish the right 
distance to policy makers, is not a straightforward task. Rather, it is a complex 
interplay between researchers and policy makers, during which many political 
interests and normative considerations have to be taken into account as well. This 
is seen in discussions at the centre about the use and value of standardized health 
measures. These may seem neutral but instead emphasize specific health issues 
while leaving out others and because they compare between groups of citizens. De 
Hollander and Hanemaaijer (2003) show for example for the choice for ‘healthy 
life years’ that this measure values young healthy people more than elderly people 
and those that suffer from a chronic disease when policy measures have to be 
taken. The measure ‘death per year’ for example measures elderly, adolescents, 
poor and rich equally. Although this seems fair, it also implies that the early 
passing away of severely ill elderly people with a few days measures equally to the 
death of healthy adolescents. But if ‘lost life expectancy’ is the measure for policy 
than this favours adolescents above elderly, as elderly have less life expectancy to 
loose. De Hollander and Hanemaaijer rightly argue that “there is no universal risk 
measurement; the choice for a risk measurement is always a derivative of the nor-
mative standpoints we wish to express” (2003:74). These discussions emphasize 
that the centre needs to put much effort in establishing close distance. The centre 
deploys a few strategies to create a close distance. 
Disentangling the political from the scientific
First the centre disentangled the political from the scientific by reorganizing 
different kinds of input at different times during the writing process of the reports. 
The first director of the Centre argued that because the interests of both policy 
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and scientific groups are so different, he became wary of putting scientific repre-
sentatives and policy representatives in one board, because “you’d get discussions 
you don’t want to have, for instance about numbers that displease the Ministry” 
(20050913). And these discussions could lead to “influence from the Ministry on 
numbers that are brought about by the experts” (20050913). It is for this reason 
that the centre installed ad hoc expert groups that are installed on specific topics 
for the duration of the writing of one topic. Policy makers are not welcome in 
these expert groups. Therefore, the centre reformed the Policy Advisory Board 
(pab) into two types of boards in which experts and policy makers are explicitly 
separated. Secondly, the centre has placed project leaders from the centre inside 
the Ministry, as ‘liaisons’. These liaisons work in the Ministry in a separate unit, 
the Unit Information and Analysis (dia). The dia unit helps to develop the 
contacts between the Ministry and the centre vtv into a more structural form 
to accommodate the more formal aspects of the relation between the Ministry 
and the centre. They do this by building contacts that form a small but effective 
source of information for the Ministry and a source of influence for the centre. As 
the former head of the division Public Health stated, “all correspondence [goes] 
directly to the directors, (…) and if people don’t show up at meetings, we play on 
their sense of responsibility by referring to our status as commissioner and the 
amount of money involved” (interview 20050914). These sources work formally 
on structuring ‘knowledge questions’ from the Ministry and the related research 
protocols, and informally on agenda setting at different levels within the Ministry 
and on settling agreements between policy makers and the centre.
These liaisons are very important especially since the relations between the 
Ministry and the centre has become more formalized the past eight years. The 
Ministry of Health and the centre vtv use formal research protocols to organize 
their relationship, and the centre receives external visitations every few years. 
The research protocol works dually: it formalizes the knowledge questions 
that the Ministry articulates through a formal proposal round and contractual 
negotiations and it provides close interactions between the policy makers and the 
researchers at the centre to make the writing process easier and more efficient. In 
other ways, this formalization demands more interaction between the centre and 
the Ministry; knowledge gaps do not present themselves by themselves. Moreover, 
the knowledge gaps are not a given in advance and are hard to establish. 
Creating a backstage 
In the wake of the trend towards evidence based public health policy, many 
public health scientists propose a re-conceptualisation of the relation between 
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research and policy and in line with this, have proposed suggestions to link 
research and policy earlier and closer. The Dutch example – the vtv centre – is 
successful in providing the Dutch government with an information tool for policy. 
It brings researchers and policy makers closer together in a new and innovative 
way. Our research reveals that this newly developed interaction between scientists 
and policy makers is however more complicated than suggested in the literature. 
It consists of bringing researchers and policy makers together in several arenas 
and at several levels in the organisation; in advisory boards and expert groups. 
What makes these boards and the expert groups so effective is their informal char-
acter. The scientific board serves as a bridge between the scientific world and the 
policy world at the level of the directors, the political level. The policy boards and 
expert groups are bridges between policy makers and scientists at the middle and 
micro level of policy making. Moreover, these boards and groups form a kind of 
back stage negotiation spaces where open discussions about the value of numbers 
and the possibility of policy measures take place.
But the interaction between scientists and policy makers does not only consist 
of getting them closer together, but also of separating scientists and policy makers 
at the right time in the process to avoid political discussions and to provide trust 
in the reports as a credible source. Moreover, to come to useful messages, the 
centre creates official distance, while it organizes at the same time closer contacts 
between policy makers and experts in the project groups. At the front stage, the 
centre keeps up the image of science and policy as two separate communities; the 
research domain and the policy domain that both have a different task. 
The centre does this so that the reports can contribute to the policy process by 
de-politicizing public health issues and discussions on the value of evidence. In 
this way, the centre and its reports function as consensus platforms for both policy 
makers and researchers. Moreover, the centre’s infrastructure works as a scien-
tific negotiation space in which a science for policy is created. Importantly, this 
set-up provides a situation of trust between the different producers of data and the 
users of these sources. That is, the evidence provided and assessed by researchers 
has value to policymakers only when science speaks with one voice. This happens 
only in a situation of trust between the different producers of knowledge (Gibson, 
2003). This kind of trust takes a lot of effort and maintenance but pays off in regard 
to the authority given to the centre’s products. The centre draws on an extensive 
network of data sources and experts. The list of experts that participate in one way 
or the other in the writing process of the reports often covers over one hundred 
names. This trust is reciprocal in nature, as the report is front stage given the 
status of credible source of knowledge, even in scientific circles. The reputation of 
any involved researcher or expert is weighed in this infrastructure. 
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Creating scientific policy facts 
In these negotiation processes between the experts in the groups and the policy 
makers, hybrid facts are produced to ‘bridge the gap’ between science and policy. 
These hybrid facts – or scientific policy facts – are acted upon by policy makers 
because there is an incentive to act upon. Examples are the standardized com-
pounded health measurements that incorporate all kinds of (invisible) normative 
assumptions that have to be taken into account for policy making, as discussed ear-
lier. These scientific policy facts result from the interplay between researchers and 
policy makers but are valued backstage in open discussions between researchers 
and policy makers. In this we can argue that some facts are more factual than others 
and these facts are in turn related to the possibility for the Ministry to act on them, 
that is, to develop policy measures based on these facts. 
ebhp as a dynamic interactive process 
in this article we have examined the relationship between evidence and policy, 
in the light of Evidence Based Health Policy (ebhp). As the Public Health Status 
and Forecast reports have become widely known and used in the public health 
policy process by the Dutch government, it raises the question how the centre 
vtv and its reports have come to be successful deliverers of evidence for policy 
making, and how can be investigated from a reflexive perspective. 
The idea of science policy relations as a linear one, based on notions of rational 
behaviour of organisations and a rationalist epistemology, has been criticized by 
many scholars (Fischer et al, 2007; Lindblom, and Cohen, 1979; Jasanoff, 1995; 
Hunter, 2009; Gibson, 2003). Although it has been replaced by a more a reflexive 
attitude towards science policy relations, the rational model is still widely used 
to describe and organise the relation between science and policy. Moreover, even 
tools that have been built with the idea in mind to better connect research and 
policy and start from a more enlightenment perspective, such as the Lomas 
Framework, often start from the idea of research and policy as two separate 
worlds. Such a notion overlooks the particularities of (existing) science policy 
interactions, such as trust, reciprocity of the interactions and the political nature 
of scientific knowledge.
The centre vtv currently produces reports that are taken as successful informers 
of public health policy. This happens through a process of learning and adapting 
to the needs of both policy makers that use the reports and the researchers that 
are involved in delivering data. We analyse the centre as a reflexive organisation 
because it acts upon its mediating role in science and policy making with great 
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awareness of the specificities of both practices. This way it enables a productive 
interaction between researchers and policy makers. Our research also suggests 
that this productive interaction is built on an infrastructure that supports formal 
and informal contacts between researchers and policy makers. These contacts are 
provided by a simultaneous bringing together and a separation of the political and 
the scientific. This simultaneous movement is established through the creation of 
safe negotiation spaces. These spaces are a kind of ‘backstage’ (Goffman, 1990; 
Hilgartner, 2000) that is invisible to the public but crucial to produce a specific 
form of science that is usable for policy. This backstage does not exist by accident 
nor has it grown organically; instead, it is managed. This also becomes visible in 
the evaluations performed by the centre about the construction process, percep-
tions and effectiveness of the reports for the users (the Ministry). Evaluations 
deliver lessons for the future and provide input for the external visitations. 
On stage 02 (Goffman, 1990; Hilgartner, 2000), the relationship between 
the Ministry and the centre is formalized through the formal proposal rounds, 
visitations and the role of the reports in the policy cycle. In order for research to 
contribute significantly to the policy process, in the sense that policy makers are 
able to act on this kind of information (rephrase), such formal and informal proc-
esses are a prerequisite. Informal contacts need to take place between researchers, 
in order to come to unambiguous and useable numbers. As such, the vtv reports 
function as a consensus platform for scientific knowledge enabling science to 
‘speak with one voice’. The reports not only ‘bridge the gap’; they also produce a 
specific form of science that we refer to as scientific policy facts. Examples are the 
compounded health measures and the useful messages. 
Only when the condition is met that policy makers and scientists can negotiate 
the available evidence and interpret the value of this evidence for policy making, 
can knowledge effectively contribute to policy processes. Evidence is then able 
to contribute to evidence based health policy and functions as an agenda setting 
tool for policy makers. The notion of a clear division of labour between researchers 
and policy makers is, as we suggest, rather a front stage presentation of the role 
of science in policy. To make this front stage presentation possible many issues 
need to be addressed backstage in close and informal contacts with policy makers 
of the Ministry of Health. Such open and closed procedures are not opposites, 
but have, according to Bal, Bijker, and Hendriks, a “dialectic relation and are 
not mutually exclusive” (Bal, Bijker, and Hendriks, 2004). In the current policy 
debate, with its stress on accountability and transparency, calls to act on a strictly 
rational perspective on the science policy relationship are increasingly dominant. 
This development could strongly hinder the effectiveness of knowledge for policy 
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makers as in this formal version of the process the separation rather than the 
bridging of science and policy are sought.
Investigating science policy relations as reflexive and dynamic processes starts 
from actual practices and takes into account the rational take on science policy 
relations. As we have shown, however, the rational perspective on decision making 
and the role of scientific knowledge in it as the basis for policy making could never 
function on its own. The idea that a more formal organisation of knowledge in the 
policy cycle will better effectuate the use of knowledge rings through such strate-
gies. This position also suggests that policy makers have a clear idea of existing 
knowledge gaps. Establishing what kind of knowledge is missing or lacking is not 
a straightforward task and is determined in the interaction between scientists and 
policy makers. The difference between ‘need to know’ and ‘nice to know’ is made 
in daily negotiations and is not a given in advance. Thus, a re-conceptualisation 
of the relationship between research and policy making supports a better under-
standing of these interactions. It could enhance the effectiveness of knowledge 
instruments in public health, in that it takes potential scientific and policy con-
flicts as starting points for evidence-based health policy, instead of endpoints. 
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Introduction
Scientific knowledge in policy making processes is often applied in the form 
of simulation models. Such models have since long been used by governments to 
predict e.g. (financial) consequences of policy measures. The past decades have 
shown an increasing use of such models as important tools to support policy 
making and policy decisions in many national and international policy fields (e.g. 
Morgan & Den Butter, 2000; Edwards, 1999; Hordijk, 1991; Sundberg, 2007; Van 
den Bogaard, 1998; Van Egmond and Bal, forthcoming). The growing importance 
of simulation models in policy making processes leads to the question of how 
scientific knowledge, policy questions and demands are brought together in such 
models and the consequences thereof for the social worlds of both policy and 
scientific research. 
Philosophical discussions around models have centred on epistemic issues, 
with little attention to relations between modelling practices and policy practices. 
Other studies on models show how models for policy making are the result of 
scientific, professional and policy interaction (e.g. Shackley, and Wynne, 1995; 
Van Daalen, et al., 2002; Evans, 2000; Mattila, 2005). The notion of a boundary 
object, first discussed by Star and Griesemer in 1989, has proven useful to draw 
attention to the hybrid nature of scientific tools such as models. Boundary objects 
coordinate between social worlds, e.g. on the interface between science and policy 
(Bal, 1998; Halffman, 2003), and therefore allow these social worlds to remain 
stable. This paper contributes to this body of literature by drawing on the notions 
of boundary object and performativity.
We suggest that boundary objects often ‘do’ more than bring together and coor-
dinate social worlds. Boundary objects play a role in establishing facts as parts of 
standardized packages (Fujimura, 1992). Therefore, they are active constituents 
of social worlds and may change those they function in (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 
and Millo, 2003). In assuming that the value of the concept of boundary object lies 
in the idea that different social worlds can communicate, interact, collaborate and, 
at the same time, remain dissimilar and relatively stable, analyses of boundary 
objects often conclude at the moment the boundary object has been established. 
What a boundary object ‘does’ is then taken for granted (Zeiss, and Groenewegen, 
2009). The performative nature of these boundary objects and the way in which 
they change the social worlds they coordinate has thus been under-explored. It 
is therefore crucial to understand their performative nature to understand the 
increasingly important role of models in policy making.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the performative nature 
of boundary objects. In showing the boundary object character of two models 
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as well as their performative nature, we also explore the tensions between these 
notions: how are boundary objects performative? As most literature focuses on 
‘single model’ studies, this paper provides a unique comparison of two detailed 
empirical accounts of two simulation models. These were developed in different 
(Dutch) policy context – a macro economic model for the health care system and 
an ecological model for landscape planning and assessment – by different science 
advisory bodies. Both models are used for policy planning and assessment by the 
Dutch government.
We start with a discussion of the literature on models. After introducing the 
two policy fields and models, we investigate how negotiations between scientists 
and policymakers constitute models and show how models themselves can con-
stitute the reality in which they are at work. In exploring the tensions between 
the notions of boundary object and performativity, we argue that science-based 
models for policy as boundary objects are not only performative in the coordina-
tion of socials worlds on what we call a simple or generic level, but can also be 
performative on a more substantial level, as they do affect actual practices and the 
behaviour of social worlds46.
Scientific models as boundary objects
models, in the broadest sense of the word, are formal or informal simpli-
fied representations, descriptions or imitations of (potential future) ‘realities’. 
Increasingly, scientific models are run on computers. Two such computer models 
are explored in this paper. These models, as we will explain later, are both simula-
tion models. They are used to explain complex and dynamic systems; these models 
can be dynamic or static. We call them science-based or scientific models because 
they are products of scientific research and are subject to common scientific 
practices such as quality assessment and peer review (Yearley, 1999). Yet, although 
these models are science-based, they also contain policy elements.
46 This paper comes out of a larger project on ‘Rethinking Political Judgement And Science-Based Expertise: 
Boundary Work At The Science/Politics Nexus Of Dutch Knowledge Institutes’ funded by the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research (nwo). We wish to thank the respondents of our interviews and both 
the cpb and Alterra for hosting us and opening up their archives. Moreover, we would like to thank the 
anonymous reviewers, as well as Roland Bal, Teun Zuiderent, and other colleagues of the bmg institute of 
Health Policy and Management for their comments on previous versions, and Jennifer Gaultney for editing 
the text. We are also grateful to the attendants of the boundary object workshop in Trondheim in May 2007 
at which we presented a first version of this paper.
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Many studies have concentrated on explaining the role of (the construction of) 
models in the utilization of scientific knowledge. Much attention has been given 
to the use of models in the production of scientific knowledge (e.g. Morgan, and 
Morrison, 1999; Mattila, 2005; Knuuttila, and Voutilainen, 2003). Philosophical 
discussions on models have centred around epistemic issues, with little focus on 
the relationship between modelling practices and policy practices.47 This rela-
tionship has been explored in more detail by social science and policy scholars 
who have concentrated on the role and importance of models for political deci-
sion making processes and policy development (e.g. Shackley, and Wynne, 1995; 
Edwards, 1999; Bal, 1998; Halffman, 2003; Jasanoff, 1995), evidence-based policy 
making, and the accountability of policy programs (e.g. Yearley, 1999; Evans, 2000; 
Jasanoff, 1990; Yearley, 2003). Simulation models, as Merz (1999) argues, can be 
epistemic objects and technological things at the same time and have, thus, dif-
ferent meanings to different users. Moreover, models provide ‘discursive spaces’ 
in which uncertainties are negotiated and shared understandings are created48 
between developers and policymakers (Evans, 2000). These studies show the role 
of science and policy interactions in relation to the constitution of policy facts, 
and they show that the distinction between ‘science’ and ‘policy’ is often difficult 
to make.
The notion of a boundary object has proven useful to draw attention to the 
hybrid character of science-based policy tools such as models (e.g. Agrawala et al, 
2001; Halffman, 2003). Boundary objects are used to manage the “central tension” 
that exists in the interaction between social worlds (Star, and Griesemer, 1989: 
392). They “inhabit several social worlds, (…) and satisfy the informational require-
ments of each of them” (Star, and Griesemer, 1989: 393). Because such objects are 
flexible, they can have different meanings to different social worlds: their struc-
ture remains “plastic enough to more than one world to make them recognizable” 
(Star, and Griesemer, 1989: 393) to each world. They are “simultaneously concrete 
and abstract, specific and general, conventionalized and customized” (Star, and 
47 An exception is a study by Mattila (2005) that discussed the elements of interdisciplinary modelling 
projects that provide for such insights; the dynamic relation between expertise, collaboration and the 
research object in which scientific development and mutual learning can take place.
48 Evans (2000) notices an absence of this particular way of using models in his case study on uk eco-
nomic policy. He states that the ‘translation’ of the needs of policymakers into economic models depends 
on whether economic agents accept the ‘roles’ that are designed for them in macroeconomic models. In 
this sense, models function as legitimations of political and moral theories about the world. Increasing the 
plurality of models allows for discussion about underlying assumptions and the actors and institutions one 
wants to involve, instead of producing some sort of self-fulfilling prophecy machine.
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Griesemer, 1989: 408). This enables different social worlds to connect, while 
remaining concurrently accountable to both worlds. In other words, the boundary 
object has the ability to adjust to the needs of both worlds, while the social worlds 
remain intact.
The value of the notion of a boundary object lies in the idea that different social 
worlds can communicate and at the same time remain dissimilar and relatively 
stable. Most Science and Technology Studies (sts) literature on boundary objects 
has concentrated on the process with which an object becomes a boundary object: 
[a] ‘boundary object is regarded as the result of something becoming successful 
(the explanandum) rather than the cause of its success (the explanans)’ (Zeiss, and 
Groenewegen, 2009: 93). Once it is established, the coordinating nature is taken 
for granted and not further explained. Models as boundary objects, however, do 
more than provide negotiation spaces for the social worlds involved; they can 
coordinate worlds in different ways and they carry in them facts that have been 
the result of negotiations. As such, models are also a way of creating facts.
This feature of boundary objects has been described beautifully by Fujimura 
(1992) as a means to combine notions from social worlds-theory and actor network 
theory. Fujimura discusses boundary objects as part of a standardized package, 
which is described to include ambiguous concepts and standardized tools of 
methods and theory, such as data collecting and processing tools, computers, 
etc, that “help to explain how [a] theory can be continuous across time and space 
through different social worlds” (1992: 204). A standardized package differs from 
a boundary object in that it is used “to define a conceptual and technical work 
space which is less abstract, less ill-structured, less ambiguous, and less amor-
phous” (Fujimura, 1992: 169). However, we argue that the difference between 
boundary objects and standardized packages is not as clear-cut with regard to 
models. Simulation models can, on a smaller scale, be regarded as standardized 
packages themselves, as they contain some of these elements of standardized 
packages (e.g. theory, standardized methods, computer tools). Conversely, stand-
ardized packages can themselves be regarded as boundary objects, for instance, 
in situations where separate social worlds have to cooperate or come to workable 
models and yet have to remain accountable to their own social world. This is the 
case for scientific models used for policy making that need to be accountable to 
both scientific standards and policy usefulness.
We show that boundary objects, like standardized packages, can become 
embedded in particular practices and become stable in the sense that they have 
been used as policy tools over a long time. Boundary objects are not necessarily 
more easily reconstructed and are, thus, not ‘disadvantageous’ for providing 
stabilization (Fujimura, 1992: 169). More importantly, as facts are constructed in 
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the process of modelling, models are active constituents of the society or culture 
they are embedded or developed in. Models carry in them ‘ideal’ representations 
of the world positioned by the experts that develop the model (see also Knuuttila, 
2005; Weisberg, 2003). In that sense, we argue that models as boundary objects 
create a new world. As such, they can be performative beyond coordinating social 
worlds; they can change the social worlds they function in since these worlds have 
to relate to the ideal world presented in a model.
This article describes two case studies in which reconstructions were made of 
two models which were developed in different (Dutch) policy contexts – health 
care economics and ecology – and by different science advisory bodies. Our case 
studies are based on sixty semi-structured interviews49 that were held with per-
sons involved in the development of the models, including members of the project 
groups from the respective science advisory bodies, concerned departments of 
the Ministries, and involved data providers. Some of the actors were interviewed 
more than once. Furthermore, document analysis was done based on archives 
of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Ministry of Health, 
Alterra, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Safety (further: lnv). 
This analysis contained official letters, proposals, minutes of meetings, notes, 
progress reports, and evaluations of the projects. The data collection took place 
between February 2004 and September 2007.50
Two policy fields – two models
Both the health care and the ecological model are used for policy planning 
and assessment by the Dutch government. They are developed by science advisory 
bodies which represent a particular instance of the use of scientific knowledge 
in governmental policy making that is typical for the Netherlands. The different 
science advisory bodies have a central and formalized position in science based 
policy assessment for the government, albeit on different policy domains. They 
make use of scientific knowledge and insights (e.g. economic, sociological, 
epidemiological, and ecological insights), including the use of models, in their 
analysis and publications. As typical examples of places where such interaction 
takes place, these institutes form a perfect place to study the interaction between 
science and policy. These institutes involve actors from several social worlds, for 
instance during the construction of simulation models that are often used for 
49 In order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees, some interview material is coded. 
50 The analysis of the data was done based on a research protocol that was developed for the Rethinking 
project in which seven researchers participated.
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the assessment of policy proposals, and exist at the boundary of both policy and 
science, though having distinct lines of accountability to each (Guston, 2001: 
401).
The care model was developed by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (further: cpb), which is regarded as being an expert in economic model-
ling and policy assessment (e.g. Den Butter, 2003; Van den Bogaard, 1999), in 
cooperation with the Social and Cultural Planning Office (scp), which is regarded 
as being an expert in micro economic modelling with a focus on socio-economic 
issues in Dutch society, such as effects of health policy measures on e.g. the 
accessibility of health care for individuals (Trommel, 2003). The third party was 
the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (rivm) that deals 
with many public health issues (Van Egmond, et al., 2007). These three science 
advisory institutions51 are authoritative in the use of simulation models for the 
assessment of policy proposals for the Dutch National Government.
The need for a care sector model derived from political and economic circum-
stances in the 1980s that caused Dutch politicians to be faced with structurally 
rising costs in the health care sector. The economic models used by the Ministry 
of Health proved both insufficient in explaining why and how health care 
expenditures increased so quickly and what could be done about this (vws, 2004, 
interview 040512). Moreover, the Ministry of Health lacked knowledge about 
epidemiological trends (Boer, 1987). Politically, the government shifted towards 
a new public management of governmental policy making; more accountability 
and transparency of public policy and its effects, which was a trend visible in 
other European countries as well (e.g. Hunter, 1997; Walsh, 1995; Ashmore, et 
al., 1989). The succeeding Cabinet proposed market based policy programs to 
fundamentally change the (financial) organization of the sector (Helderman, et 
al., 2005). These were, however, badly received, both politically and within the 
sector, sparking many heated political debates. Under these circumstances, an 
interdisciplinary project was commissioned by the Minister of Health. The choice 
to ask these three science advisory bodies to work together on one project was 
51 The scp focuses on social and cultural issues in Dutch society, and its two-yearly Social and Cultural 
Report is a key publication in long term strategic planning (Trommel, 2003). The rivm plays a similar role 
concerning both environmental and health issues, commissioning for example the four-yearly Public Health 
Future Prospects and the Environmental Outlook (rivm, 2002). The cpb has an authoritative position in the 
Netherlands when it comes to economic policy analysis and economic predictions. The government relies 
on cpb estimations of economic development and adjusts its policy making in economic, financial and most 
other policy fields on these estimations. Together they were fit to develop a new model for the assessment of 
policies for the healthcare sector.
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not self-evident. However, the involvement of these three authoritative institutes 
was required to provide the Minister with unambiguous policy answers for many 
parties.
The larch model – landscape ecological rules for the configuration of 
habitat – is used to assess the viability of animal populations in fragmented 
landscapes and thus the potential of biodiversity (Van der Sluis, et al., 2003). It 
simulates whether a certain landscape is able to support a sustainable animal 
population. The model will show where a landscape is too fragmented and what 
the effect will be of, for instance, an ecoduct on the viability of a population 
(Alterra, 2007). It was developed in the early 1990s at the department of Landscape 
Ecology at the State Institute for Nature Management (rin). rin later became 
part of the Directorate Agricultural Research (dlo) of lnv and, in 2000, part of 
the research institute Alterra.
The Netherlands is one of the smallest and most densely populated countries 
in the world, and due to increasing urbanization and industrialization the land-
scape has progressively been fragmented. Nature protection in the Netherlands 
from the 1960s until the 1980s mainly consisted of the maintenance of existing 
nature areas and the purchasing of new areas. This shifted in the 1980s when 
ecologists, working at lnv, framed landscape fragmentation as a public policy 
problem inspired by theories of island biogeography and metapopulations 
(Turnhout, 2009; mnp, interview 051029). The idea is that if landscapes become 
more fragmented, the number of populations and the possibilities for migra-
tion decrease. Since smaller populations become extinct more easily than large 
populations, nature policy had to focus on creating large nature reserves that are 
joined together or otherwise linked by corridors or stepping stones.
In the 1990 Nature Policy Plan, the notion of ‘national ecological network’ 
(nen) became the basis for nature policy in the Netherlands. Alterra researchers 
had been engaged with questions concerning landscape fragmentation and the 
metapopulation theory from an early stage. When field studies showed that 
animal populations in the Netherlands were affected by nature fragmentation 
and that this was a generic problem, the idea to build a model that assesses 
whether a population is viable in a certain landscape, was born (Alterra, 2005, 
interview 050217).
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Connecting social worlds through models – care and 
larCh as boundary objects 
Creating a priori standards for modelling
Models can often be regarded as boundary objects that bring together several 
social worlds. They are “discursive” spaces where social worlds can meet. This 
enables negotiations between scientists and policymakers about the parameters 
of the model (Evans, 2003) and to put scientific as well as non-scientific elements 
together to create a model to support policy making. It is in fact this feature that 
enables models to mediate effectively between ‘theory’ and the ‘world’ (Sismondo, 
1999). There are no general rules for the construction of models, but it involves 
“elements of theories and empirical evidence” (Morgan, and Morrison, 1999: 15). 
As is argued by Boumans, these ingredients are integrated in such a way that the 
model meets a priori set standards (Boumans, 1999). 
Interestingly, these a priori set standards however, differed in both models. At 
the start of the care model construction, the project team formulated three goals 
with regard to the models’ content. This was done with the help of a fourth party 
in this interdisciplinary project, the Macro Economic Labour Section (meeva) of 
the Ministry of Health. This section had taken up the task to host the project and 
provided a project secretary who was responsible for the financial organisation of 
both projects.52 The specific formulations of the aims of the project connected 
the scientific worlds of the science advisory bodies with the policy world of the 
Ministry. It connected the social aspects of government policy and health through 
the scp, rivm’s expertise on health trends, and cpb’s expertise on macroeconomic 
modelling with the macroeconomic policymakers. 
The model firstly needed to explain past developments in the use and costs of 
health care on the macroeconomic level. Second, it needed to calculate the future 
effects of possible financial-economic policy options on the macroeconomic level. 
Finally, it needed to show the effects of possible health care and prevention poli-
cies on the demand and supply of health care and its consequences for health care 
costs (Pre-study, 1994). The first two questions required the economic modelling 
of the structure of the health care system, whereas the third question required the 
modelling of public health issues and epidemiological trends. The project team was 
also faced with the difficult task of integrating these three approaches to modelling 
health care. Because there had previously been no such attempt, the care project 
52 The project secretary was also responsible for the progress of the project, as well as for secretarial sup-
port in meetings with the scientific committee.
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became a unique attempt to bring together micro-economic knowledge (e.g micro-
simulation modelling), knowledge about public health trends (epidemiological 
approaches), and macro-economic knowledge for the first time at this scale. 
larch was developed by a team of ecologists, and had no explicit policy ques-
tion at the basis of the model, as did the care model. However, the theoretical basis 
for the larch model was much stronger. The issue of landscape fragmentation 
had become a prominent issue both in the ecological theories taken up by Alterra 
researchers and in the 1990 Nature Policy Plan based on these theories. The larch 
model was built on two developed theories: the island theory and the concept of 
‘metapopulation’. The island theory was developed by MacArthur and Wilson – 
The theory of island biogeography. This theory states that the number of species on 
an island depends on a balance between the rate of extinction on the island and 
the rate of species immigration or colonisation of the island (Begon, and Harper, 
1996). This balance is influenced by, for instance, the size of the island and the 
distance to the mainland; islands closer to the mainland with larger habitat areas 
tend to have greater species diversity than islands further from the mainland. 
This theory cannot, however, comment on the question of which species could be 
expected in a certain area. 
The concept of metapopulation (Levins, 1969) – a group of spatially separated 
(sub) populations of the same species which interact through migration – helps 
to address this problem. An individual population lives in relative independence 
of other populations and can go extinct, but a population as a whole is often 
stable because immigrants from one population can re-colonize the habitat of 
the extinct population. The connectivity between seemingly isolated populations 
that guarantees the survival of the species as a whole is thus central to the idea of 
‘metapopulation’. The ecologists working at lnv in the early 1980s advocated an 
ecological network consisting of nature reserves in which no agricultural activity 
would take place and presented this in a policy document on nature development 
(Baerselman, 1988; Turnhout, 2003). 
On the basis of these theories and the policy document, an adjusted ecological 
network was designed, including ‘cultivated’ landscapes in order to mobilize 
(bureau) political and public support for the idea (Visser, 2006). lnv ecologists 
provided policy advice on how to build the national ecological network (nen). 
larch was built in this context to assess the viability of animal populations in 
fragmented landscapes and thus the potential of biodiversity. Policy questions 
developed as researchers and policymakers continued working on the construc-
tion of the nen but were strongly supported by available theoretical concepts on 
animal populations. 
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Science-based models that are developed by advisory institutes, such as the 
larch and the care model, are neither fully scientific nor fully policy-oriented. 
However, our cases show that some models can be less science based at the outset 
than others. In the care model project, clear aims were formulated for the model 
based on policy wishes rather than based on available theory. larch, however, 
could be developed on the basis of the available theoretical concepts and empirical 
field research. It developed in parallel with the articulation of nature ecology 
networks as public policy problems but was not steered from the policy side. The 
Dutch health care sector at this stage lacked such a supportive theory. 
Model construction: negotiating health economics – negotiating ecology 
Models that are often employed by experts for policy assessments have to be 
scientifically sound yet useful for policymakers. However, being useful entails that 
a model meets a broad set of criteria. Models carry in them bits of theory and bits 
of the ‘world’ (data) as representations of the reality that it needs to represent (be 
that theory, the world or something in between) and other elements such as tacit 
knowledge and experience of the model-builder (Evans, 2000; Morgan et al., 1999). 
The actual process of model building is, as Bouman has argued, like a “trial and 
error process till all the ingredients, including the empirical facts, are integrated” 
(Boumans, 1999: 95). Modelling is thus a constant shifting from data to theories 
and back, which occurs several times until something ‘useful’ has come up and is 
negotiated by the experts involved. 
The care project team struggled with the need to be simultaneously scientifically 
sound and policy-oriented because of the combination of three different epistemo-
logical, theoretical approaches. This was made more difficult by the need to use as 
much empirical data as possible. A project member explained that “to simultane-
ously connect micro level derived demand and supply with demand and supply 
at an aggregated macro level is extraordinarily complex and will in practice lead 
to immense practical problems” (scp, 2004, interview 040422). Outcomes on the 
macroeconomic level are as of yet very hard to derive from micro data analysis.53 
The solution that was sought was to limit the focus of the model to explaining 
past developments in costs of health care and to first make an ‘accurate’ descrip-
tion of the policy field (cpb, scp, and rivm, 1994). This solution was endorsed by 
both State Secretary Simons and the project secretary from the Ministry of Health. 
53 Within economics this is known as a major challenge that many have tried to solve. It also addresses 
the question how to accurately perform econometric science to answer policy questions. One of the more 
famous econometrists that performed good work in this field is the Nobel prize winner Heckman. 
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This, nevertheless, reduced the role of the rivm and the public health approach 
and, consequently, limited the scope of the model to an economic one. 
Moreover, at this stage of the project, political discussions and scientific dis-
cussions began to intertwine more openly. Now that the rivm’s role was reduced, 
the role of macroeconomic policymakers from meeva became more important, 
influencing the kind of ‘reality’ that was represented in the model. This became 
most visible when demand was modelled. At first, three options were available 
to model the parameter demand. The first option of the team was to not take 
into account the demand side of health care by treating demand as an exogenous 
factor. This choice, however, was not in line with political discussions on how 
demand can be influenced. The authors argue that: 
The not taking into account of demand effects would imply that we lay on the model the 
fact that own payments for gp consults or specialist consults do not have any effect on 
the production of health care. Given the prominent place of the issue of own payments 
in the [political] discussion on cost containment in health care, it seems irresponsible 
to not build such an assumption into the model (In: Cpb, and sCp, 1995:6).
Here we see that the political context of the model – the content of political 
discussions – directly influenced the shape of the model. 
The second option, favoured by scp, was to develop a dynamic model based 
on actual descriptions of the behaviour of the actors in the field. Such a model 
would be in line with the aim to incorporate microeconomic notions with macr-
oeconomic modelling practices. However, a dynamic model requires lots of data 
and would make the model very large and prone to uncertainties and fluctuations, 
especially as the available data – as is true in this case – was of a poor quality. The 
third option, favoured by cpb, and eventually put in the model, was to develop a 
structural model that provided a description of the structure of the policy field 
based mostly on the theoretical notions of economics in the field. 
larch was developed by a very stable research team – the people who were 
involved in the construction of larch are still part of the team fifteen years later 
– and with only one main disciplinary background involved (ecology). Due to the 
similar academic backgrounds of the researchers involved, problems with com-
bining different theoretical approaches rarely occurred.54 Problems encountered 
54 The team used to be called ‘Spatial Models’ but is now ‘Ecological Models and Monitoring’. This team 
discusses how models can be coupled, but further model construction often takes place in project teams 
which work on specific applications of the model. They may adjust the databases with which the models work 
for a specific application of the model. 
Connecting social worlds through models – care and larCh as boundary objects 119
focused not so much on theoretical problems but on ‘contextual’ elements such as 
modelling skills, computer capacity, how to model dispersion of species, and what 
arithmetic methods should be used. For example, according to one individual, ‘we 
used to wish that we could calculate the distances between all nature areas, but 
in the beginning we couldn’t do the calculations for the distances between one 
thousand or 10.000 swamp areas; now we have a table of these areas and we don’t 
have any problems with calculating distances’ (Alterra, 2004, interview 041020). 
Although the model was initiated and developed by researchers, they wanted 
the model to be useful for policy and sometimes tried to involve policymakers in 
the decision making about parameters needed for the model. One such example 
is the definition of a ‘viable population’. The output of the model consists of 
data about the viability of populations and therewith the extinction probability. 
However, to assess network cohesion and viability, an index is needed which 
involves both ecological and political decisions: ‘It entails decisions regarding 
whether one sustainable network is enough, whether 50% should be sustainable, 
or even all networks’ (Opdam et al., 2003:120). It also includes political decisions 
regarding the set of target species included in the assessment (i.e., which species 
are seen as more valuable) and about e.g. what percentage of area with at least 
what percentage of the species should be sustainable. These decisions inform 
the outcome of the model in terms of what can be defined as viable populations. 
Researchers maintained that these decisions should be made by policymakers. 
Namely, ‘the question of what risk level should be used is not one for ecologists 
to answer but rather one for managers’ (Verboom, 2001), and instead ‘the policy-
maker should decide whether the consequences of such decisions are acceptable’ 
(Alterra, interview 050217). Yet, the researchers received little input from policy-
makers; consequently, they themselves chose a definition of population viability 
with a risk level of 5% per 100 years. Out of every 20 species, they were willing to 
risk losing one every 100 years. 
The model was first applied in 1995 in the project ‘Ecological networks in river 
rehabilitation scenarios: a case study for the Lower Rhine’ (Reijnen, 1995). However, 
the model remained continuously in development. Despite little involvement of 
policymakers in the definition of parameters and assumptions for the model, the 
changing context in which the researchers worked and particular policy questions 
increasingly influenced the shape and content of the model. The period following 
the first application of the model in 1995 was characterized by the externalization 
of the in-house expertise from the Ministry of lnv and increasing project-based 
and output-centred research. The research team that developed larch had been 
part of lnv and had worked as civil servants until the year 2000 when the dlo 
institutes were legally privatised and Alterra was founded. Formally, Alterra and 
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the researchers were now independent from policy, but research projects could 
now only be carried out when research was commissioned – often by lnv. As a 
result, lnv could commission any institute to carry out the research that they 
deemed important for policy making. As a consequence, it is claimed that:
Researchers at institutes of Wageningen ur work differently than they did in the 80s: 
project-based, output-centred. (…) The new procedures result from the changes around 
the management and financing of the institutes: at a distance, demand driven output 
funding rather than input driven funding, in the form of a Public Limited Company [plc] 
rather than as a government institute. (Grin, 2004.)
This is confirmed by the Alterra researchers, one of whom states that the 
‘freedom’ the researchers used to have changed when Alterra became a market 
based institute that needed to acquire funding for research:
When I started working here [ibn-dlO], 16, 17 years ago everyone worked on what he / she 
thought was interesting. Today we need to account for all our time and can only work 
on something when a paying commissioner is in involved. We do what for instance the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency finds important and is willing to pay 
for. This is due to the privatisation of Alterra and the decrease of government subsidy. 
(Alterra, 2004, interview 040928).
Researchers could no longer build the model according to what they thought 
desirable. Instead, they had to take a more pragmatic approach: what is feasible 
within the time and money constraints that we have and what policy purpose 
should the model serve? 
As in the case of the care model, this raised the issues of balancing scientific 
and policy needs, of what needed to be represented and of the translation of 
politically sensitive issues. Uncertainty in the form of lack of available data, for 
example, represented a problem for researchers in some cases with regard to 
the scientific status of (the outcomes of) the model. For policymakers, however, 
this uncertainty could be irrelevant: ‘small uncertainties in a model are not likely 
to influence for example the decision to extend the nen with robust corridors; 
uncertainties in policy making and with regard to other uses of land and nature, 
such as recreation, are of a different scale than the uncertainties in science and 
in the model’ (Alterra, 2004, interview 041027). Since the research was often 
project-based, questions about how to deal with uncertainty were negotiated on 
a case-by-case basis. The issue of representation is illustrated by the choice for 
specific indicator species. In order to work with the model in the context of the 
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nen, indicator species had to be chosen which would represent other species in 
the distances it travels, the habitat it lives in, etc. larch would then assess the 
viability of these indicator species in various nature reserves. Much knowledge 
needed to be available about these species, but to create political legitimacy, they 
also needed to be furry and cuddly (mnp, 2005, interview 051029).
These seemingly scientific discussions concerning the respective data-versus-
theory-ladenness of models that was present in both modelling processes tend 
to mask their political dimension. Thus Edwards argues that the model / data 
relationship should be viewed as “symbiotic, rather than oppositional” (Edwards, 
1999:454). The reason for this is that “the purpose of simulation models is not to 
explain or theorize, but to forecast by creating analogues based in both theory and 
data” (Edwards, 1999:454). Edwards shows empirically that data and theory are 
constituted by each other: facts (or data) are theory-laden, and theory is data-laden. 
The question of whether the data or theory is sufficient enough for the occasion is, 
thus, not a technical discussion but an epistemological discussion. Facts provide 
scientific credibility for theories. Theory-laden models, however, provide experts 
with control over the presence of certain facts in a model: which facts you put in a 
model, and which ones you leave out. The care model team chose to rely on theory 
by building a structural model and to test it with data as it became available in 
later years. The larch modellers, however, chose furry and cuddly animals as 
their indicator species (mnp, 2005, interview 051029), relying on specific facts, 
while leaving out others. 
The care and larch models as boundary objects
Models that are used for the assessment of policy proposals act as boundary 
objects between policy questions and scientific practices; they simultaneously 
keep together and keep apart social worlds. Moreover, as we have seen, seem-
ingly scientific discussions are often disguised political discussions situated at 
the “interface between science and policymaking” (Edwards, 1999: 462). This is, 
as our cases show, especially so for science-based models for policy making, as 
these have to account for scientific and policy worlds concurrently. Interestingly 
enough, in our case, economic experts seem to lean more towards the needs of 
policymakers and less to the scientific world, whereas the ecologists seem to 
account for both worlds more equally. The models described here are in that sense 
boundary objects with different consequences. 
The care model is a boundary object for different scientific disciplines in that 
it provides a negotiation space to ‘depoliticise’ political problems (Jasanoff, 1995). 
However, its ability to serve as a boundary object between scientific disciplines 
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proved limited; instead, it acted as a division tool for the scientific parties involved. 
It contributed to endorsing existing differences between the scp, cpb and rivm, 
The Ministry of Health and related institutes concerning how to cope with health 
care issues such as efficiency, scarcity, and solidarity. It did, however, bring 
together macroeconomic modellers and specific health policymakers. The idea 
behind the care model was to either use it for the assessment of policy measures 
developed by the Ministry of Health regarding the regulation of costs of health 
care or to gain a sense of what parts of and to what extent the health care sector 
would be financially affected by certain financial policy measures. The initial use 
of the 1999 version of the model was, however, limited. Involved policymakers 
questioned its usefulness for policy assessment, as it was said to be “only a 
distribution model” (Ministry of Health, 2004, interview 040512A). Accounts 
from previous years were put in the model to see where changes would occur, as 
opposed to using it as a simulation model to predict future developments. 
larch, like the care model, incorporates politically normative standpoints 
and contains elements of both science and policy. larch provided not neces-
sarily a space to depoliticize problems but certainly a space to tinker with policy 
questions related to the nen. Interestingly, the boundary nature of larch 
is found in its ‘stable variations’. Since larch has often been used for ad hoc 
projects and different applications, a number of building blocks (modules) of 
the model have been developed, which we call ‘stable variations’. larch-scan 
is, for example, based on the dispersal capacity of species and delivers species’ 
specific results, whereas larch-europe assesses the biodiversity potential in 
fragmented European ecosystems. The stable variations of the model provide the 
model its boundary object features, allowing it to be flexible enough to be used to 
investigate certain policy questions, yet stable enough to prevent the high costs 
and time involved in adjusting the model.
Models as performative boundary objects
In discussing simulation models that have come to play an important role in 
policy making, we argue that mainly pointing to the coordinative role of models 
as boundary objects is not sufficient to understand the much more performative 
character of models. Models are tools for scientists and policymakers to provide 
negotiation spaces for the social worlds involved in modelling practices and coor-
dinating these social worlds; they carry in them facts that have been the result 
of negotiations that took place during the model construction. As such, models 
are also a way of creating facts. Moreover, models are active constituents of the 
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context they are constructed for, be it the scientific world, the policy world, or 
another world. Callon and others have referred to this as performativity (Callon, 
1998; Callon, and Muniesa, 2005; MacKenzie, and Millo, 2003; Garcia-Parpet, 
2007). Although these authors investigate performativity in relation to economic 
models and theory in economy (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2007; Garcia-Parpet, 
2007; Zuiderent-Jerak, 2009), this quality or property of theory does not apply 
to economic models alone. The notion of performativity may, thus, aid us in 
understanding how models – in this case they can also be regarded as boundary 
objects – also actively change practices and social worlds. Interestingly, the idea of 
a boundary object as introduced by Star and Griesemer can be seen as an attempt 
to integrate both theories with the help of a material device, the boundary object. 
However, the concepts of boundary objects and performativity also create an 
interesting tension. The notion of boundary object, which originates from social 
worlds theory, refers to ways in which different social worlds can interact and 
relate without having to change, for instance, through the flexibility and coordi-
native role of objects (such as models). The notion of performativity derives from 
the context of actor network theory and focuses on the role of materiality in the 
shaping and forming of facts (Latour, 1999). Thus, while boundary objects are 
about how dissimilar, already existing social worlds can relate without having 
to change, performativity is about how such objects shape and form the world in 
which they are to operate. 
Although these concepts seem mutually exclusive, in engaging with 
MacKenzie’s levels of performativity, we aim to do justice to the boundary object 
nature of science-based models for policy as well as to their performative character 
that goes beyond their function as a boundary object. Scientific models for policy 
making, on the one hand, bring together social worlds and enable these worlds to 
work together and to negotiate knowledge and policy. However, as we show, these 
models are at the same time also material actors. They bring with them a new 
social world made out of elements of the social worlds involved in constructing 
these models. As such, they are tools through which facts – reality – are made; 
they are performative. 
MacKenzie’s classification of performativity has been helpful in unravelling 
performativity as a theoretical concept. Performativity is explained in several 
steps. Generic performativity happens when an aspect of economics or another 
discipline, be that a “theory, model, concept, procedure, data-set, etc.” (MacKenzie, 
2007: 55), is used in daily life. He uses the term effective performativity when the 
use makes a difference to this reality. These two forms of performativity are, how-
ever, superficial enough to keep the social worlds involved in their place. The care 
model project, for instance, brought together different disciplines that had not 
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worked together previously on health care. The project did not succeed as a col-
laboration project at the time, and the parties involved fell apart, while the project 
continued as a one-disciplined project occasionally consulting other experts. 
Effective performativity was evident for the reason that the different parties were 
involved and became acquainted with each other’s epistemologies. 
However, the model as a boundary object effectuated more than this alone. It 
also provided the cpb with a new knowledge tool for a policy area it previously had 
refrained from. As such, the model has extended the cpb’s authority in the Dutch 
policy arena and created a new authoritative institute in health care alongside 
others (such as the scp and rivm). In this respect, the model also works as a 
disciplining tool for other actors in the field in a few ways; the model has forced 
data providers to register data that formerly was not registered. Other actors 
in the field of health care now have to relate to the macroeconomic perspective 
provided by the cpb. In that sense, the model also actively shaped social worlds 
in health care. MacKenzie describes this as Barnesian performativity. This takes 
place when the use of theory or models makes reality – in any form – behave more 
like the depiction of that reality in theory, such as a model.55 
The care model has in that sense also contributed to a shift in the science-
policy boundary in health care towards a more economic approach to health 
care. Although the government had used a cost containment strategy of supply 
regulation since the 1980s, the model incorporated a market oriented approach 
that was visible in the demand parameter. This limited the use of the model for 
policy assessments based on the supply regulation system. Although the notion 
of a market oriented health care system was not seriously being considered in 
the debates concerning a new policy program until the beginning of 200056, the 
model incorporated a market based notion long before the government. As the 
model incorporates a market oriented policy program, it helped to articulate, make 
stronger and put on the agenda a market based policy program (Van Egmond, and 
Bal, forthcoming). Once a policy approach has permeated many governmental 
institutions, it becomes more difficult to argue against such a policy approach. 
As such, the model has served to legitimate new governmental policy directions 
regarding the health care system. 
55 This event is well described by Garcia-Parpet for the Soulogne strawberry market (Garcia, 2007).
56 Since 2000 the Government has worked on the introduction of a new policy program for the governance 
of health care, based on the notion of managed competition by Enthoven (vws, 2001), which was introduced 
in 2006. Alongside, the cpb published a revised version of the model in 2006. This version is better suited 
to deal with the assessment of policy measures taken within the market oriented care sector, and for the 
tri-annual release of the health expenditures prognoses reports.
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The use of larch can also be analyzed through the notions of generic and 
effective performativity. The externalization of the ‘in-house’ expertise of lnv 
into Alterra provided larch with an opportunity and necessity to more con-
sciously bridge and coordinate the scientific and policy world which strengthened 
its function as a boundary object. larch has been used for ad hoc projects, often 
in relation to quick policy recommendations and quick scans for lnv and other 
Ministries (Verboom, 2006). It has, for example, been used in a project by the lnv 
to assess the ecological effectiveness of ‘corridors’ between nature reserves; on 
the basis of which, it was decided whether each corridor should be funded or not. 
The ecological corridors that had originally been drawn by lnv had been heavily 
criticized for the lack of scientific input to assess their ecological efficacy. These 
corridors, with the exception of those with legal commitments, administrative 
commitments, robust corridors which were ecologically sound, and those that 
were expected to soon be finished, were tested for ecological importance with 
larch (Alterra, 2005, interview 291005). larch and the ecological criteria 
within larch, thus, shaped policy decisions. 
In addition, larch is extensively and systematically used by the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (mnp), one of larch’s largest customers 
(Verboom, 2006). Amongst others, larch is employed for the redrawing of 
boundaries of the nen and for projects related to the European Bird- and Habitat 
Directive and Natura 2000, a European network of protected nature areas. Since 
it operates in a changing institutional and political environment of increasing 
decentralization ranging from national to regional levels and towards decision 
making as a participative, multilevel, process with a number of stakeholders, the 
model is itself continuously being evaluated and further developed. larch has 
now also become an interactive tool that is used in these processes as a tool for 
deliberation and group decision support in provincial / local stakeholder consulta-
tive processes (Alterra, 2007). In this respect, it has also become a performative 
boundary object between diverse groups of stakeholders.
Whereas larch and its use are constantly in development, the modules remain 
relatively stable simply because it would be too expensive and time-consuming to 
adjust them for every new commissioned project, nationally or internationally. In 
some cases data is lacking to run larch in detail; whether there is funding for 
obtaining these data or whether larch should work with rougher data is then 
a decision that needs to be made. In this respect, the model often directs the 
research and the results which lead to policy decisions. Policy questions may be 
adjusted to the possibilities of the model. In assessing ecological corridors and 
projects related to Natura 2000, larch helps to shape what nature will look like 
in the future and this can be regarded as Barnesian performativity. The use of 
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larch has been classified as having a middle to high policy risk because of the 
money involved and the large societal concerns that are at stake (Jansen, et al., 
2004): if the corridors may not have the predicted effect or even a counter effect, 
the reputation of the Ministry of lnv and its relation with stakeholders could be 
at stake.57
Both models legitimate decision making and have influenced both the context 
and form in which certain knowledge is constructed and used for policy processes. 
They have been constituents of the (political) reality by selecting, providing, and 
structuring information that then sometimes became an ‘obligatory point of pas-
sage’ (Callon, 1986) in decision making processes. In this, they have also become 
disciplining tools: they legitimate the use and form of certain data over others, 
they determine what research and policy questions can be (easily) answered and 
which ones can be left out. More importantly, once models have been developed 
and are used for the making or evaluation of policy, they often result in routinized 
patterns in research and, moreover, in policy making, and therefore, also in the 
coordination and demarcation of science and policy. Yet, they do this in different 
ways with different consequences. 
Conclusion
Models play an increasingly important role in the use of scientific knowledge 
for policy making processes. This paper argues that it is insufficient to concentrate 
on the boundary object character of models to understand this ever-increasing 
role and stresses that also the performative character of models needs to be 
investigated. Although the notions of performativity and boundary object have 
different origins and a tension seems to exist between them, connecting these 
notions together facilitates a more complete understanding of the role of models 
in policy. 
This paper has demonstrated that both the care and the larch model can be 
regarded as boundary objects and demonstrate several levels of performativity. 
These levels do not necessarily co-exist at all times. Whereas both models show 
some form of Barnesian performativity, it can be argued that the care model 
became increasingly performative with regard to this stronger form of perfor-
mativity. In contrast, larch is used in a more varied range of settings. In its 
57 Mackenzie distinguishes a counterperformativity as well when the use of models, or theory, makes proc-
esses in reality look less like their depiction by models, or theory. In both events, however, the use of theory, 
or a model, intervenes in the social world to such extent that it changes that reality.
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increasing function as a tool for deliberation and group decision support, the 
generic and effective forms of performativity are dominant. On the other hand, 
its role in deciding which ecological corridors will be established can be classified 
as a feature resembling more closely Barnesian performativity. 
Models can be regarded as a special kind of boundary object in their perfor-
mative nature. Models ‘commonly exert a compelling persuasiveness; they are 
designed to look ‘real’ – particularly to those beyond the model-constructing 
community’ (Yearley, 1999: 846). In addition, models incorporate some aspects of 
what Fujimura (1992) calls standardized packages, e.g. theory and standardized 
tools. Both the care and larch model have become relatively stable objects and are 
strongly embedded in both the research (cpb, and Alterrra) and the policy context. 
They have been used as policy tools for a long time, which has led to routinized 
patterns in both research and policy in which their function as a boundary object 
is crucial. This makes it increasingly difficult to reconstruct them. These features 
and their embeddedness make their performative features stronger and do not 
diminish their boundary object character. 
By illustrating and making explicit that performative science-based models go 
beyond their role as boundary objects, we aim to obtain a better understanding of 
how models shape practices, social worlds and lived realities. Moreover, in order 
to acquire a more thorough understanding of how models shape our (policy) 
worlds in an era in which models play an increasingly important role in the use of 
scientific knowledge for policy making processes, we contend that a more system-
atic investigation of the performativity of models as boundary objects is needed. 
A next question would be to more extensively explore the differences and tensions 
between the two concepts during the construction of models, and to focus on 
the tension models bring with them between remaining a boundary object that 
coordinates between relatively stable worlds and becoming a performative object 
that changes the social worlds. 
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Introduction
This article58 investigates the role of economic science in the creation of 
material devices – policy tools – and their role in constituting health care reform. 
Recent market solutions that aim for a ‘better’ governance of the public sector 
have been studied by many scholars (Balle Hansen, and Lauridsen, 2004; Hunter, 
2005; Pierson, 1994; Pierson, 2004; Porter, and Olmsted Teisberg, 2004; Ranade, 
1995; Walsh 1995; and others), and explanations for public policy reforms have 
delivered insights into the meanings and legitimacy of policy change from a con-
textual interpretative stance (Fischer, 2003; Hall, 1993; Hajer, and Wagenaar, 2003; 
Rhodes 2000; Yanow, 2006). Though this empirical turn has been a welcomed 
shift in the policy sciences, the study of science-policy interactions as an explicit 
research focus has until recently been left untouched in the analysis of policy 
changes. Where science-policy interactions have been included in the analysis, 
scholars have focused on defining the usefulness or efficiency of knowledge to 
policy makers (see Maasen, and Weingart, 2005; Sabatier, and Jenkins-Smith 1993) 
or on knowledge as instrumental component in the policy learning processes (see 
Hall, 1993; Weiss, 1991), thereby depoliticizing the role of science in the policy 
making processes. Moreover, through its focus on deliberative and discursive 
practices and through methods like discourse analysis, the new policy sciences 
fails to analyze how material manifestations of science-policy interactions – such 
as policy tools – shape and configure policy change. 
Policy tools used by policy makers are often the result of interaction with 
scientists through hybrid science policy practices – examples are the many policy 
assessment tools such as effectiveness studies and economic models and the use 
of knowledge instruments in the form of reports, think tanks or (international) 
negotiation structures (Stone, 2007). Such tools are, however, not just technical 
instruments for policy makers or politicians, as is often stated, but are practices in 
which normative assumptions are built in that often remain outside the political 
debate. The study of policy practices should therefore broaden its scope to the 
role of science in creating such material devices and their role in policy change. 
In this article we address this issue by investigating the role of economic science 
in the creation of such material devices for policy making. We focus on how such 
material devices come about as a result of science policy interactions concerning 
Dutch health care and how we can understand these devices in relation to the 
legitimacy of health policy change in the Netherlands. 
58 The authors wish to thank the members of the Healthcare Governance group of the bmg, John Law and 
the anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments on earlier versions of this article. 
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In our analysis of the role of economic science in the making of material 
devices we use the notion of performativity of economics offered by Callon (1998) 
and extended by others, such as MacKenzie and Millo (2003), Çali¸skan and Callon 
(2009) and Zuiderent-Jerak (2009). This concept captures the idea that economics 
not only investigates and classifies (social) phenomena but also actively brings 
these phenomena to life through these investigations and classifications. As 
such, it deconstructs the central idea within economics that ‘naturally competi-
tive’ markets can be discovered by economic scientists and replaces it with the 
notion that markets are actively configured by economists and economic theory 
and other material tools.
We argue that health care markets are actively configured by material devices 
constructed in processes of close interaction between scientists and policy 
makers. We show that constructing material market devices is crucial for this 
act of configuration. Moreover, we argue that the importance of studying the 
role of economics (or other scientific practices for that matter) in policy change 
lies in the fact that economics and market devices are important constituents of 
policy programs. Hence, both have far-reaching normative implications for the 
actors involved in and the people affected by that policy program. The inclusion 
of market devices and scientific practices in policy analysis leads to a reloca-
tion of political discussions from the explicit policy processes to the scientific 
domain. This relocation has consequences for the accountability and legitimacy 
of political decision making regarding the development of health care markets. 
The implications of our analysis go beyond the health care sector and can be 
generalized across other policy sectors.
Towards affordable health care: competing policy 
programs for conflicting stakes
In 2006, the health care system in the Netherlands was profoundly reformed 
with the introduction of the new health insurance law. The health care sector 
reformed from a corporatist health care system in which private bodies have 
been responsible for the provision of most health care facilities and a financial 
structure that has predominantly been publicly arranged to a market-oriented 
policy model with a larger role for health insurers and health providers as 
market parties (Schut, and Van de Ven, 2005; Van Hout, and Putters, 2004; Van 
der Grinten, and Kasdorp, 1999). The new system, based on the idea of managed 
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or regulated59 competition developed by Enthoven, stimulates competition 
between health insurers, health providers and health users. 
The reform of the health care sector has resulted in new modes of governing 
and controlling health care, allowing the central government to withdraw from 
directly steering health care price and quality. These changes are accompanied by 
other fundamental changes in the health sector at several levels, with the most 
prominent change being the shifted responsibility of insurance companies to 
allocate means and to deliver high quality care as well as an involuntary insurance 
scheme where consumers have the freedom to choose level of coverage, the instal-
lation of a Health Authority and Inspection Authority and new contracts and laws 
that should secure open information exchange and free entrance to the health 
care market (Enthoven, 2006; Enthoven et al., 2007; Schut, and Van de Ven, 2005). 
This reform followed three decades of fierce political discussions and policy 
proposals about the need and desirability to reform the health care system in order 
to restrain the rising costs of health care that had begun to consume a substantial 
portion of public expenditures60 from the 1970’s onwards. Although since the 
1970s proposals were developed for policy programs based on market notions61, 
the government held on to the supply regulated cost containment strategy, until it 
was faced with the emergence of new problems in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
Increased access times for health care services and a growing complexity of the 
system led to a growing societal uneasiness with this policy program and to a 
renewed public debate in which the ‘Stalinist’ health care system of supply regu-
lation was critiqued (Van der Ploeg, 1992). Despite three decades of opposition 
against policy change in health care, in 2001 the government presented a blueprint 
for plans based on market ideas that was executed in 2006. This seemingly fast 
change has presented policy analysts with the possibility to consider the question 
of why and how this quite profound policy change has been possible despite much 
political and societal resistance.
59 Both terms are used equally throughout different publications and seem to point to the same theoretical 
concepts. Enthoven consequently uses the term ‘managed’ competition, and in recent years this term seems 
to have replaced the term ‘regulated’ competition.
60 From 5.5 percent of bnp in 1968 to 6.7 percent in 1972 – a rise of more than 1.2 percentage points in four 
years (Schut, 2003:214). 
61 The structure report was published by the committee Hendriks in 1974, in which the importance of future 
cost containment was stressed and the solution was found in a fundamental governance restructuring with 
a more directive role for the government in cost containment (Schut, 2003; Kasdorp, 2004) The 1987 plans of 
the Dekker commission (vws, 2001) suggested a market for health care based on regulated competition.
Explaining policy change in health care 137
Explaining policy change in health care
Public sector reforms under the heading of New Public Management and the 
paradigm of the market as a solution for the perceived ineffectiveness of the public 
sector, especially the health sector across Europe and other Western countries, 
have been analyzed and criticized by many (e.g. Balle Hansen, and Lauridsen, 
2004; Hunter, 2005; Pierson, 1994; Pierson, 2004; Porter, and Olmsted Teisberg, 
2004; Ranade, 1995; Walsh 1995). Within these ongoing discussions concerning 
the position of health care as a public good throughout the Western world, the 
late shift towards a market-based policy program in the Netherlands has been 
described by Dutch scholars as deriving from the inefficiency of the old policy 
system of supply regulation and cost containment (e.g. Enthoven et al., 2007; 
Helderman et al., 2005). Developments such as increasing waiting lists and rapid 
growth in health care expenditures put into perspective the effectiveness of the 
supply regulation politics and challenged, according to Helderman et al. (2005), 
the principle that a ‘market’ is unsuitable for ensuring a public good such as 
health care. 
The idea of regulated competition as a solution for the public sector released 
a profound fear by opponents, as it was viewed as an assault on health care as 
a public good and the central values and solidarity of Dutch health care – that 
is the quality, equal accessibility and distribution and affordability of health 
care. Many negative side effects were associated with market regulation such as 
adverse selection of unhealthy people and fear of a growing gap between citizens 
with a low socio-economic status and people with a better socio-economic status 
(Trappenburg, 2005), the undesirability of a perception of health care in more 
economic terms (Kasdorp, 2004). In reaction to the statement of the president 
of the Health Insurance Board that “health care is like cars” – some are willing 
to pay for an expensive car while others are satisfied with a smaller and cheaper 
car – Trappenburg pointed to contradictions in this line of thinking because 
“we would like to pay for other people’s need for health care, but not for other 
people’s need for a car” (Trappenburg, 2005:26, translation sve). A closer look at 
the critiques shows that the disagreement with the reform plans did not so much 
question the need for restructuring the health care system, as for most involved 
the need for this seemed apparent. The disagreement centered on the question of 
whether or not health care as a public good could be left to the market. Namely, 
could regulated competition secure the core values of health care and combine 
them with market notions? 
Proponents argued that market regulation would be able to provide better 
quality and more efficiency in health care provision (see e.g. Brouwer et al., 2006; 
Chapter six Analyzing Policy Change138
Schut, 2003; Schut, and Van de Ven, 2005), although some worries were expressed 
about leaving a public good such as health care to market parties instead of to 
government parties. In a 2002 Manifesto, many Dutch economists pointed to 
twenty possible problems within the system if the government would neglect to 
take the right technical measures for this new system in time (ibmg, 2002). In 
this manifesto economists frame problems in the health care market as a lack 
of knowledge about health use and the role of the individual in such use. Other 
economists do likewise. Arrow, for instance, has argued that most problems 
in the health care sector stem from uncertainty regarding risks for diseases at 
the individual level and related the importance of information and the location 
of information in health care markets (Arrow, 1963). The solution that is often 
proposed is to come to more knowledge of individual economic behavior.
Discussions within (health) economics show that the idea that markets need 
active configuration is widespread. Enthoven for example argues that “the markets 
for health insurance and health care are not naturally competitive like the markets 
for transportation, financial services, automobiles or jogging shoes” (Enthoven, 
1988:87). The solution is to develop theories that frame health care in terms of 
‘normal’ markets and accordingly develop instruments and tools that support the 
market idea. Examples of tools often considered a necessity to constitute a market 
(in health care) include transparent product classifications, appropriate consumer 
information on insurance companies and performance indicators of (health) pro-
viders, free entrance to the market and free choice (Brouwer, et al. 2006; Enthoven, 
1988; Arrow, 1963), and the aforementioned measures as an Health Authority and 
an Inspection Authority and new contracts and laws for information exchange 
and free entrance to the health care market. In that sense, economists do acknowl-
edge an extensive role for economists and economic science in creating tools that 
constitute policy programs such as managed competition in Dutch health care. 
Investigating the role of science in policy change 
The role of science in policy making has been investigated mostly in its form 
as scientific advice to politics, for instance in knowledge utilization studies 
(see Lindblom, and Cohen 1979; Weiss, 1991; Giddens, 1994; and others). In 
such studies, scholars focused on solving questions concerning the legitimacy 
of democratic decision making under conditions of uncertain knowledge and 
within changing political systems (Maasen, and Weingart, 2005). The main goal 
of such research is to acquire precise descriptions of the differences between sci-
ence and policymaking and to develop heuristics of science-policy interactions. In 
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such studies, science has largely been depoliticized and scholars have focused on 
finding definitions of how knowledge can be useful or efficient to policy makers 
(see Maasen, and Weingart, 2005; Sabatier, and Jenkins-Smith 1993) or on knowl-
edge as an instrumental component of the policy learning process (see Hall, 1993; 
Weiss, 1991). Analytically, however, the dichotomy between science and policy as 
part of separate worlds is often maintained, as is the normative stance of science 
as the deliverer of facts and politics as the realm of values and protector of public 
interests. 
Such positivist claims are rejected by deliberative policy analysis that departs 
from the notion that contemporary politics is situated in dynamic networks and 
calls for a new understanding of shifting locations of power and legitimacy. Thereby, 
these scholars focus on studying such networks, particularly how such changing 
networks relocate and redefine issues of power and interests in society (Fischer, 
2003; Hajer, and Wagenaar; 2003; Hall, 1993; Yanow, 2006). Regarding the role 
of science, Fischer has argued that the new take on policy analysis should under-
stand the role of science “as a more subtle interaction between physical and social 
factors” (Fischer, 2003:215). Thus, the focus should lie on investigating changing 
manifestations of policy making and politics and the role of scientific knowledge 
in these manifestations (Hajer, and Wagenaar, 2003). Although these scholars do 
take into account the consideration that scientific research can be recognized as a 
social practice that contextually and continually comes about in specific historical 
and linguistic contexts (Fischer, 2003), their research has yet to explicitly focus on 
science-policy interactions, nor have they analyzed what this new role of science 
actually means for studying science-policy relations or policy change. 
Despite these insights, many policy scientific explanations on decision making 
and its interaction with science do not go beyond the limited explanation that 
decision making is unpredictable and ambiguous, hence arriving at concepts such 
as ‘windows of opportunity’, ‘resistance’, and ‘slowness’ that often mask the soft 
irrational, unexplainable elements of change or non-change in the political deci-
sion making process. Moreover, through its focus on deliberative and discursive 
practices and through methods like discourse analysis, the new policy sciences 
fails to analyze how material manifestations of science-policy interactions shape 
and configure policy change. 
The role of (scientific) materialities in policy change, such as the formulation 
of the leading principles of the health care system by means of laws and rules or 
the creation of tools to support markets, is often only taken as a technical matter 
to be solved by issuing new technical measurements (Helderman et al., 2005; 
Kooiman, 2009). Even where the materialities of market development are put 
centre stage in the analysis, as in Helderman (2005), they are seen as preparations 
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in infrastructural terms rather than as a normative playground where what 
regulated competition is and what values are built into it are practically shaped 
by economists and health policymakers through these material tools. As a conse-
quence, in these explanations the role of (economic) science in the constitution of 
public policy programs remains highly underexplored. 
Performativity of economics 
In recent years, social studies of markets have recognized the performative 
role of economic science and the material embeddedness of economics in soci-
etal institutions as essential elements in constituting (new) ways of economic 
thinking (Porter, 1995; Callon, 1998; Barry, 2002; MacKenzie, and Millo, 2003; 
Zuiderent-Jerak, 2009). The notion of performativity of economic science captures 
economic science not only as a mode of investigation and classification of (social) 
phenomena, but also as an actor that actively brings these phenomena to life 
through this investigation and classification. In this perspective, economic laws 
are not naturally given events that can be studied and described by economists 
through an economic theory but are instead actively constructed by economists 
and economic science through economic theory and economic classification. 
Within this theory, the idea of naturally competitive markets should be replaced 
with the notion of actively configured markets. 
A focus on the role of economics in the constitution of markets provides, 
according to Callon, insights into how “notions such as that of supply and 
demand, or those of interconnected markets, imperfect competition or incen-
tives, have been formulated in constant relation to practical questions which, in 
turn, they help reformulate” (1998:2). Competition, in this line of argument is not 
the starting point but the endpoint, and competition occurs when the technical 
options have been selected, developed and made fit for use. To ensure competition 
or to make a market, economic actors use a heterogeneous set of tools such as 
contracts, laws, and material devices in the form of scales, forms and models. 
These provide actors with calculative agency; that is, the ability of agents to calculate 
on an aggregated level according to the needs of markets. Such calculative agency 
cannot be possessed by individuals because it builds on complex and aggregated 
information62. 
62 An example is the existence of money. Money as a calculative agency is not given a priori but is actively 
brought into life by economics. This is built upon and maintained by historically grown traditions and 
conventions; for instance, by the classification work of Adam Smith and the work of National Trusts. The 
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Economic theory provides the framework to institute the elements for 
particular markets. As such, economic science is brought up as an important 
constitutor of the economy in that tools, theories or descriptions of economic 
behavior become available for its advocates – economists, the State and other 
institutions. Such embeddedness of markets (Callon, 1998) in institutions and 
economic theory offers a perception of economic science as a technological tool 
(Osborne, and Rose, 1999) or a kind of materiality that enacts specific notions of 
a market. MacKenzie and Millo (2003) show that economics as a technological 
tool is itself a result of negotiating practices by the users of these tools. Their 
research on the emergence of derivatives markets in the United States – the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (cboe) and the International Monetary Market 
(imm) in Chicago – shows how economics and its associated practices “simplify 
and disembed [economics] to the extent that economics becomes applicable” 
(2003:138) (emphasis added). Not only the interactions between economists, the 
State and other agencies – the mobilization of human actions – are important 
in shaping the economy, the mobilization of economic theory and the kind of 
mobilization is as important as research shows. Such an analysis on the perfor-
mativity of economic science offers a way out of a technical or instrumental 
perception of the role of science in society as presented by policy analysts and 
allows for a study of the consequences of involving economics in the constitution 
of economies. 
In the next section we will elaborate on instances of economization and the 
role of economists in the establishment of managed competition as the dominant 
health policy program in the Netherlands. 
From a health care sector to a health care market 
From the 1980s onwards the health care sector has been interwoven with an 
increasing economization of health care. The term economization in public 
policy in the Netherlands has pointed to several trends of economization, from 
the interpretation of health care in terms of part of bnp (Kasdorp, 2004) and the 
introduction of economic language that describes health care, such as clients, 
outcomes, and care processes (Van Hout, and Putters, 2004), to the growing 
attention created by the government for the role of the market as a problem-solver 
under the heading of the New Public Management movement (Walsh, 1995; 
value of money is, therefore, the result of highly complex calculations done by complex models that work 
across countries and cannot really be understood or acted upon by individuals.
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Kickert, 2000)63. This adoption of a more economic view on health care was par-
alleled by the emergence of health economics as a separate scientific discipline, a 
trend that can be seen throughout many industrialized countries (Ashmore et al., 
1989; Hunter, 1997; Pierson, 1994). These instances of economization of health 
care enabled health care to be thought of and talked about in economic terms and 
to become part of the economic debate in general. 
Educating society about the market for health care
The role of health economists in economic discourse has been extensive through 
educating society about health care markets. Since the 1980’s, when two Dutch 
universities – Maastricht University and Erasmus University Rotterdam – under-
took the initiative to develop a curriculum in health care economics and manage-
ment64, health economists have educated an increasing number of students on 
health economics (Moen, 1989)65. The institute Health Policy & Management 
(ibmg) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, with which the economists discussed 
in this article are affiliated, employs about 80 health economists and a significant 
63 Kasdorp (2004) describes the interpretation of health care in terms of part of bnp as an economization 
of health care. Others see the growing attention created by the government for the role of the market as a 
problem-solver during the 1990s as a form of economization (Van Hout, and Putters, 2004) when the notion 
of total control of society had lost the better part of its appeal. In this, the government followed the discussion 
in the us under Reagan and the uk under Thatcher about the future of the steering role of the government 
and the extent of the government’s tasks (Kasdorp, 2004; Kickert, 2000; Pierson, 2004; Pierson; 1994; Walsh, 
1995). The 1987 Dekker report on the future of the Dutch health care system showed the first signs of the New 
Public Management movement. Also the chairman came from the business community – he was a former 
ceo of the Philips Company. Two other seats were taken by experts in economics. This was an unparalleled 
event for the health care sector where chairmen and seats tended to be chosen from the policy field itself. 
64 Maastricht University set up a new chair in health economics situated in the medical department, and 
in 1982, the Institute of Health Policy and Management (ibmg) was established at the Erasmus University in 
Rotterdam. The ibmg offered an interdisciplinary curriculum based on economy, sociology, law and public 
administration, taking as a starting point the perspective of health providers.
65 In 1983, the Dutch-Flemish Health Economics Association was founded. At the start of the eighties, 
handbooks on the subject and the first scientific journals on health economics and related subjects appeared, 
such as the Journal of Health Economics published by Elsevier since 1982. Health economists in the 
Netherlands and Flanders have written a number of Dutch handbooks on economics and health care issues 
since halfway through the 1990s. The first international Handbook of Health Economics (by Cuyler, and 
Newhouse) was published only in 2005. Since 1996, a growing number of health economists have attended 
the international Health Economics Association (ihea) conferences (Rutten, 2004).
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number of health policy scientists and health sociologists and educates more than 
one hundred students a year. The importance of this is illustrated by one of the 
founders of the ibmg, professor in health economics Van de Ven:
The fact that we have in the Netherlands a small group of people working, thinking, 
communicating and lecturing in managed competition in a very consistent way, for 
about twenty years now, is significant. Let’s not forget the importance of the education 
we offer. Each year we deliver about fifty students, in twenty years. That makes about 
one thousand people working in health care, for the Government, for insurance 
companies, for advisory boards that have been educated about managed competition 
and are very familiar with it. As far as I know we’ve been the only country so consistent 
in this. (Interview Van de Ven, 060425)
Consequently, the ibmg has been actively involved in discussions concerning a 
workable system for the governance of public health care and the development use 
and distribution of economic theories regarding health care. In fact, regarding 
the new policy program, health economists are very well informed, as the (former) 
head of the bmg has acknowledged:
On many issues we know exactly what is going on and we have well-founded advice to 
offer. Take for instance the 2002 manifesto in which we expressed our worries regarding 
the new system. That has become our business card! Even the Ministry complimented 
us on the manifesto. The story covers many aspects of the new system. (Interview 
Rutten, 060329) 
This position is emphasized by involvement of ibmg in the recently published 
evaluation of the health insurance law and the care gratuity law. 
The active engagement of economists with health care not only created an 
economic discourse regarding health care. It also led to material manifesta-
tions of this economization such as newly developed theory and policy tools 
that framed the economics of health care in terms of managed competition or a 
regulated market. 
Building an economic theory on health care as a market: a risk 
adjustment system
The theory of managed competition, first developed by the American economist 
Allen Enthoven, was introduced in the Netherlands by the health economists Van 
de Ven and Rutten in an article published in a leading Dutch Journal for Economy 
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and Statistics (esb) in the early eighties66. Since then the theory on managed 
competition has been refined, and necessary tools have been developed to make 
the notion of managed competition as a policy program possible. Managed 
competition was introduced as a way to safeguard the solidarity of Dutch health 
care through market regulation. In theory, managed competition is seen as a 
tool to control both market failure – quality and accessibility of health care – and 
government failure – the efficiency and affordability – in health care. As stated 
previously, health care markets differ from other markets, such as the market for 
jogging shoes – or cars – according to economists (Arrow, 1963; Enthoven, 1988, 
2006), because demand for health care, the amount and length of health care and 
technological and demographic developments in care are all uncertain factors in 
this market (Lapré et al, 2004; and also Arrow, 1963; Enthoven, 1988). Therefore, 
price mechanisms that regulate ‘normal’ markets play a minor role in the health 
care market. In economic theory, these uncertain conditions and lack of effec-
tive price mechanisms effectuate a higher consumption in health care – an effect 
known as moral hazard or government failure. Moreover, health markets suffer 
from market failure: (1) health providers and health insurers have conflicting 
interests towards health demand and consumption; and (2) doctors are at the 
same time agents for patients as well as their own economic actor while health 
insurers have to provide good services and make a profit. This mechanism is 
enhanced by information asymmetry between doctors, patients and insurance 
companies, with the latter trying to avoid contracts with ill persons (Arrow, 1963; 
Enthoven, 1988; Schut, 2003). This market failure can, according to economists, 
be controlled by specific tools that influence the health behavior of the involved 
actors. 
Risk adjustment: building a tool for solidarity in health care markets – 
influencing health behavior
In the Netherlands solution was sought in building a risk adjustment fund 
as the best way to safeguard Dutch health care of market failure, or to secure 
solidarity67. The current Dutch fund has existed since the 1990s when (limited) 
competition in the Sickness Funds was introduced. It works two-fold. First, as an 
insurance scheme for insurance companies, it settles financial differences between 
66 The first had spent time as a visiting research associate at the rand Corporation in California where he 
became acquainted with the theory of managed competition (Interview van de Ven, 060425).
67 This is underlined by recent publication lists of health economists and the partaking in societal debates 
on the desirability of the new system.
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insurance companies caused by uneven distribution of predictable costs of medical 
expenses. Thus, it prevents insurance companies from the potentially negative 
financial consequences of (accidentally) insuring an unequally high amount of 
people that claim medical expenses in comparison to other insurance companies 
(cpb, 2006; Schut, 2003). Second, the fund is used by insurance companies to set 
the prices of the insurance schemes for the following year. With these interlinked 
functions, the fund ideally safeguards solidarity in the health insurance market, 
as it protects the consumer against risk selection by insurance companies while 
simultaneously protecting insurance companies against consumer moral hazard. 
Moreover, economists created with this fund a calculative device for the health 
care market that enables economists to talk about and act upon health behavior in 
terms of risks while it simultaneously attempts to limit this market failure. 
Because it brings together opposing behavior of actors the Dutch risk adjust-
ment fund is a complex calculative device. It is built upon health indicators 
that constitute the main reasons for an individual’s health care demand in the 
Netherlands. At its commencement in 1993, the risk assessment fund took only 
age and gender into account as indicators for health care use, as this accounted 
for 95% of shortages in insurance funds (interview Van Vliet, 060529). In later 
years, the risk adjustment fund was refined by the indicators ‘region’, ‘medicine 
use’, ‘diagnosis’ and ‘means of income’ (Douven, 2005; Van Kleef, 2007; Interview 
Van Vliet, 060529). Together these indicators sum up to about one hundred health 
indicator groups that determine one’s (future) need for medical services and the 
costs involved in these services. These indicators are based on aggregated medical 
information taken from many sources such as health insurance companies, 
health care providers and related umbrella organizations, health care related 
ngo’s, and Statistics Netherlands. Data are collected from insurance companies 
that deliver about 170 codes according to the icd coding system. A committee of 
health care experts critically assesses the codes that represent chronic illnesses. 
This procedure delivers detailed and highly aggregated and consented informa-
tion. Moreover, the refined fund controls insurance companies better than the 
simple Fund because insurance companies’ claims are subjected to more detailed 
demands; they can claim a refund but as the demands for claims are more refined 
it is a claim has to be more precise in its description to receive approval.
Ideally the fund should function as an incentive for insurance companies to 
work more efficiently. All the same, this complex system is selective and imperfect 
because of the lack of knowledge and model limitations. However, as recent devel-
opments in Switzerland have shown, imperfect Funds contribute to the unequal 
treatment of persons within the health market (Beck et al., 2003; Van de Ven et 
al., 2003; Van Kleef, 2007). In that sense, the imperfectness of the fund frames 
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the fund as a political tool in disease selection and in the interaction between the 
insurer and the insured, for instance, by the indicator for future health care use. 
A careful analysis of this indicator reveals the normative considerations about 
the worth of illnesses that are built into the system. This indicator is established 
through the diagnosis of illnesses. Although an obvious way to establish future 
use of health care, it does raise the question of where to measure diagnoses. For 
example, should diagnosis be measured based on visits to the gp, admissions to 
hospital, information from the insurance companies that pay the bills during 
treatment or based on the discharge letter from the hospital after the disease 
has been treated? Currently, the data are collected from information on declared 
diagnosis retained by insurance companies. However, not all diagnoses represent 
the true illness. The introduction of the Diagnose and Treatment Combinations 
systems (dbc systems) demands translation of illnesses and treatments into 
well defined terms. Especially for non-illness related diagnoses the dbc system 
will probably deliver problems in tracing chronic illnesses at least for some 
more years68. 
The fund is not only used for tracing illnesses but also for tracing differences 
in use of health care due to socio-economic status of individuals. However, the 
change in set up of this indicator has shifted responsibility for health from the 
government to health insurance companies and individuals. The risk adjustment 
system is built on the indicator ‘use of health care’. As previous research on the 
effect of income on health showed income and health are related; the lower the 
income the greater the health care consumption. In 2004, for example, individuals 
with public insurance spent about 400 euro’s more on health care than privately 
insured individuals. Although there are good explanations for about 90% of this 
amount, about 10% remains unexplained. This last 10% is often explained by the 
lower socio-economic status of those individuals who were covered by the public 
insurance scheme. This research was based on information concerning means of 
income that was used in the fund until 2006. In the old system, public insurance 
companies delivered information about means of income. Researchers and politi-
cians used this information to justify developing a socio-economic policy. 
68 Another example is the use of medication which represents consumption of prescription pharmaceuti-
cals by consumers in the Netherlands. The idea behind this is that the nature of diseases can be determined 
by the kinds of medicine that are prescribed (e.g. insulin for diabetes). Because this indicator is limited to the 
category of persons using medicines for 180 days a year or more, it distinguishes groups of people suffering 
from chronic illnesses from those with other medicine use or disease related medicine use. Furthermore, in 
many cases one form of medication can be prescribed for more than one disease; for example, prednisone is 
used for the treatment of several chronic diseases. 
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In the new health insurance system this division no longer exists and infor-
mation on health status related to income level is no longer provided by insur-
ance companies, also due to privacy standards. In fact, income-related health 
differences have disappeared with the new insurance system as the information 
regarding income status has become unavailable. Nevertheless, insurance 
companies that insure a large amount of individuals with a low income run the 
risk of having to pay more fees than expected based on the general population. 
Especially companies that were previously public insurance companies may have 
over one million or more insured individuals with a low socio-economic status. 
The new indicator may therefore also be understood as an incentive for insurance 
companies to act on the health behavior of the insured individuals for instance by 
enlarging the own payments or providing health programs for insured. Moreover, 
since information on the relation between income and health use has become 
more much more difficult to retrieve69, researchers and the government will have 
more difficulties maintaining or developing a socio-economic policy. 
The care model for macroeconomic policy making
Whereas the risk adjustment fund is developed to frame health care as a ‘fair’ 
market and to control the health behavior of individuals and insurance compa-
nies, the care model frames patients and doctors as market actors who pursue 
economic interests. The care model – a macro economic model for the health care 
sector – was built by three authoritative science advisory bodies and was commis-
sioned by the Ministry of Health in 1994 to three authoritative science advisory 
bodies for the government: the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(cpb), the Social and Cultural Planning Office (scp) and the National Institute 
for Public Health and the Environment (rivm). The model was commissioned to 
fill the gap in health policy assessments; its purpose was to describe and assess 
macroeconomic policy measures regarding health care. Although at the time the 
government carried a policy program based on supply regulation with no obvious 
intention to reform the health care sector into a market model, the model builders 
created a model that enabled early assessment of a market-based policy program. 
This comes to the fore most in the indicator for ‘demand’. Although other 
options were available, the project members used neo-classical labor supply theory 
to model the patient and medical specialist for the parameter ‘health care demand’. 
69 Now other sources have so be searched for information regarding income, such as the tax department, 
Statistics Netherlands and the uwv (social benefit payments company); hence, its calculation has become 
even more complex (interview Van Vliet, 060529).
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Two alternative options were considered but deemed insufficient. The first option 
had been not to take into account the demand side of health care. This choice, 
however, would keep the model from assessment of policy proposals associated 
with notions of managed competition, such as the introduction of incentives for 
patients to reduce demand. In the document the authors argue the following: 
The not taking into account of demand effects would imply that we impose on the model 
that individual payments for gp consults or specialist consults do not have any effect on 
the production of health care. Given the prominent place of the issue of own payments 
in the discussion on cost containment in health care, it seems irresponsible to build 
such an assumption into the model (In: Cpb and sCp, 1995:6).
The first option, moreover, was also not proven in reality (1995:7). The second 
option was to assume a negotiation model, in which both the doctor and the 
patient negotiate on the need for health care. Although deemed more ‘realistic’ 
by the modelers, it would lead to what was called an “exceptionally complicated” 
dynamic model. This was deemed unrealistic for modeling practices due to the 
lack of data to fill the dynamic model. Hence the third option was left. This option 
assumed that demand for the health care market is derived from a) the first visit 
by the patient and b) the referral written by the medical specialist or the gp. This 
option was based on existing theoretical work. The project members chose the 
third option, as it corresponded with the notion that the “demand for health care 
is less determined by the patient as the patient gets more involved in the medical 
system” and with the Dutch situation where the gp functions as the gatekeeper 
of the health care system (cpb, and scp, 1995:7), and it thus an important actor in 
constituting demand.
The introduction of the specialist and gp as an agent for the patient allowed 
the portrayal of the patient as a rational actor in the health market by capturing 
the patient’s behavior as being dependent on financial incentives, which was a 
revolutionary act at the time. Although health care was not considered a market 
at the time, the model builders took these political discussions regarding health 
behavior into account and enabled the model to follow these political discussions. 
Moreover, the introduction of incentive-dependent behavior provided both the 
Ministry of Health and the cpb with a tool for assessment of policy measures 
based on managed competition (see for instance in cpb, 2000; cpb 2003). Because 
one macro economic model in itself does not effectuate a behavioral change of 
individuals, other disciplining tools need to be developed, such as the risk adjust-
ment system discussed and in which insurance companies and individual health 
behavior are upfront as the main actors in constituting demand. 
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Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we have investigated the role of material devices in the constitu-
tion of policy reform in Dutch health care as well as the role of economic science 
in this process. The central question focused on how material devices come about 
through science and policy interactions in Dutch health care and how we can 
understand the role of devices in relation to the legitimacy of health policy change 
in the Netherlands. In our analysis, which is based on qualitative case study 
research concerning the role of scientific knowledge in policy making processes 
in the health care sector, we have used the notion of performativity of economics. 
This notion deconstructs the central idea of economics that ‘naturally competi-
tive’ markets can be discovered by economic scientists through investigating and 
classifying economic phenomena and replaces it with the notion that markets are 
actively configured by the work performed by economists, economic theory and 
other material tools. Such an analysis on the performativity of economic science 
offers a way out of a technical or instrumental perception of the role of science in 
society as offered by policy analysts and allows for a study of the consequences of 
involving economics in the constitution of economies. 
Our empirical examples show that economic science has formatted health care 
as a market in several ways. From the seventies onwards, the emergence of health 
economics paralleled an economization of health care. Health economists have 
since been actively involved in the articulation of health care in more economic 
terms and in the articulation of health care in market terms. Since the constitu-
tion of new schools of health policy, many former students – educated in health 
care economics and regulated competition as market solution – found their way 
into governmental institutions, insurance companies and other institutes related 
to the health care sector. Slowly, the idea of managed competition with its focus 
on individual responsibility has gained ground in the Netherlands. 
Besides contributing to thinking and talking in economic terms, health 
economists developed material devices that framed the health care sector as a 
regulated competitive market that ensured contrasting public interests by cap-
turing individuals’ health behavior in economic terms. The first tool – the risk 
adjustment fund – framed health as the behavior of individuals and insurance 
companies and thus portrayed the regulated competitive health care market as a 
‘fair’ market in which both market failure and government failure are diminished 
by controlling health behavior. Because of this fund, a regulated market secures 
open entrance to the market and patients’ choice, and enables economists to 
talk and act upon health in terms of risks. The other calculative device we dis-
cussed – the care model – has framed individuals as market actors who pursue 
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economic interests and thus provided the government and economists with a 
tool to assess macroeconomic policy proposals in health care and to have more 
insight into the effects of financial policy on individual behavior. In this way 
both calculative devices are more than technical tools. Both devices are shaped 
according to normative assumptions of behavior of actors in a market, and at the 
same time these devices enable this behavior to take place. For instance, in order 
for the health care market to work, an active framing of patients and doctors as 
market actors that pursue certain economic interests was needed. Precisely this 
assumption of economic behavior by individuals is built into the care model and 
therefore contributed to a configuration of these actors’ behavior as described in 
economic theory. The model is not the best representation of ‘reality’, but the best 
representation of a health market. 
Although we have described two material devices, if market devices are no 
longer preconditions for but enactments of the idea of a health care market, these 
devices become central actors in the production of policy consequences. In this 
manner, the introduction of tools that support a specific market are not policy 
actions geared towards an ideal of the market described, for instance, theoreti-
cally by economists but are themselves acts of a specific form of marketization, as 
in the care model and how demand is constructed in it. Our research shows that 
some of the modeling activities performed by both the cpb and health economists 
concerns defining which theories are most useful and which ones are not and 
creating new theories and data collection devices in support of a specific health 
care system. Hence, normative considerations that require political discussions 
are relocated to these hybrid science-policy practices. 
Although the market-based policy program originates from the idea to create 
a smaller role for the government, at the same time that same government exerts 
great effort to frame markets in ways that articulate certain core values in health 
care that are in line with policy programs. It accomplishes this with the help 
of economic science. Although in the market ideal the government seems to 
be taking up a more distant role in public policy, we show that this leads to the 
paradoxical situation that market solutions for the public sector require hardly 
less government control. It is the moment and location of government control that 
has changed, rather than the quantity. Framing markets in, for instance, material 
devices has become a crucial site for carrying out health policy. The market in 
health care is, in that respect, not the endpoint but rather a relocation of govern-
ment, and the starting point for other tools that support the market idea, such as 
open information sources, free entrance of the market and free choice. 
More importantly, as economists and economics contribute to a large extent 
to the framing of markets by constructing material devices that carry in them 
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many normative and, hence, political decisions, the development of such devices 
for health care markets warrants their inclusion in the study of science-policy 
interactions and analyses of the construction of legitimate policy, as it relocates 
political discussions to these hybrid science-policy practices. Although policy 
analysis studies focus on accountability and legitimacy of policy making proc-
esses and policy reforms, their departure from deliberative analytical concepts 
overlooks the role of materiality of science in policy change because these analyses 
are constructed at sites that are not yet taken into account by many policy sciences. 
Namely, policies are analyzed before policy reform takes place or are regarded as 
mere technical applications instead of instances of a specific policy reform. 
Moreover, market practices need to be included in the accountability of political 
decision making in order for policy processes to maintain their legitimacy. The 
importance of this consideration is illustrated by health economists themselves; 
for a market-based policy program that fully acts upon and incorporates competing 
public values, many measures must still be taken. As Enthoven stated at the health 
economic conference in Rotterdam in November 2006 that “the next step is to 
explore how competing insurers can engage doctors and hospitals in the creation 
of efficient and improving health care delivery systems” (2006). The problem here 
seems to be that the current framing of insurers has not led to optimal competing 
behavior of insurers. However, the market has always been promoted based on 
the idea that a regulated market can also protect competing public interests. At 
this point the market apparently does not adequately serve the public interests. 
This casts serious doubts as to how effective a market can be in protecting public 
interests, and more importantly it calls into question the legitimacy of the current 
market for health care. 
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis was to investigate practices of science and policy interac-
tions for policy-making in health care as forms of boundary work, and to analyse 
the performativity of science in policy. These general questions were elaborated 
on in the following research questions: how are practices of science and policy 
interactions organised? What are the social, cultural and political consequences 
of this organisation? And what is the role of materiality in these interactions? 
In this last chapter I return to the original research questions and describe the 
insights that this research has brought to the practices of science and policy in 
policy-making in health care. 
This focus of the research helped me make choices in selecting the case studies 
and in analysing the data from the cases. Based on an ethnographic approach 
I focused on what scientists do when they make policy messages and assess-
ments, and how they do this in interaction with policy makers, and how we can 
understand this in relation to ideas of the role of science in policy-making. This 
focus on actual practices of science and policy interactions led to new and more 
specific questions, which were elaborated in the previous chapters. Along the way, 
these questions evolved into specific themes that emerged from the case studies, 
and which helped me to better understand the practices of science and policy 
interactions. The boundary work theme helped me to understand the way sci-
ence advisory organisations mediate in the health field. This theme derived from 
my wish to understand what science advisory organisations do to sustain their 
positions in this field, including the differences and similarities between several 
strategies. The theatrical metaphor of science and policy interactions in terms 
of on stage and backstage performances derives from my initial puzzling over 
the persistent presence of the dichotic thinking about science and policy as two 
separate realms, either technocratic or bureaucratic. This dichotomy remained 
strongly present, even though in practice policy makers and scientists alike were 
often quite aware of the limitations of this line of thinking, and also contested 
this dichotomy. On the other hand, often other interviewees proved very capable 
of drawing lines between science and policy, as if they had invented and guarded 
these boundaries themselves. These themes provide insight into why and how 
science-policy practices and thinking about these practices often differ.
How experts come to scientific advice for policy in interaction with policy 
makers can be divided in two parts: the first is on stage, where scientists and policy 
makers work according to formally set boundaries and formalised structures of 
the idea how science and policy should relate to each other, with clearly defined 
division of work. The second is backstage, where these formally set boundaries 
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and clearly defined division of work are temporarily lifted, and recreated, during 
consultations and negotiations about the value of scientific knowledge and 
policy problems. The boundary work performed both on and backstage in sci-
ence and policy interaction, I explain in this thesis with the help of the following 
concepts:
— Strategies of authoritativeness 
— Boundary configurations
— Materiality in science and policy interactions
Science and policy interactions as forms of  
boundary work 
Strategies for authoritativeness
Throughout the previous chapters I have shown that the role science advisory 
organisations play in policy is in part the result of the institutional contexts in 
which they operate, as well as the outcome of the roles they (can) employ. The 
institutional context in which these science advisory bodies operate is, thus, not 
a given in advance but is a dynamic process in which the science advisory bodies 
themselves play a role. Science and policy interactions are not static procedures 
but dynamic processes that take place in oftentimes politicised environments, 
and are hence not easy to map. What’s more, a large part of such interactions 
takes place behind closed doors, often literally. Moreover, as discussed in earlier 
chapters, political debates often permeate and determine the advisory trajectories 
of the science advisory bodies that this thesis investigates. 
In the cases included in this thesis the model building started from a political 
wish for a specific (policy) tool. Political desirability at this level of interaction is, 
however, often local and small-scale, and comes down to concrete and practical 
questions such as: how to prevent the minister from making mistakes with inac-
curate figures (number of smokers)? Or, does the government earn back money 
with the prevention of illnesses (diabetes)? How large is the role of specialists in 
constituting demand? Or, how is means of income valued as part of constituting 
health? Or, what animals are cute enough to serve as examples in policy advice? 
Such questions are political but at the same time get posed to science advisory 
bodies with the intention to come up with a scientific justification. In such ques-
tions the distinction between what is normative and what is not, and between 
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facts and values is not always easy to make and in many cases this distinction 
cannot be made. Science advising in a political environment is hence often 
expressed through epistemological and territorial conflicts, as the case studies 
show. My investigation of science and policy interactions in the case studies dem-
onstrates that science advisory bodies use many strategies to solve such conflicts. 
These strategies often commence to build or maintain the authoritative position 
of these organisations towards politics and policy makers, but also to maintain 
authoritativeness towards other scientists. 
As the cpb provides assessments for all policy fields and all ministries, it has 
the important task of standing above all parties. The cpb does much work, in 
which scientific authority is an important element to achieve this. The cpb uses its 
math-based statistical approach, in the form of models, as a strategy in seeking 
consensus, as Van den Bogaard (1998) and Wilts (1997) have also pointed out. The 
cpb used the outcomes of model assessments to maintain a precise understanding 
of its role towards the ministries: the cpb presents options, while policy makers 
and politicians make choices. This rational repertoire is also visible in the care 
model project: the cpb used its macroeconomic expertise as a way to keep other 
scientists at bay. Moreover, the epistemological differences between the cpb and 
other science advisory bodies are used by the cpb to exclude other experts, rather 
than taking these differences on as a starting point for discussions. This is what I 
call the strategy of exclusion. This strategy has, in the case of the care model, led to 
an expansion of the boundaries of the cpb’s work into a field previously reserved 
for other expert organisations. But it also led to the creation of a new knowledge 
space not claimed by other science advisory bodies; namely that of a macroeco-
nomic understanding of health. 
In contrast to the cpb, the vtv’s position seems unproblematic to the public 
eye: the messages presented by the vtv are rarely put up for discussion in public, 
and its information and messages are often used without question by policy 
makers. The cvtv also uses a contingent repertoire in its involvement with policy 
makers: the strategy of ‘staying out, but keeping near’, also described by Gieryn (1995; 
and discussed in chapter three) as a way to protect knowledge from the influence 
of politics. Hence this strategy is used to give the messages of the vtv the proper 
authoritative status for policy makers, while appearing non-political. The cvtv 
puts a lot of effort into its relationship with the Ministry of Health. The centre 
continuously has to (re)establish its position towards policy – not too close and 
not too far – to come up with information and messages for the ministry to use, 
employing many instruments to do so; the liaisons, the policy and scientific 
boards, the ad hoc project teams. Specific formulations are important too: the 
cvtv delivers policy messages, not policy advice, to emphasise its non-political 
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role in public health policy. And even as the relationship between the ministry 
and cvtv has been formalised, this formalisation is used to constitute the best 
‘close distance’, by employing research protocols. The cvtv also uses strategies of 
inclusion and expansion to maintain its authority over other scientists and expertise 
that contribute to vtv reports. In its research process the cvtv includes as many 
parties and expert opinions as possible. This inclusion makes vtv messages more 
authoritative for policy, but also to other scientists, as large parts of available 
knowledge and opinions are assessed and taken into account. This also contrib-
utes to the depoliticising of issues as far as possible. Moreover, the contingent 
strategy of inclusion employed by the cvtv can contribute to a more democratic 
take on scientific evidence, and the question of how to act on it or with it. 
The inclusion strategy differs from Gieryn’s strategies of monopolisation and 
expansion of boundaries in that Gieryn’s strategies seem to include the notion 
that knowledge comes into the possession of the expander and becomes part 
of the knowledge base of the expander. This strategy is seen in the care model 
project, where the cpb became the owner of the model and all its parts, even the 
parts developed by other experts elsewhere. In the inclusion strategy employed by 
the cvtv the knowledge employed to write the reports, remains the ownership of 
the individual experts involved in the writing process. In other words, the cvtv 
does not become the owner of this expertise, in contrast to for example the cpb 
that became the owner of the expertise used to develop the care model. 
Boundary configurations in science-policy interactions
In chapters two, three and four I showed that the science advisory organisations 
discussed in this thesis are strongly allied with the policy makers at the ministries 
for which they work. They form boundary configurations with these other parties. 
Boundary configurations are, as chapter three explains, strongly situated inter-
connections between science advisory institutes and policy institutions, as well 
as other actors involved in the science advisory trajectories. These configurations 
share a specific approach to problem definitions and methods and are embedded 
in (and at the same time embed) specific social, discursive, and material elements. 
A boundary configuration is made up of the networks of experts and policy 
makers that share similar backgrounds for example in education, in speaking 
similar languages from which to understand the societal problems at hand, or in 
preference for a political party. The actors involved in this configuration share the 
same epistemologies and methodologies. 
These configurations are constructed, that is, they are not inevitably occurring 
events. Moreover, as the examples in this thesis show, the organisations perform 
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much work to create and maintain their boundary configurations, by using either 
inclusion or exclusion strategies to other experts, institutes and networks. Such 
boundary configurations contribute to the inclusion of specific kinds of science, 
and the kind of social and political theories about health and illness, and hence 
reinforce the discourse it represents. Boundary configurations are dynamic as 
they change shape over time and per project. As seen in the care model case, new 
boundary configurations can create new knowledge fields, and thus constitute 
new discourses. These experts and organisations share a scientific and policy 
language and vocabulary in how to understand problems in the policy field. 
Together these parties produce written and printed reports that serve as input 
for policy. Again, the choice of words can be important to underline a specific 
involvement of organisations outside the configuration, as for example in the 
formulation on the cover of the care model report that stresses the involvement 
of other organisations. 
Boundary configurations are constituted through such and other material ele-
ments. Something as seemingly mundane as the possession and location of soft-
ware and the availability or absence of theory to model parameters can provide a 
boundary for other experts to enter such a configuration, as for example happened 
in the care model project first for the rivm and in a later stage the scp. 
Performativity of science
Science as materiality 
At a more substantial level such materiality becomes even more important as 
materialities, such as economic theory, models, and software, support the nego-
tiating abilities of some and close that of others. Models play an important role 
in science and policy interactions, and science advisory bodies draw substantially 
on them. Models enable authoritative assessments of policy proposals that would 
have been impossible without them (see Morgan and Den Butter, 2000). Models 
are also tools that provide credibility to science advisory practices. They do this 
as simplified but negotiated realities; models are thus the outcomes of long proc-
esses of negotiating data and theory by model builders. The interesting feature 
of models is that modelling practices provide a discursive space (Evans, 1999) where 
various disciplines meet, and where negotiations between these disciplines take 
place, and where weighing and simplification of theory and data against the policy 
questions is done until workable solutions are found. Models are thus nodal points 
or junctions of several networks, networks that are not necessarily engaged in the 
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same specific issue of that specific model (Fujimura, 1992) but prove useful in this 
instance. Importantly, models are not just negotiated representations of specific 
scientific and policy realities, but also material arrangements of these negotiations. 
As all the chapters show, modelling experts gather and develop theoretical 
concepts and bits of data from many places. These elements are tangible, they can 
be touched, lifted, written on and put to use. These elements can be data on paper 
or on a cd rom sent through the post. It can be computer software, the specific 
theoretical components of a model that are handed over or developed by other 
experts or the modules of the model that are transferred to other models. It can 
be handwritten notes, books filled with formulas, and meetings with peers and 
end-users of the models. All these elements are assembled to construct a specific 
model that is itself a representation of a certain reality. Models – such as the 
larch model, the care model and the risk adjustment system – thus contribute to 
a reconfiguration of the social worlds in which they operate. These models bring 
together, as said above, social worlds and enable these worlds to work together 
and to negotiate knowledge and policy. 
In this, these models have become disciplining tools: they legitimate the use 
and form of certain data over others, they determine what research and policy 
questions can be (easily) answered and which ones can be left out. More impor-
tantly, once models have been developed and are used for the making or evalu-
ation of policy, they often result in routine patterns, or standardised packages 
(Fujimura, 1992) in research and in policy-making, as well as in the coordination 
and demarcation of science and policy. Models are, in this way, constituents of the 
(political) reality by selecting, providing, and structuring information. Models, 
as expressions of scientific knowledge, can thus be performative in that these 
scientific representations can shape reality to resemble more the descriptions 
of that reality in those representations. Moreover, some of these materialities 
become this reality. For example, the models used by the cpb are often granted 
the status of ‘arbiter’ or starting points for policy-making instead of an expedient 
in policy development (Passenier, 1994). The same could be said for the standard-
ised compounded health measures developed by the cvtv, and the modules of the 
larch model. Chapter six illustrates how the active engagement of economists 
in health care has led to an understanding of health care in more economic terms, 
and through the construction of material tools – in this case the risk adjustment 
system and the care model – contributed to the construction of a regulated com-
petitive market in health care. 
These tools do not do perform regulated competition alone, but are part of sets 
of tools that make competition in health care possible. This thesis suggests that 
the idea that competition in health care is a natural state of things is inaccurate; 
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instead, creating competition involves much work and many material devices that 
each in themselves is a specific enactment of that kind of competition. If market 
devices are no longer preconditions for, but enactments of the idea of a health 
care market, these devices become central actors in the production of policy 
consequences, instead of mere instrumental tools in a policy programme geared 
towards an ideal of the market. In fact, a market is as ‘naturally competitive’ as 
the tools that allow it to be. 
Acting on stage and backstage 
This research developed the insight that it can be useful to understand the 
interaction of science and policy and the way it is organised from the theatrical 
metaphor brought up by Goffman (1990) and specified by Hilgartner (2000). 
Hilgartner states that “ the theatrical perspective offers a means to examine 
how credibility is produced in social interaction, rather than treating it as a 
pre-existing property of an advisory body” (2000:7), and he characterises the 
interaction between science and policy in terms of on stage and backstage, both 
of which are managed realms. These terms refer to the ways in which science 
advisory bodies position themselves in relation to ministries, policy makers, poli-
ticians and media that use this advice. On stage is the realm of the presentation 
of reports and messages to policy makers, for example in the form of reports, 
white papers and media debates. The backstage is the realm of construction for 
reports and messages. The meaning of on stage in relation to backstage can, 
however, differ per organisation. Bijker, Bal, and Hendriks (2009) have extended 
these concepts by showing how for the Health Council the backstage enables a 
constructivist notion of science and policy interactions, as fuzzy and non-linear, 
whereas on stage science is portrayed as a unified, objective and non-political 
exercise. In opposition van ‘t Klooster (2007) has shown that for futurists at the 
National Environmental Assessment Agency the exact opposite counts: futurists 
often mask their quite positivist approach to futurism by portraying on stage 
uncertainty discussions in constructivist terms. 
The strategies the cpb and the cvtv employ to remain their authoritative 
position in the field and carry out their work are partly organised institutionally 
by their formal relation with the ministries and their formal role in policy cycles, 
and is partly shaped by the boundary configurations in which the institutes are 
located. These on stage appearances are in their turn the outcome of backstage 
processes, and are at the same time representations of the role science advice has 
to play in policy-making: objective and distant and non-political, or involved and 
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political as in the case of futurists. Hence, what constitutes credible sources of 
information differs for each organisation. To come to useful and credible advice 
or ‘scientific policy facts’, much work has to be done backstage. Both institutes 
put great effort into including networks of experts in health issues upon which 
they explicitly and extensively draw. Both institutes employ strategies, albeit 
different, to come to authoritative reports. The backstage provides, however, 
both institutes with a necessary discursive space where discussions can take 
place without immediate repercussions for the experts involved. This backstage 
is necessary in the Netherlands, where many experts at one and the same time 
are involved in the policy process; as policy makers, as members of government 
committees and councils, as members of municipalities, provincial government 
and parliament and a host of other ways. The roles of science and policy are often 
interwoven in multiple ways and that calls for tools that can restore the image 
of independence and objectivity. The backstage of science advice provides such 
a tool. 
A closed or open backstage 
Both strategies employed in the cases described in this thesis contribute to the 
status of the organisations as credible and authoritative sources, but do that in dif-
ferent ways in relation to their role in the policy cycle. Backstage processes should 
be kept out of sight, because an open backstage could influence the credibility and 
authority of science advice (Bal, Bijker, and Hendriks, 2004). Many examples of 
public disputes between scientists influencing public opinion and undermining 
scientific authority, such as happened in the swine flu epidemic1, seem consistent 
with Bal, Bijker and Hendriks’ argument. Based on their distinction of process 
transparency and content transparency, these authors argue that backstage itself 
should not always be open, but that science advisory bodies should be open about 
the fact that there is a discursive or negotiation space where discussions can 
take place. If science advisory bodies cannot be totally open about what happens 
backstage, they can at least be open about the processes taking place in it, for 
example by providing a list of invited experts invited and by being open about the 
procedures followed. 
1 Experts differed in opinion about the extent of the swine flu epidemic, and its consequences in terms of 
deaths and the way it could disorganise society. Especially Ab Osterhaus, Professor of Virology at Erasmus 
mc and head of the Department of Virology at the Erasmus mc was fiercely attacked in the media for his 
biased position regarding vaccination; e.g. in Maurits, and Vanheste. Ik Geloof Heilig in Wat Ik Doe. Vrij 
Nederland, 19 juni 2010 2010, 34-39, and other (digital) media, for example nuzakelijk.nl. 
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This thesis suggests, however, that this might not count for all advisory bodies 
to the same extent. The organisations discussed in the chapters here employ 
opposing strategies to achieve the same aim, namely to produce credible output 
and maintain their authoritative positions. The cvtv uses contingent strategies 
(Bal, 1999) in the presentation of its reports and ‘policy messages’, and employs 
an inclusion strategy to bring together many expert opinions. Thus, the centre 
seems more open about the processes and discussions that take place in back-
stage. It often openly reflects upon its role and limitations in public health policy 
and how it struggles with the most efficient distance to the ministry and its policy. 
The cvtv builds upon an open and qualitative model of health indicators – the 
Lalonde model – that offers a backstage room for discussion and debate. The 
cvtv’s credibility and position in the public health field seem to benefit from this 
openness, and its reflexive attitude towards research seems to add to its authority. 
The position of the cvtv is, as said before, surprisingly uncontested, politically 
as well as scientifically, all the more remarkable because the National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment, to which the cvtv belongs, has been under 
scrutiny about their models in relation to uncertainty, as is discussed in Chapter 
three. Hence, science advisory bodies characterised by a dialectical or contingent 
take on science and policy interactions, such as the cvtv, may have to be more 
open about their backstage processes. These contingent strategies of inclusion 
contribute to the authority of its science advice, and contribute to its independent 
and impartial position in the health field. 
The cpb seems to take in a more difficult position. In contrast to the cvtv, the 
cpb uses a stricter, more rationalist, strategy to meet criticism from economists, 
politicians and other commentators. It keeps a strict regime on stage towards 
other parties to secure its independent status as impartial arbiter for all gov-
ernmental policy fields. The cpb employs strategies of exclusion and expansion 
when it is faced with knowledge conflict, in order to maintain authority. Models 
are tools in this rationalist repertoire, adding to the cpb’s credibility. This use 
of models, however, makes the cpb vulnerable to critical appraisal of its role 
in policy-making, despite the fact that it has somewhat opened up about their 
models (most are available on their website or can be ordered by mail). Because 
models tend to become ‘black boxes’, and much of the modelling work remains 
invisible to the public eye, open discussions about model parameters is limited. 
In recent years the cpb has opened up about the use of their models and the way 
the institute deals with uncertainty issues (De Vries, 20082), under pressure in 
the uncertainty debate and the need for transparency. The cpb has since depicted 
2 See also Klooster, 2007 for more on uncertainty in relation to planning bureaus.
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a more transparent attitude towards its technical and scientific tools, and the 
limitations of these tools. Uncertainty, however, remains articulated by technical 
terms – in terms of statistical uncertainty and model limitations.
 
Dealing with the reality of science and policy 
interactions in health care
To summarise, science and policy interactions are organised in different ways. 
In the cases discussed in this thesis, the science advisory organisations use two 
opposing strategies. On the one hand, contingent strategies of inclusion, and staying 
out but keeping near are employed, which hear all possible expert opinions, and an on 
stage absence of both the rational model of science, and the use of mathematical 
models. In this, the contingent strategy of inclusion can contribute to a more 
democratic take on scientific evidence, and the question is how to act on it or with 
it. Contingent strategy offers ways to include many voices, and to be nuanced. 
This way (health) problems can be taken seriously in all their breadth, and leads 
to understanding that there are no ‘simple’ solutions to change behaviour, only 
localised and situated solutions that may be ‘simple’ in form but still take into 
account the complexities of human life. 
On the other hand, a strategy of exclusion and expansion is employed in a ration-
alist repertoire that builds heavily on the rational model of science by using the 
mathematical-statistical approach. Both strategies seem opposites, while both 
strategies aim at creating authoritative and impartial science advice for policy. 
With respect to the on stage role of scientific advice, science advisory bodies 
that use the contingent strategy of inclusion seem to benefit from opening up 
backstage processes. A certain openness about backstage processes contributes 
to their authoritative position in the field. Science advisory bodies that employ 
the strategy of exclusion and expansion seem to benefit from closed backstage 
processes with respect to their role in science advice, whereas they benefit from 
openness about their tools. Maintaining a rationalist approach can, however, 
lead to a further societal distrust in scientific advice (Halffman, 2003; Horstman, 
2010), and to a further gap between scientific evidence and the public, whereas, as 
both Halffman (2003) and Horstman (2010) argue, in the light of societal develop-
ments, a shift towards a more democratic take on the role of science is needed.
Science advisory bodies are organised by boundary configurations which build 
strong alliances with other actors. Strong boundary configurations thus seem a 
prerequisite for the authority and credibility of scientific advice for policy. These 
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configurations built on specific ontologies and epistemologies of reality. Hence 
these configurations influence decisions that are taken on which ‘theories of the 
world’ are incorporated or left out, and influence the kind of policy measures and 
decisions that are taken by policy makers and politicians. Such close intercon-
nections between scientists and policy makers thus limit the value of input from 
other science-based experts in policy-making processes and possibly hinder open 
democratic debate (see also Halffman, 2003; and Fischer, 1990; Shackley and 
Wynne, 1995; Wynne, 1992). More importantly, my research shows that boundary 
configurations are also political actors instead of merely instruments to build 
consensus and depoliticise policy problems (Jasanoff, 1990, 2005; Hilgartner, 
2000). This is partly true also for the cases discussed in this thesis. Many tricky 
(or untamed) political issues are first transported to science advisory bodies for 
sorting out before they return to the political realm. However, in and between 
boundary configurations political discussion is ongoing, even in a depoliticised 
environment, and this lends boundary configurations to re-politicisation of 
(health) policy-making. This emphasises the impossibility of depoliticising 
political problems by transporting these problems to the scientific realm. A tech-
nocratic organisation of the science-policy boundary would not help overcome or 
mute political discussion. Instead, political discussion goes on with other means 
in another setting. The consequence of transporting political problems to science 
advisory organisations is that politicians lose sight of the normative considera-
tions that are made in modelling practices and in constructing policy messages. 
And this would give science advisory organisations too much the role of arbiter of 
the playing field. 
 
Concluding remarks
In Chapter one I promised to provide more insight into science and policy 
interactions, the organisation of science and policy interactions, and the conse-
quences of such organisation. The case studies presented in this thesis are by no 
means representative of other practices of science and policy interactions in the 
Netherlands. However, I do think that the strategies described in this thesis, as 
well as the emphasis on the importance of material arrangements of knowledge, 
can be found in other practices of science and policy interactions. This can be 
helpful in understanding in what happens in science and policy relations, and in 
understanding the role of science in policy-making. 
In conclusion, experts and policy makers should be aware of the limitations of 
transporting tricky policy problems to the scientific realm, as political discussions 
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are not actually stopped by technical means. Although the market-based policy 
program originates from the idea to create a smaller role for the government, 
this thesis shows that market solutions for the public sector require hardly less 
government control. It is the moment and location of government control that 
has changed, rather than the quantity. Hence, politicians should be more aware 
of science and policy practices, and should be more involved in them. Moreover, 
policy makers, politicians and science advisors should be aware of importance of 
the materiality of science, for example in (policy) tools. Such tools are not inno-
cent items that help policy makers carry out specific policy, but are in themselves 
specific enactments of that kind of policy. They become central actors in the 
production of policy, and have consequences of their own. The development of 
such devices for markets demands their inclusion in the study of science-policy 
interactions and in analyses of the construction of legitimate policy. 
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Summary
Policy-making is difficult without scientific knowledge. Therefore it is impor-
tant to gain more insight into science and policy interactions and practices. On 
the basis of case studies, this thesis investigates how scientists and policy makers 
come to useful facts and how they negotiate the processes involved in applying 
scientific knowledge in policy–making. The emphasis lies on strategies scientists 
use in their interactions with policy makers, and on the consequences for the 
shaping of Dutch health policy. 
Chapter One  Science and policy in interaction
The first chapter introduces some theoretical perspectives that capture the rela-
tion between science and policy, and some concepts from which we can understand 
this relation. Up until the 1990s it was often understood as a technocratic relation 
and as such science advisory bodies were criticised for their influence on policy 
decision-making. However, the past decade has heard a call for a larger role for 
science, especially in public health. This concerns local and small-scale interven-
tions carried out by Municipal Health Services as well as national policy regarding 
the (financial) organisation of the entire health care sector. Government policy 
must be evidence-based. The problem with evidence-based policy is that on the 
one hand there is lack of knowledge about the effects of that policy. On the other 
hand existing evidence has a hard time finding its way to policy-makers. In this 
line of thinking policy-makers and scientists experience a gap between scientific 
knowledge and policy where science is positioned as objective and independent, 
while policy-making is in the realm of the normative. The solutions offered by 
scientists to overcome this gap are limited and ineffective and have raised the 
question of how to understand the role of science in policy-making.
Policy science and sts offer the insight that policy processes are not linear 
but erratic social interactions. Thus the role of science in policy-making is 
ambiguous, most of all in relation to the way facts come into being and the way 
facts are valued. Scientific knowledge is understood in this line of thinking as 
the outcome of a process of negotiation or ‘boundary work’ that takes place 
between scientists and policy-makers, and also as the result of the social context 
in which it is developed. This situatedness of scientific knowledge highlights the 
importance of the interactions that produce scientific knowledge which in turn 
brings to the fore the importance of studying such interactions. The boundary 
work between scientists and policy makers is influenced by material manifes-
tations of scientific knowledge, such as data, theory, software programs, and 
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models. Such materialities can also have their own effect, a performativity. This 
take on the role of science in policy offers new insights into the organisation of 
science and policy interactions. I use these insights to analyse the case studies 
investigated in this thesis.
Chapter t wO  Exploring the future of health care: how science advisors 
struggle with the policy boundary in Dutch public health policy
This chapter looks at and compares the various types of boundary work and 
their consequences that are carried out by several science advisory institutes. As 
starting point, it questions the organisation of science-policy interaction proc-
esses. How can we understand the way scientific institutions mediate in the health 
field? What do these institutions do to sustain their own positions in this field? 
How can we understand the differences and similarities between these? 
For a better understanding of these questions, two examples of science and 
policy interaction – the macroeconomic care model built by an interdisciplinary 
project team, and the construction of vtv reports at the rivm – are compared 
with regard to the interactions between these science advisory bodies and health 
care policy makers. The chapter provides a short account of the institutional his-
tory of both the cpb and the rivm. It connect the institutional organisation of 
the science-policy boundary, in which each science advisory body is embedded, to 
the specific organisational set up of each science advisory institute. This has the 
effect of bringing into focus the links between the different roles played by science 
advisory institutes– the cvtv produces reports that seem to fulfil an advocacy role 
in the public health sector while the cpb fulfils a more technocratic role in the 
economic advisory field – both on stage in their field of expertise and backstage in 
the organisation of the processes they use in coming up with science-based advice 
for policy. Likewise, the differences in institutional organisation on either side of 
the science-policy boundary extends to the strategies that the institutes employ 
in dealing with values, knowledge conflicts, uncertainty, and with political trust 
or distrust. I argue that characterising single institutions according to one model 
is superficial. Instead, the case studies show different science-policy interactions 
at work at different moments in the advisory processes, and at different places 
in the organisational structure. At each moment, both the on stage image of the 
role of these science-based organisations in the policy-making process, and the 
backstage ways of performing their role as science advisory institute for policy-
making influence the way the institutes present themselves and in constituting 
and maintaining their credibility and authority. At different moments in these 
processes the science advisory bodies also use their on stage presentations as an 
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argument to maintain their authoritative positions. In that sense the on stage rep-
resentations and backstage practices cannot be seen as separate entities, but as 
two sides of the same coin; they are strategies to maintain authority and remain 
spokespersons of their field of expertise.
Chapter three  Boundary configurations in science-policy: modeling 
practices in health care
This chapter focuses in greater detail on the construction of the care model as 
a boundary configuration in the making. Using this case study of the care model 
project I investigated the interactions and negotiations that the economic experts 
and public policy makers in the project employed in order to come to a work-
able model. Through a detailed account of these interactions and negotiations 
I discuss how science advisory bodies are entangled with (some of) the policy 
actors they advise in what I call boundary configurations. These strongly situated 
interconnections between science advisory institutes and policy institutions share 
a specific approach to problem definitions and methods and that are embedded 
in (and at the same time embed) social, discursive, and material elements. 
Boundary configurations build upon existing relationships that preceded the 
interdisciplinary project. Over the course of the project, these interconnections 
became stronger and began to have consequences for the inclusion of other 
experts in the project. Importantly, as the case study illustrates, such boundary 
configurations shape the kind of science, and relatedly, the kind of social and 
political theories about health care, that are effectuated in modelling practices. 
Moreover, because the model is based upon a neo classical theory of demand it 
contributed to the articulation of health care in terms of a market-based policy 
programme for the health care sector. In this chapter, I also show how the model 
was at first not as successful as hoped for at the start of the project – but that it 
did succeed in other ways. It provided one participating institute with a new tool 
for assessing economic policy measures for the care sector. As such the model 
extended the work of this institute to the care sector, and filled in a space that 
was not yet claimed by other science advisory institutes. Also in this chapter I 
illustrate how the process of model construction forged new liaisons between 
the cpb and the Ministry of Health, thus enforcing the boundary configuration 
between economists at the ministry and the experts at the economic science 
advisory institute. The care model also created new links between the cpb, the 
scp and the rivm on issues related to health care. 
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Chapter fOur  Connecting evidence and policy: bringing researchers 
and policy makers together for effective evidence-based health policy 
This chapter investigates a tool for evidence-based public health. vtv reports 
have grown into authoritative resources of information that are used as input for 
policies relating to health promotion. The question is how to understand this from 
the idea of science and policy interactions as interactive and reflexive practices. 
Moving beyond current theories about knowledge utilisation often employed in 
public health, I offer a reconceptualisation of science and policy interactions as 
interactive and reflexive processes in which science and policy are not taken as 
separate worlds but are seen as two ends of a continuum. I discuss the role of 
materiality in these interactive processes. An investigation of the processes of 
the vtv reports over a ten-year period suggests that the success of the reports 
in informing policy depends largely on the specific institutional infrastructure 
that has been created over the years. This infrastructure supports and manages in 
many ways and on many levels both formal and informal contacts between scien-
tists and policy makers. I argue that this infrastructure takes into account the fact 
that science and policy interactions are multidimensional and thus have to take 
place in both formal and informal settings. Dividing science-policy interactions 
between on stage representations and backstage action offers space for reflexive 
interactions between scientists and policy makers. It also offers an effective way 
out of the current trend towards a stricter separation of the scientific and the 
politic in the light of the accountability trends. 
Chapter five  Modelling policy: science-based models as performative 
boundary objects in Dutch policy-making
This chapter discusses the role of models for policy by drawing on and 
exploring the tensions between the notions of boundary objects offered by Star 
and Griesemer (1989) and performativity (e.g. Callon, 1998). This central question 
is what is the performative nature of computer models as boundary objects and 
how do these models shape and change (or not) the social worlds they coordinate? 
The concept of boundary object proves useful in gaining a better understanding 
both of the hybrid character of science-based models and their role in the coordi-
nation between different social worlds. However, such a sociological or symbolic 
interactionist’s account of the functions of models in science and policy interac-
tions tends to hold the assumption that although these worlds need to interact, 
they remain stable throughout the interaction. Building on the idea of science as a 
performative tool, the case studies illustrate how models are constituted by nego-
tiations between scientists and policy makers and at the same time constitute, 
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(re)configure and reform social worlds. I argue that models not only actively coor-
dinate social worlds but also contribute to changing them. The performativity of 
models ranges from generic (instrumental) to substantial as they influence social 
worlds to the extent that these worlds start to behave in the way described in the 
models.
Chapter six  Analysing policy change: the performative role of economics 
in the constitution of a new policy programme in Dutch health care 
This chapter extends the notion of performativity by investigating the role of 
economic science in health policy development. Here I focus on the role of eco-
nomic science in the creation of material devices – policy tools – used by policy 
makers and politicians in political decision-making regarding health care reform. 
These devices configure and frame health care as a market. Building on Callon’s 
notion of performativity of economics, and on the basis of case study research 
in the Netherlands, I demonstrate how science-policy interaction co-constructs 
material devices that frame the health care sector and its actors as parties within 
a ‘regulated competitive’ market. I conclude that the notion that competition in 
health care is a natural state of things is inaccurate. Creating competition involves 
much work and many material devices, such as the care model and the risk adjust-
ment system. Each tool is a specific enactment of that kind of competition. This 
also makes market tools central actors in the production of policy consequences. 
An example is the specific way ‘demand’ is constructed in the care model; this 
enables assessments of policy proposals that contribute to the idea of managed 
competition in health care, long before the government agreed with this policy 
reform. Markets are as ‘naturally competitive’ as the tools that allow them to be. 
This also argues for more political monitoring of such devices.
Chapter seven  Conclusion
Finally I return to the general questions posted in the introduction (Chapter 1) 
concluding with a general discussion of the practical and theoretical consequences 
of practices of science-policy relations in health care. The main conclusions are 
that scientific advisory organisations employ different strategies to come to effec-
tive and authoritative knowledge for policy, contingent strategies of inclusion 
and strategies for ‘staying out but keeping near’ or more rationalist strategies of 
exclusion. Which strategies get are employed depends partly on the institutional 
context, and partly on the boundary configurations in which these organisations 
are situated. A boundary configuration is made up of the networks of experts 
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and policy makers that share for example similar backgrounds in education, 
who speak the same language to understand the societal problems at hand, or 
share a preference for a political party. The actors involved in this configuration 
share epistemologies and methodologies, and scientific tools such as models. 
Important in practices of science and policy interactions are materialities such as 
models, as expressions of scientific knowledge. Materialities can be performative 
in that they shape reality to resemble more the descriptions of that reality in those 
representations. Moreover, materialities are also political actors, and should also 
be treated this way.
Moreover, it can be useful to understand the interaction of science and policy 
and the way it is organised from a theatrical metaphor. Science is on stage in pres-
entations of reports and messages to policy makers, for example in the form of 
reports, white papers and debates in media. The backstage is the realm where 
the reports and messages are constructed in interaction with policy makers. The 
presentation on stage is in its turn the outcome of backstage processes, and is at 
the same time a representation of the role science advice should play in policy-
making: objective and distant and non-political, or involved and political as in 
the case of futurists. With respect to the on stage role of science advice, science 
advisory bodies that use the contingent strategy of inclusion seem to benefit from 
opening up backstage processes. Certain openness about backstage processes 
contributes to its authoritative position in the field. Science advisory bodies that 
employ the strategy of exclusion and expansion seem to benefit from closed 
backstage processes with respect to its role in science advice, whereas they benefit 
from openness about their tools.
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Samenvatting
Zonder wetenschappelijke kennis zou beleid er heel anders uitzien. Op het 
terrein van de (openbare) gezondheidszorg speelt wetenschappelijke kennis een 
belangrijke rol. Daarom is het van belang om inzicht te krijgen in de wijze waarop 
wetenschap en beleid met elkaar omgaan. Aan de hand van een aantal concrete 
casussen waarin wetenschappelijke kennis wordt ingezet voor beleid verken ik in 
dit proefschrift hoe wetenschappers en beleidsmakers tot bruikbare beleidsfeiten 
komen ten aanzien van de (openbare) gezondheidszorg. De nadruk ligt daarbij 
op de vraag naar de strategieën die wetenschappers hanteren, de consequenties 
die dat heeft voor de rol van wetenschap en wetenschappers in beleid, en voor de 
inhoud van het beleid ten aanzien van de zorg. Deze vragen vormen de kern van 
dit proefschrift. 
Hoofdstuk één gaat in op de verschillende theoretische perspectieven die er 
bestaan over de relatie tussen wetenschap en beleid en worden de verschillende 
wetenschappelijke concepten waarmee de relatie tussen wetenschap en beleid 
bekeken kan worden uiteen gezet. Tot aan de jaren negentig bestond er veel 
kritiek op de technocratische rol van wetenschap in beleid. Wetenschappelijke 
adviesorganen zouden te veel invloed hebben op de besluitvorming van de over-
heid, hetgeen leidde tot een pleidooi voor de democratisering van wetenschap-
pelijk advies. De laatste jaren wordt de roep om beter onderbouwd beleid in de 
publieke gezondheidszorg steeds groter. Dit gaat niet alleen over kleine en lokale 
interventies die bijvoorbeeld door ggd’en worden uitgevoerd, maar dit strekt zich 
ook uit tot het nationale overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van de (financiële) organi-
satie van de zorgsector, zoals die bijvoorbeeld in preventienota’s en de rijksbe-
grotingen (voorheen de zorgnota’s) van het Ministerie vws wordt geformuleerd. 
Overheidsbeleid moet onderbouwd worden met bewijsvoering van het nut en de 
effectiviteit van bepaald beleid waarbij beleid wordt gecontinueerd of stopgezet. 
Een complicerende factor bij het wetenschappelijk onderbouwen van beleid is dat 
er weinig onderzoek bestaat over de effecten van beleid. Bovendien vindt bestaand 
onderzoek onvoldoende de weg naar diegenen die beleid maken. Kortom, er 
bestaat een kloof tussen wetenschappelijke kennis aan de ene kant en beleid aan 
de andere kant. Hierbij wordt aan wetenschappelijke kennis vaak een objectieve 
en onafhankelijke positie toegeschreven, terwijl binnen het beleid de normatieve 
afwegingen worden gemaakt. Oplossingen die door wetenschappers worden 
aangedragen om deze kloof te overbruggen blijken minder effectief als gehoopt 
en vragen om een andere conceptualisering van de relatie tussen wetenschap en 
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beleid. Bovendien roept het vragen op over wat de specifieke rol van wetenschap in 
beleid nu zou moeten zijn. 
Wetenschap en techniek onderzoek evenals beleidswetenschappen bieden het 
inzicht dat beleidsprocessen geen lineaire processen zijn maar bestaan uit sociale 
interacties die nogal grillig kunnen verlopen. In het verlengde hiervan is de rol van 
wetenschap in beleid ook niet eenduidig. Dit heeft vooral betrekking op de manier 
waarop ‘feiten’ tot stand komen en de waarde die vervolgens aan die feiten wordt 
gegeven. Wetenschappelijke kennis kan ook worden gezien als de uitkomst van 
een onderhandelingsproces, van grenzenwerk tussen wetenschappers en beleids-
makers. Zo bezien kan wetenschappelijke kennis nooit losgezien worden van de 
sociale context waarin deze tot stand komt. Deze gesitueerdheid van wetenschap-
pelijke kennis maakt dat de manier waarop kennis tot stand komt van belang is 
bij het begrijpen van wetenschaps- en beleidsinteracties. Daarin zit meteen de 
noodzaak om deze interacties nader te bestuderen en beter te begrijpen. Daar 
komt nog bij dat het grenzenwerk tussen wetenschap en beleid en de uitkomsten 
van dit grenzenwerk, bepaald wordt door fysieke manifestaties van wetenschap-
pelijke kennis, ook wel de materialiteit van wetenschappelijk kennis genoemd. 
Dergelijke materialiteiten kunnen zijn: beschikbare theorie, beschikbare data, 
modellen, software programma’s, enzovoorts. Uit onderzoek naar economische 
modellen blijkt dat materialiteiten zelf ook als actor kunnen optreden. Dat wil 
zeggen dat zij ook acties kunnen genereren op zichzelf. Dit kan plaatsvinden 
zonder inmenging van mensen. Modellen hebben kortom performativiteit. Dit 
perspectief op de rol van wetenschap in beleid levert nieuwe inzichten op over 
de organisatie van dergelijke interacties en over de rol van wetenschappelijke 
kennis in beleid. Deze gebruik ik om de casussen die in het proefschrift worden 
besproken te analyseren. 
Hoofdstuk twee is een bespreking van de analyse van twee casussen, de 
constructie van het zorgmodel voor de bepaling van de macrokosten van de 
gezondheidszorg in een interdisciplinair team en het tot stand komen van de 
Volksgezondheid Toekomst Verkenning (vtv), een vierjaarlijks rapport waarin de 
gezondheidstoestand van de Nederlandse bevolking wordt beschreven. De nadruk 
ligt op de strategieën die ingezet worden door de verschillende wetenschappelijke 
adviesorganen om te komen tot voor hen werkbare samenwerking met verschil-
lende disciplines en beleidsorganen. Ik zet de metafoor van het theater in om deze 
strategieën beter te begrijpen. De institutionele plaats van beide organisaties 
in de beleidswereld beïnvloedt de manier waarop in beide organisaties gewerkt 
wordt, de zogeheten backstage van het wetenschappelijk advies, en op de manier 
waarop beide organisaties hun boodschappen presenteren aan de buitenwereld, 
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front stage. Aan de vtv wordt vaak de rol toegeschreven van vertolker van de 
belangen van de openbare gezondheidszorg, terwijl het cpb juist vaker techno-
cratische macht toegeschreven krijgt. De manier waarop beide organisaties hun 
rol in beleid begrijpen, heeft direct invloed op de organisatie van het werk binnen 
beide organisaties als op de manier waarop beide organisaties hun boodschappen 
brengen. Beide organisaties gebruiken verschillende strategieën, zowel backstage 
in de werkprocessen als op het podium naar de buitenwacht om de betrouwbaar-
heid en autoriteit van hun uitspraken in stand te houden of te verhogen. 
In hoofdstuk drie analyseer ik de constructie van het zorgmodel door een 
interdisciplinair team als een voorbeeld van grenzenwerk tussen verschillende 
disciplines binnen de wetenschap en betreffende beleidssectoren. Dit grenzenwerk 
wordt gekenmerkt door het bestaan van grensconfiguraties. Deze grensconfigura-
ties zijn gesitueerde en in elkaar grijpende verbindingen tussen wetenschappers, 
wetenschappelijke instituten en beleidsmakers die dezelfde probleemdefinities 
en (theoretische) oplossingsrichtingen met elkaar delen. Daarnaast worden deze 
verbindingen versterkt doordat deze ingebed zijn in specifieke sociale, talige en 
materiële zaken. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn het volgen van dezelfde studies, het 
spreken van dezelfde (theoretische) taal, het werken bij dezelfde werkgevers, en 
het beschikken over bijvoorbeeld dezelfde wetenschappelijke gereedschappen 
zoals modellen. Hierdoor hoeft men weinig moeite te doen om elkaar te begrijpen. 
Binnen de casus van het zorgmodel bleek al snel dat het macro economisch denken 
de overhand kreeg binnen de onderhandelingen die werden gevoerd tussen de 
drie partijen. Dit werd versterkt doordat de macro economische experts een sterke 
grensconfiguratie vormden met macro economisch geschoolde beleidsmakers van 
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport die de opdracht tot dit model 
hadden gegeven. Daarnaast beschikten de macro economische experts, in tegenstel-
ling tot de micro economische en epidemiologische experts, over instrumenten die 
hen in staat stelden om sneller en vaker modelparameters te testen. Dit versterkte de 
macro- economisch insteek van het model. Uiteindelijk viel het interdisciplinaire 
project uiteen, en kwam het model geheel onder de verantwoordelijkheid van het cpb 
tot stand. Hoewel het zorgmodel project niet als een geslaagd voorbeeld van samen-
werking van planbureaus kan worden bestempeld, heeft het wel zeker bijgedragen 
aan het expliciteren van de verschillende rollen van de verschillende planbureaus 
binnen de zorgsector. Zo heeft het cpb expertise opgedaan op een beleidsterrein 
waarop het vóór dit project niet of nauwelijks werkzaam was. Bovendien bestaat er 
nu een kennisinstrument waarmee de zorgsector macro economisch kan worden 
begrepen. Het zorgmodel vult hiermee een kennisleemte waarin niet eerder door 
andere planbureaus werd voorzien. 
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In hoofdstuk vier begrijp ik de vtv als kennisinstrument voor overheidsbeleid 
op het terrein van publieke gezondheid als een voorbeeld van wetenschap en 
beleidsinteracties als reflexieve en interactieve praktijken. Het uitgangspunt is 
inzicht te verkrijgen in de reikwijdte van deze nieuwe relatie tussen wetenschap en 
beleid. Hoewel in discussies over evidence based werken in de publieke gezondheid 
veel wordt gesproken over een reconceptualisering van de relatie tussen kennis en 
beleid, bestaan er in feite maar weinig voorbeelden die kunnen dienen als input 
voor een dergelijk reconceptualisering van wetenschap en beleidsinteracties. Aan 
de hand van de analyse van het werk van de vtv laat ik zien hoe zo n´ reconceptu-
alisering van wetenschap en beleidsinteracties eruit zou kunnen zien. Daarbij zet 
ik inzichten uit het wetenschapsonderzoek in om het werk van de vtv te duiden. 
De vtv heeft kunnen uitgroeien tot een krachtig en effectief beleidsinstrument 
doordat het een zeer groot netwerk om zich heen heeft gecreëerd waarmee zowel 
wetenschappelijke als beleidsmatige input is verzekerd. Bovendien kunnen er 
tussen deze wetenschappelijke kennis en de beleidsmatige input op verschillende 
manieren interacties plaatsvinden. Interessant genoeg worden wetenschappers 
en beleidsmakers zelden rechtstreeks met elkaar geconfronteerd om discussies te 
vermijden en de aandacht niet af te leiden van de beleidsprioriteiten en de belang-
rijkste beleidsboodschappen. 
Deze manier van confronteren van beleid met kennis leidt in veel gevallen tot 
het ontstaan van nieuwe wetenschappelijke beleidsfeiten. De kennis die de vtv 
aanlevert is daarom hybride van aard; het is zowel wetenschappelijk als beleids-
matig gevormd en komt tegemoet aan de eisen van beide werelden. In die zin is 
de vtv als reflexief instrument in staat om enerzijds tegemoet te komen aan het 
idee dat wetenschap en beleid verschillende werelden zijn die moeilijk nader tot 
elkaar komen, terwijl het anderzijds uitgaat van het idee dat wetenschap alleen 
iets kan brengen aan beleidsmakers als de beleidsvragen en de kennisproductie 
hand in hand gaan. Het instrument vtv bouwt voort op een interactief en reflexief 
begrip van de rol van wetenschap in beleid; wetenschap–beleid interacties kunnen 
alleen effectief zijn als zij lokaal en gesitueerd zijn. Het beleidsprobleem en het 
wetenschappelijk probleem zijn zodanig geformuleerd dat deze de beleidsmatige 
elementen en de wetenschappelijke elementen evenredig en werkbaar in zich 
dragen. Zonder dit uitgangspunt is de kans groot dat de uitkomsten van onder-
zoek in een la verdwijnen en beleid wordt gemaakt zonder evidence.
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt ingegaan op het effect dat wetenschappelijke modellen 
kunnen hebben op beleidsvorming. Ik doe dat in dit hoofdstuk door enerzijds 
modellen te zien als grensobjecten die verschillende sociale werelden aan elkaar 
verbinden. Anderzijds laat ik zien hoe deze grensobjecten zelf ook de werelden 
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die zij aan elkaar verbinden gewild of ongewild veranderen. Ik ga hierbij uit van 
het idee van grensobjecten dat Star en Griesemer in 1989 hebben geïntroduceerd, 
en het idee van performativiteit dat door Callon is uitgewerkt. Het begrip grens-
object is nuttig als het gaat om het begrijpen van het hybride, of samengestelde 
karakter van wetenschappelijke modellen en de rol die deze modellen hebben 
bij de coördinatie van verschillende sociale werelden. Daar staat tegenover dat 
een dergelijke sociologische of symbolisch interactionistische opvatting over de 
functie van modellen in de interacties tussen wetenschap en beleid uitgaat van 
het idee dat, hoewel sociale werelden met elkaar kunnen interacteren, zij door de 
interacties niet veranderen maar juist stabiel blijven. De case studies laten nu juist 
zien dat modellen twee functies kunnen hebben: ze zijn in de eerste plaats zelf 
de uitkomst van onderhandelingen tussen wetenschappers en beleidsmakers, en 
van het samenbrengen van netwerken en materialiteiten zoals bestaande theorie, 
en data. Tegelijkertijd scheppen modellen een bepaalde werkelijkheid die toe 
bijdraagt dat deze geconstrueerde werkelijkheid als startpunt, als een waarheid 
dient voor verdere actie. In die zin zijn modellen in staat om sociale werelden te 
verbinden en deze ook te veranderen. 
Hoofdstuk zes gaat verder in op het idee van performativiteit van weten-
schappelijke kennis door aan de hand van drie casussen te laten zien welke 
invloed materiële verschijningsvormen van wetenschap kunnen hebben in de 
vormgeving van in dit geval de zorgsector. De vooronderstelling dat de markt de 
problemen in de zorg oplost, ondanks de vele bezwaren uit de zorgsector zelf, is 
in 2006 omgezet tot een beleidsprogramma. Deze beleidsverandering wordt vaak 
verklaard als een proces van policy learning. Dit uitgangspunt van policy learning 
wordt in dit hoofdstuk aangevuld met het inzicht dat materiële manifestaties van 
wetenschap eveneens belangrijk zijn in het slagen van een dergelijk beleidspro-
gramma. Uitgaande van Callons idee van performativiteit en de cases studies, laat 
ik zien hoe wetenschap- en beleidsinteracties bijdragen aan de co-constructie van 
materiële gereedschappen die op hun beurt bijdragen aan het bouwen van een 
macro economisch of g´ereguleerd competitief´ raamwerk voor de zorgsector. Ik 
concludeer dat het idee van competitie in de zorg geen natuurlijke gegeven is. In 
tegendeel, het creëren van competitie in de zorg vereist veel werk en veel mate-
riële gereedschappen zoals het zorgmodel en het risicovereveningsysteem. Elk 
gereedschap is een specifieke verwezenlijking of materialisering van deze vorm 
van competitie. Om deze reden zijn materiële gereedschappen centrale actoren 
binnen de productie van een markt voor de zorgsector. Een andere conclusie die 
hieruit volgt is dat een markt zo competitief is als de gereedschappen die deze 
markt mogelijk moeten maken. 
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Hoofdstuk zeven keert, op basis van de eerdere hoofdstukken, terug naar de 
vragen die werden gesteld in het eerste hoofdstuk; hoe komen wetenschappers 
en beleidsmakers tot vruchtbare samenwerking? Welke strategieën hanteren 
wetenschappers daarbij en welke consequenties heeft dat voor de rol en functie 
van wetenschap en wetenschappers en voor de inhoud van het beleid ten aanzien 
van de zorg? De belangrijkste conclusies zijn dat wetenschappelijke adviesorganen 
verschillende strategieën inzetten om tot effectieve en betrouwbare kennis voor 
beleid te komen. Zo worden exclusie en inclusie strategieën ingezet, en strategieën 
om nabij het beleid te blijven, maar ook weer niet te dichtbij. Welke strategieën 
ingezet worden is deels afhankelijk van de institutionele context van adviesor-
ganen in het politiek-bestuurlijke bestel, maar is tegelijkertijd afhankelijk van de 
grensconfiguraties waarin deze adviesorganen zich bevinden. Grensconfiguraties 
bestaan zoals gezegd uit gesitueerde en in elkaar grijpende verbindingen tussen 
wetenschappers en wetenschappelijke instituten en beleidsmakers. Zij delen 
bovendien dezelfde probleemdefinities en (theoretische) oplossingsrichtingen. 
Daarnaast worden de verbindingen versterkt doordat deze ingebed zijn in specifieke 
sociale, talige en materiële elementen. Wetenschappelijke modellen bijvoorbeeld, 
scheppen een bepaalde werkelijkheid waarna mensen die met modellen werken de 
geconstrueerde werkelijkheid in de modellen als startpunt aannemen. Daarmee 
krijgt deze specifieke geconstrueerde werkelijkheid meer gewicht ten opzichte van 
een eventuele andere (nog niet) geconstrueerde werkelijkheid. Dergelijke materia-
liteiten hebben politieke gevolgen en moeten als zodanig behandeld worden.
Daarnaast kan het nuttig zijn om de interactie tussen en de organisatie 
van wetenschap en beleid te begrijpen vanuit de eerder besproken theater meta-
foor. De presentatie van wetenschap op het podium vindt plaats in de vorm van 
beleidsboodschappen, rapporten en debatten in verschillende media. In de back-
stage vinden de onderhandelingen plaats over de beleidsboodschappen samen 
met beleidsmakers. De manier waarop wetenschap wordt gepresenteerd is een 
uitkomst van de onderhandelingen in de backstage en representeert tegelijkertijd 
de wenselijke rol van wetenschap in beleid, namelijk als objectief, afstandelijk 
en non-politiek of andersom juist wel politiek geëngageerd. Wetenschappelijke 
adviesorganen hebben er baadt bij om open te zijn over wat er gaande is in de 
backstage, omdat dit bijdraagt aan hun betrouwbaarheid. Deze openheid strekt 
zich uit van openheid over de constructie van de gebruikte modellen tot openheid 
over de inclusie van expertise. 
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Dankwoord
Het uitvoeren van een promotie onderzoek is net zo goed de uitkomst van een 
onderhandelingsproces, als de rol van wetenschappelijke kennis is beleid dat is. 
Dat geldt in elk geval voor mijn onderzoek. Die onderhandelingen gingen over 
de opzet en de inhoud van het onderzoek, maar ook over de hoeveelheid tijd die 
ik voor dit onderzoek nodig had. Op de plek wil ik iedereen bedanken die mij de 
afgelopen jaren heeft geholpen bij deze ‘onderhandelingen’, of die er gewoonweg 
voor mij waren!
Allereerst wil ik Mark Berg en Roland Bal bedanken omdat zij mij aannamen 
op het cpb project en omdat zij mijn begeleiders waren. Mark Berg nam als eerste 
de rol van promotor op zich. Hoewel je rol kort duurde, heb ik je inspirerende 
en kritische opmerkingen altijd als zeer behulpzaam ervaren. Bovendien zijn je 
opmerkingen gedurende het hele project een bron van inspiratie geweest. Roland 
Bal, als copromotor heb je me in de eerste jaren veel steun verleend in de onder-
zoeksfase, en bij het vinden van analytische begrippen om de hoeveelheid en de 
strekking van het empirisch materiaal te ordenen. Roland, als geen ander kun je 
conceptueel denken integreren met het echte leven: voor mij ben jij het levende 
voorbeeld van hoe je als mens privé en beroep sts-style kunt combineren: maak 
van je woonkamer tegelijkertijd je werkkamer! Dank voor je vertrouwen in mij. 
Ten tweede wil ik hier de verschillende planbureaus –het Centraal Planbureau, 
het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau en het centrum Volksgezondheid Toekomst 
Verkenning van het rivm– bedanken voor hun gastvrijheid en hulp bij het 
uitvoeren van dit onderzoek. Dit promotieonderzoek kwam voort uit een acad-
emische interesse naar de specifieke rol van Nederlandse planbureaus bij het tot 
stand komen van beleid. Nederlandse planbureaus hebben een unieke plek in 
Nederlands beleid, en wellicht zijn nergens ter wereld experts zo nauw verweven 
met beleidsmakers als in Nederland. Deze unieke rol maakt planbureaus ook 
kwetsbaar voor kritiek vanuit velerlei richtingen. Juist daarom was het spannend 
om een kijkje te mogen nemen in de keuken van deze planbureaus. Ik wil speciaal 
de volgende mensen bedanken: ten eerste de vorige directeur van het cpb, Henk 
Don, voor zijn tijd en scheppen van de mogelijkheid om bij het cpb rond te lopen, 
Jacqueline Timmerhuis die zeer veel werk heeft verricht om mij wegwijs te maken 
in de archieven van het cpb. Er was weinig dat aan haar aandacht ontsnapt als het 
gaat om het cpb. Verder wil ik hier de verschillende projectleiders en (oud) medew-
erkers bedanken voor hun tijd en bereidheid om steeds weer (schijnbaar) dezelfde 
vragen te beantwoorden. Verder wil ik de directeur van het scp, Paul Schnabel, 
bedanken voor zijn bereidheid commentaar te leveren op een eerste analyse van 
de casus over het zorgmodel. Ook wil ik de verschillende projectleiders en (oud) 
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medewerkers van het scp bedanken die ik heb mogen interviewen. Bij het rivm 
wil ik graag Hans van Oers en Guus de Hollander bedanken dat zij het mogelijk 
maakten dit onderzoek te doen. Ook wil ik alle medewerkers bedanken die ik de 
afgelopen jaren heb gesproken en geïnterviewd. Zonder hun tijd, openheid en 
vertrouwen was dit proefschrift nooit mogelijk geweest. 
Een proefschrift is in veel opzichten een eenzaam proces, maar gelukkig zijn 
er veel mensen geweest die mij zeer hebben bijgestaan de afgelopen jaren. Ik heb 
zeer goede herinneringen aan de ‘Torentje overleggen’. De vele discussies over 
grenzenwerk en andere symbolisch interactionistische begrippen waren soms 
confronterend maar altijd inspirerend. Dank aan allen die daar regelmatig bij 
waren: Willem Halffman als de coördinator van het Rethinking project (waarvan 
mijn project een onderdeel was), en verder in alfabetische orde, Dave Huitema, 
Esther Turnhout, Peter Scholten, Peter Stauvermann, Ragna Zeiss, en Udo Pesch. 
Annick de Vries, jou wil ik ook bedanken, ook omdat je erg fijn conferentie gezels-
chap bent. Verder wil ik Annemiek Nelis en Paul Wouters bedanken voor hun rol 
als coördinatoren van wtmc voor de vele inspireerde en leerzame bijeenkomsten. 
En natuurlijk iedereen die daar als PhD student aanwezig was, en speciaal Babette 
Mueller-Rockstroh en Susan van t´ Klooster voor de inhoudelijke bijdragen aan 
mijn denkproces. 
Verder wil ik hier graag al mijn naaste colleges van Healthcare Governance 
bedanken voor de vele inspirerende maandaglunches. En speciaal Sam Adams, 
Katharina Paul, Kim Putters en Tom van der Grinten voor kritische en behulp-
zame opmerkingen waarmee ik mijn artikelen kon verbeteren, Teun Zuiderent-
Jerak en Sonja Jerak-Zuiderent voor discussies over Callon en performativiteit, en 
Annemiek Stoopendaal voor alle andere discussies. Ook wil ik hier graag mijn 
(oud) kamergenoten Semiha Denktas, Yvonne Jansen, Marleen de Mul bedanken 
voor hun emotionele steun. Dat geldt ook voor Hester van de Bovenkamp, en 
Jolanda Dwarswaard: omdat er naast promoveren nog zoveel meer is dat om 
serieuze aandacht vraagt. En Anuska Chote, omdat promoveren wel belangrijk is! 
Iris Wallenburg, voor het lezen van de ‘laatste’ versie van mijn conclusies. Verder 
wil ik speciaal bedanken Marja Wille-Buurman voor haar professionele interesse 
en steun in de eerste jaren van mijn project, en Rolph Pagano voor zijn enthousiaste 
en kritische steun tijdens de laatste fases van mijn proefschrift. En Rigini Werner 
voor de laatste verbeteringen aan het Engels.
Zoals gezegd, het schrijven van een proefschrift is ook een onderhandeling-
sproces over tijd. Gelukkig kan een proefschrift niet geschreven worden zonder 
tijd vrijaf. Daarom wil ik iedereen bedanken die mij deze tijd heeft gegeven voor 
hun liefhebbende en gezonde (des)interesse in mijn proefschrift! Zonder jullie 
was dit allemaal nooit gelukt en was het allemaal een stuk saaier geweest. In het 
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bijzonder: Nienke Maseland, de wijnclub, Josien Pieterse, Sandra Langendijk, 
Huong Ngo, Petra de Vries, Cas Bool voor hulp met de referenties, Rob Westendorp 
voor de lay out en de omslag, Gordon Phillips voor hulp bij het Engels, mijn broers 
en zussen Maartje, Thomas, Joep, Liselot and Joris van Egmond (voor alles natu-
urlijk) en Roosmarijn van Egmond in het bijzonder voor je hulp met de referenties, 
en Annuska Overgaag en Arnie Theel als schoonfamilie. Verder natuurlijk mijn 
ouders en ouderachtigen: Anna Huisman en Paul Ditiecher, Piet van Egmond 
en Nellie van Egmond- Priester, Ben Gerrits van den Ende en Martha Esvelt voor 
al jullie vertrouwen, en Jan Seijbel voor je commentaar op eerdere versies van 
artikelen in dit proefschrift. Verder mijn schoonouders Erik Kriek sr en Eeva Kriek 
Tuovinen, ook omdat jullie altijd bereid waren om op Clovis te passen. Natuurlijk 
eerst en vooral mijn levenspartner Erik Kriek en mijn zoon Clovis Kriek. Erik, 
dank voor al je steun en vertrouwen! Clovis, gewoon voor het feit dat je er bent. 
Zonder jullie zou het leven kaal en leeg zijn. 
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In the field of health policy, the role of scientific knowledge is 
significant, and trends towards more involvement. The growing 
need for scientific knowledge points to the tension between the 
need for more evidence-based policy, and fear of a technocratic 
and uncritical role of science in policy-making. This paradox of 
scientific authority emphasises the importance of questions about 
the role of science in policy making: how do scientists and policy 
makers come to useful facts, how do they negotiate the processes 
involved in applying scientific knowledge in policy–making, and to 
what consequences for the shaping of Dutch health policy. This 
thesis investigates these questions inspired by the concepts 
boundary work and performativity. This book contributes to 
discussions on science and policy interactions. The book is not 
only relevant for researchers of the science policy boundary, but 
also for policy makers, politicians and others who have an interest  
in the role of science in policy.
